Department of Marketing

Videography in Consumer Culture Theory

An Account of Essence(s) and Production

Joel Hietanen

Aalto University

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

Joel Hietanen Videography in Consumer Culture Theory

Aalto University

Aalto University publication series
DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS 78/2012

Videography in Consumer Culture Theory: An Account of Essence(s) and Production

Joel Hietanen

Aalto University
School of Economics
Department of Marketing

Aalto University publication series
DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS 78/2012

ISBN 978-952-60-4661-7 (printed)
ISBN 978-952-60-4662-4 (pdf)
ISSN-L 1799-4934
ISSN 1799-4934 (printed)
ISSN 1799-4942 (pdf)

Unigrafia Oy
Helsinki 2012

Finland

Publication orders (printed book):
joel.hietanen@aalto.fi

Author
Joel Hietanen

Name of the doctoral dissertation
Videography in Consumer Culture Theory: An Account of Essence(s) and Production

Publisher School of Economics

Unit Department of Marketing

Series Aalto University publication series DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS 78/2012

Field of research Consumer Culture Theory (CCT)

Abstract

Liberated into the online virtual spaces through digitalization, video media has become an omnipresent part of our lives. Simultaneously, the videographic method for conducting and expressing ethnographic research has received increasing attention in the field of consumer culture theory (CCT). Yet, as is the usual case with nascent and still marginal research orientations, the publications about the method have been relatively descriptive, and thus have not explored the potential of the approach from a philosophical perspective. This dissertation addresses this gap and develops a possible ontology and epistemology for conducting and expressing research on video media. How is videographic expression different compared to text and photography? What could it be like to experience it? While such a philosophical account of essence(s) in video work in CCT calls for establishment, there is also a need to further consider issues about the production of videographic research on a workbench level, i.e. what the production of such visual ethnographic research is like.

In this study an epistemology of videographic relation is constructed, in a bricolage fashion, by adapting 'postmodern' perspectives from 'poststructuralist', 'radical humanist' and a Deleuzian 'superior empiricist' perspectives. This Deleuzian approach eschews the objectifying and Cartesian logic of representation and any correspondence between video and a reality that is often attributed to the videographic image. Instead, I will present possibilities for evocative relations of affect and embodiment that have the potential to emancipate thought and thus constitute an efficacious relation towards the world. Adopting key notions from Deleuzian philosophy of cinematography, I will also provide concrete approaches from my three earlier videographic projects, in order to bring these abstract notions into practice by utilizing various aesthetics of the moving image, thus extending the toolkit of aspiring videography researchers in CCT.

Keywords videography, visual ethnography, Deleuze, poststructuralism, radical humanism, practice theory, non-represational theory, relation

ISBN (printed) 978-952-60-4661-7 **ISBN (pdf)** 978-952-60-4662-4

ISSN-L 1799-4934 **ISSN (printed)** 1799-4934 **ISSN (pdf)** 1799-4942

Location of publisher Espoo **Location of printing** Helsinki **Year** 2012

Pages 233

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I wish to thank our department head at the Aalto School of Economics Department of Marketing, professor and my supervisor Henrikki Tikkanen, for not only allowing but also actively supporting this unorthodox and unconventional work. His passion is the true passion of an academic – to not be content with the status quo, but to actively criticize and develop scholarly discussion.

I was also honored with the renowned professors Russell Belk (York University) and Jeff Murray (University of Arkansas) serving as the preliminary examiners for my work. Their comments, not to mention encouragement have been invaluable.

I wish to extend my gratitude to assistant professor Joonas Rokka, who by some fortuitous happenstance stumbled on the idea to conduct videographic research in the first place. He is a mildly mannered man who does not shy away from a challenge.

I wish to also extend my heartfelt gratitude to all the international scholars I have had the fortune to cross paths with. Thank you for further blowing life on the flame of unconventional approaches to consumer research. I especially mean you guys, professors Robert Kozinets, John Schouten, Diane Martin, Avi Shankar, Markus Giesler, Robin Canniford, Marylouise Caldwell, Paul Henry, Eric Arnould, Sammy Toyoki, Kristine De Valck, Alexandre Schwob, Johanna Moisander and Geoffrey Easton.

Professor Tikkanen was all for employing interesting and curious people. One such recruitment was Henri Weijo, with whom I have had my most interesting (and sometimes also quite heated) theoretical discussions. Our work will go on! The same applies to Antti Sihvonen, Sammy Toyoki, Mikko Laukkanen, Andrei Botez, Juho-Petteri Huhtala, Jari Salo and Anastasia Seregina (to mention just a few from our fantastic and fascinating faculty), who always performed the role of trustworthy sounding boards for developing many of my nascent ideas. In addition, I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to Metropolitan of Helsinki, Ambrosius for his support during these years and his help with organizing the day of the defense.

I wish to also thank all of my collaborators. Joonas and Kristine you already know, the other video enthusiasts were, to name only a few, Risto Roman, Hannu Uotila, Karolus Viitala, Henri Myöhänen, Niklas Lindroos and Elina Koivisto. Whether from the doctoral student circles or from my Master's Thesis seminar group on videography, thank you for all for our travels! I'm sure that further congregations will follow.

In addition, I am indebted by all the support given to me by the Department of Marketing and various initiatives, most notably MediaMark heralded by professor Pekka Mattila. He has been a great supporter of this work and has

always been able to negotiate ample funding for diverse and interesting research without sacrificing the academic value of any research project. I wish to also recognize the support I have received in the form of grants from the Finnish Foundation for Economic Education (LSR), Jenni and Antti Wihuri Foundation, Marcus Wallenberg Foundation and the Helsinki School of Economics Foundation.

I can neither forget Helsinki Cyclone and the Voodoo collective for a radiant past and many brilliant research opportunities. Let our travels continue.

Finally, I wish to thank Hanna-Maija Lahtinen for copious amounts of grammar-related help as well as putting up with me. Likewise, I wish to thank my family for their love and support. I know I can be a handful.

Contents

Acknowledgements ..... **i**

Contents ..... **iii**

List of Images and 'Videography notes' ..... **vii**

I Introduction **1**

1.1 Video? Video Media? Videography? *1*

1.2 An Introduction to Extant Streams of Videographic Inquiry *6*

1.2.1 Visual Anthropology 6

1.2.2 Art and Visual Culture 7

1.2.3 Videography in Managerial and Usability Studies 8

1.3 A Preface to 'An Account of Essence(s)' *9*

1.4 A Preface to 'Production' *12*

II An Account of Essence(s) **13**

2.1 What Could a Medium Like Video be Like? *13*

2.2 Levels of Analysis: Video as Method *15*

2.2.1 What Is the Video Media? 15

2.3 Consumer Research: Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) *21*

2.3.1 Background in Alternative Ways of Seeking Knowledge 22

2.3.2 The Hunt Versus Anderson Debate 25

2.3.3 Constructivist Ontology, Interpretive Epistemology, Emerging Criteria as well as Early and Lingering Realism 33

2.3.4 Various Epistemological and Methodological Approaches for Different Takes on Knowledge 36

2.3.5 Early Proliferations of CCT's Interpretive Epistemologies 42

2.3.6 Videography in CCT 44

2.4 Videography in CCT, a Deleuzian Perspective *49*

2.4.1 Sense, Event, Series, Singularity 52

2.4.2 Deleuze on Empirical Inquiry and Research 57

2.4.3 How Deleuze Brings about New Relations through Humor, Paradox and Free Indirect Discourse 61

2.4.4 Deleuze on Representation 65

2.5 Deleuze on Cinema Applied to Video *70*

2.5.1 What is Cinema when Seen as the Movement-Image? 72

2.6. Types of Movement-Image *75*

2.6.1 Perception-Image 76

2.6.2 Affection-Image 79

2.6.3 Action-Image 82

2.6.4 Reflection-Image 87

2.6.5 Relation-Image 88

2.7 Types of Time-Image *92*

2.7.1 Hyalosigns: Time as a Break in the Sensory-Motor Schema 95

2.7.2 Chronosigns: Time as a Break in Linearity and an Extension into Relation 97

2.7.3 On the Limits of the Time-Image: Images as Thought, Sight and Sounds 99
2.7.4 Relinkages of the Aural Dimension of the Movement-Image 102
2.8 Moving Image as an Embodied and Co-creative Experience 108
2.8.1 Reciprocity of the Cinematographic Experience and its Qualities 108
2.8.2 Moving Image as Tactile/Haptic Surfaces 112
2.8.3 Types of Embodiment 118
2.8.4 Skin 122
2.8.5 Musculature 124
2.8.6 Viscera 125
2.8.7 Experience of Mimesis as the Evoker of 'Action Tendencies' 127
2.9 On Social Practices and Space 134
2.9.1 Practice Theory 135
2.9.2 Non-Representational Theory 139
III Videography in CCT: Elements of Essence(s) and Relation 148
3.1 (Post)Overview of a Heretical Journey so Far(ther) 148
3.2 Video Medium Contra Textual and Photographic Expression 149
3.3 Videography and the Epistemology of Relation – Implications for Videographic Work in CCT 159
3.3.1 Adding to Existing 'Criteria' 162
3.4 Final (In)Complete Contemplations 167
IV An Account of Production 176
4.1 Linkages to Essence(s) 176
4.1.1 Focusing on the Relational Contexts (*in situ*) 177
4.1.2 What about the Camera's Presence and 'Truth-manipulation' 179
4.1.3 On Autoethnography and Research Team Interaction 181
4.2 Notes on 'Brothers in Paint': A Practice Theoretical Inquiry into a Tribal Marketplace Culture (BIP) 186
4.2.1 Foreword 186
4.2.2 Notes on Some Notable Problematics 186
4.2.3 A Note on Theoretical Implications 190
4.3 Notes on 'Pushing the Scene': Tensions and Emergence in an Accelerated Marketplace Culture (PTS) 190
4.3.1 Foreword 190
4.3.2 Notes on Some Notable Problematics 191
4.3.3 A Note on Theoretical Implications 196
4.4. Notes on 'Post-Materialist Work': Dreams as Fetishes (PMW) 197
4.4.1 Foreword 197
4.4.2 Notes on Some Notable Problematics 198
4.4.3 A Note on Theoretical Implications 199
References 201

Appendix 1 ..... **217**
Appendix 2 ..... **218**

List of Images and 'Videography notes'

Videography note 1 18
Videography note 2 53
Videography note 3 56
Videography note 4 63
Videography note 5 78
Videography note 6 81
Videography note 7 85
Videography note 8 88
Videography note 9 90
Videography note 10 98
Videography note 11 103
Videography note 12 107
Videography note 13 116
Videography note 14 120
Videography note 15 122
Image 1 133
Videography note 16 138
Image 2 165
Videography note 17 166
Image 3 177
Videography note 18 193

"The obstinancy of reality is overcome, as the recalcitrance of the mind, in the generosity, the sharing, the resolution of conflict in hyperreality"

Sean Cubitt

I Introduction

1.1 Video? Video Media? Videography?

> "the dominant cultural form of the twentieth century is, and has been, cinema, and now video. Only modernist formulations argue that we inhabit a print culture. We live instead in a video, cinematic age, where the cinematic apparatus intervenes between the material world and everyday, lived experience" (Norman Denzin)

Today, video media has become an ubiquitous part of our lives through cinema, TV, documentaries (of various forms) and visual art. Yet, facilitated by digitization, the widespread proliferation and accessibility of information over the Internet seems to mark the most profound changes in how we acquire, view, and experience video media thus expressing and producing culture. From the perspective of videography in consumer culture theory (CCT – see Arnould and Thompson [2005; 2007] for a comprehensive overview) research, it is this relationship I set out to address. Specifically, a possibility for an ontology and epistemology for conducting and publishing research on video media warrants interest. While such a philosophical account of Essence(s) in video work in consumer research calls for establishment, there is also a need to further consider issues about the production of such work on a workbench level.

Conducting and representing academic research by utilizing videographic methodologies is by no means a novel approach. Various streams have explored the medium since the early 20th century, far before digitalization or the advent of the video format (e.g. Russell 1999; Ruby 2000; Pink 2001, 2006). Also, visual expression on film and video has long been debated in the domain of visual arts (e.g. Cubitt 1993; Jenkins 2008; Leighton 2008). Today, we also have the possibility to consider examples also from the fields of usability design (Greenbaum and Kyng 1991; Ylirisku and Buur 2007), documentary production (e.g. Bernard 2007; Artis 2008), business-to-business marketing (Borghini, Carù and Cova 2010) and importantly, consumer research (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007a; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). In the realm of consumer research, specifically in the subfield of CCT, the videographic method has been recently growing in popularity in a rapid fashion (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 2010).

In addition to academic journal articles, the most notable evidence of the increasing adoption of video in consumer research has been its growing presence in the conferences of the Association for Consumer Research (ACR), with Russell Belk and Robert Kozinets heralding the annual 'Film Festivals' in the previous decade at the North American conference (Belk and Kozinets 2005b). The passing years have witnessed the tradition becoming also adopted by the European, South American and Asian conference venues (Belk and Kozinets 2010). Furthermore, the journal *Consumption, Markets & Culture* has come out with two special 'DVD issues' (see Appendix 2 for a table of the publications in the two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; Vol. 10]), dedicated to videographic publications. Yet, even with such early proliferation of academic video work, a plethora of questions about ontology, epistemology and methodology of videographic research await further consideration. And while this growing interest in the videographic method can certainly inspire, and in and of its own, provide a mandate for this study, a degree of humility is needed when we orientate towards the considerable amount of work that waits to be conducted. In this study some early accounts are developed further and a few novel ones are provided.

An initial driving force for this study emerged from a seminar in 2008, where I presented some early video work. Surprisingly, the mere notion of academic research as videography sparked a wholesale controversy in the audience, even as I had barely pushed open the starting gates in the discussion. The primary concerns of the audience can be paraphrased as follows:

- "Videography can't be serious academic work, it is in the realm of art and entertainment!"

- "You can surely manipulate your audience as much as you want in video representation!"

- "There is no way to find rigorous methods for representing academic studies on video media!"

In this study, a thorough consideration of these concerns (and many others) is pursued. From the outset it is clear that all of them are inherently linked to more complex questions about the ontological and epistemological nature of the medium (in CCT, for the present purposes), which has, apart from the few publications, still received relatively little interest. It seems that the various fields of academic videographic research, no matter how long they have been experimenting with video, have been more interested in experimentation than conceptual work on the nature of the medium. Additionally, this

experimentation has been generally contained within the respective fields with very little cross-pollination.

Certainly, the dichotomy of art/science is a pressing one, but as we will soon see, contemporary videographers who have come to understand the requirements of reflexive research from a postmodern/poststructural perspective can offer ways to respond to this concern. Considering the question of manipulation naturally refers to the need to understand the differences between the ontology and epistemology of video and the dominant paradigm of textual academic expression. The final concern is a normative one. What kinds of methods would we like to expect in conducting good videographic work, without limiting the opportunities for creativity, reflexivity and expression? To date, no specific criteria exist. And more importantly, should/could such criteria exist?

This directs the present work toward two avenues of inquiry. First, the discussion about possible ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the videographic method in CCT is furthered – what is it about doing research on video that warrants interest? Second, we need an account of the normative side of videographic work – how should it be conducted and to what ends? These questions are naturally greatly intertwined.

To approach these questions, the extant usage of the video media across various fields of inquiry is briefly assessed. Subsequently, video media is further conceptualized in the field of CCT. These early explorations have led this work into considering the philosophical underpinnings of the nature of human interaction in spatiotemporal settings and their expression across different media. Moreover, both the aesthetic form of audiovisual moving image and how it is experienced seemed to require extensive consideration. Additionally, the practice of conducting and representing videographic research within more established academic discourses, and importantly, its pragmatic purpose in academia called for close scrutiny. These contemplations are exemplified through three large-scale ethnographic videography projects that were conducted by my research fellows and myself (Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010; Hietanen and Uotila 2012; Hietanen, Rokka and Roman 2012).

I will make continuous references to these videographies throughout this study. A textual synopsis of those videographies is provided in the sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. The goal is not to seek validation of my epistemological positions, but rather to illustrate their possibilities. The videographies can be found online as follows:

Hietanen, Rokka and Roman (2012), 'Pushing the Scene' – Tensions and Emergence in an Accelerated Marketplace Culture

- *http://vimeo.com/32192229* - Hereafter abbreviated 'PTS'.

Hietanen and Uotila (2012), 'Post-Materialist Work' – Dreams as Fetishes

- *http://vimeo.com/30893212* - Hereafter abbreviated 'PMW'.

Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck (2009), 'Brothers in Paint' – A Practice-Oriented Inquiry into a Tribal Marketplace Culture

- *http://vimeo.com/36543163* - Hereafter abbreviated 'BIP'.

The insights from the field, the editing table, video/paper submissions, and attending numerous conferences to showcase and discuss videographic research act as a pragmatic sounding board against which to construct and evaluate the present philosophical reasoning and practical ideas for production.

The goal of this research is to provide perspectives to one over-arching research question, what is so special about academic research conducted by videographic methodology? Due to the relative novelty of the methodology in the CCT tradition, this grand question becomes quickly filtered into a set of more specific subquestions. These questions range from the specific character of video as a media, its epistemological nature, its role in CCT, the nature of the research team and the nature of the audience. These questions will be addressed in turn.

While this study utilizes three published videographies as illustrative examples, it is not about them. Instead, I will attempt to construct a possible ontology and epistemology of videographic work in CCT – in effect conducting an inquiry that is steeped in the philosophical rather than the empirical. I began this work by familiarizing myself with CCT publications that have to do with videography and the critique(s) of representation. This postmodern reading directed me to a Deleuzean philosophy of cinematography and furthermore to various scholars utilizing a Deleuzian underpinning in their analysis of the embodiment of the moving image and the contextual production of representation and emergent relations. In addition, in somewhat of a bricoleur 'quilt-making' fashion (see e.g. Denzin and Lincoln 2005), I have gone over a gamut of works by other scholars that make claims about the moving image in line with much contemporary continental postmodern/poststructuralist philosophy. This is accompanied with a visitation to other academic discourses utilizing the moving image in their research activities. Through these readings, an image of the potential of the video medium began to coalesce – one that I am sharing with you as we go through these lines. This is thus not a typical marketing/consumer

research study, it comprises not of 'rigorous' research, but rather it is one of conceptual investigation.

In this study, the terms video and video media are used interchangeably. They express the medium of the video and refer to its digital nature, and with it, its (online) accessibility and simultaneous democratization. Video is not to be confused with film, which refers to its predecessor, a projector light shined through moving still images creating an illusion of the moving image. Videography refers to the entire methodology of the production of an expression via moving image, but it also means the finished product of the videographic work. This is no mistake. Videography in consumer research is to be taken as a holistic concept, as the production, the practice, and the dissemination of academic video work, and is, as a hermeneutic endeavor, inseparable from the finished product – the *show*. Likewise, two conceptualizations need to be introduced here. In my use of the term 'moving image' I mean to express the contemporary form of an image set in movement accompanied with sound – the 'audiovisual moving image'. While I am well aware of the silent cinema of yore, this research will not make many references to this form – when they are made I will attempt to make the distinction explicit. Additionally, the reader may note, that unlike several works describing the epistemology of text, photography, moving image or sound, I will be very hesitant to use concepts like 'representation' or 'reproduction' in my subsequent analysis. Instead, following a Deleuzian reading by Massumi (2002), I will generally adopt the term 'expression' for my purposes, where the concept is distinguished from the realist perspective of representation, which assumes an external world and possible objective descriptions of it. Here expression is not *about* the world but *constitutive* of it. Thus, expression is always a part of the world's creation, not a description of it as any given static state, or as stated by Massumi (2002):

> "The subject does not express the system. It is an expression of the system. The system expresses itself in its subjects' every 'chosen' deed and mystified word" (p. xvi). "Expression is always on the move, always engrossed in its own course, overspilling individual experience, nomadically evading responsibility. It is self-transporting, serially across experiences" (p. xxi)

I hope the reasons for this will become clear in the course of reading this work, but particularly in the sections dealing with the concept 'representation' (see 2.4.4).

This introductory section to this doctoral study is further structured as follows. Next, a brief overview of extant academic streams that have displayed interest in the videographic method is presented. This account is necessarily a concise one, and attempts to raise very basic but pertinent issues in each of the literary streams. Also, I will suggest possible overlappings to draw from when the discussion later moves to focus specifically to videographic research in the tradition of CCT. Then, an introduction to ontological/epistemological

considerations of possible Essence(s) of videographic research is provided. Finally, the introductory section of this study will conclude by briefly outlining the subsequent chapter on Production (see IV) of conducting videographic research in the CCT tradition.

1.2 An Introduction to Extant Streams of Videographic Inquiry

In order to approach the goal of providing a philosophical and practical account of videographic work in CCT research, an exploration of videography-related extant academic discourses must be carried out first to establish some initial grounds for interdisciplinary perspectives. Following this, I will present a brief background investigation of the diverse CCT discourse(s) in consumer research and an overview of the videographic research under the CCT rubric. A focus will be put on the annual Association for Consumer Research Conference (ACR) 'Film Festival' events and the two published DVD issues of *Consumption, Markets & Culture* (see Appendix 2 for a table of the two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; Vol. 10]) in order to uncover the current state and prevalent methodological approaches of the field. Within this context, also the three videographies (Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010; Hietanen, Rokka, Roman 2012; Hietanen and Uotila 2012) by the author will be introduced. All of these works can be found online as noted above, and they can also be accessed via our blog that reports on our videographic projects (see http://insidevideography.com).

Regarding other discourses on visual media, a cornucopia of fields that attempt to make sense of film and video from numerous perspectives exists. The following albeit necessarily brief exploration is intended to highlight these fields 1) basic epistemological and ontological positions, 2) development through time, and 3) the nature of 'good' videographic practice within each stream.

1.2.1 Visual Anthropology

In terms of research utilizing the moving image, the field of visual anthropology certainly has the longest lineage. Ever since Robert Flaherty's 1922 seminal film *Nanook of the North* describing the everyday struggle of the Inuit, scholars in the field of visual anthropology have concentrated filming exotic (and often deteriorating) cultures (Ruby 2000). However, and perhaps due to this lengthy heritage in the moving picture, the visual anthropologists are still struggling to emerge from persistent past assumptions. The fascination of the exotic (the 'otherness') has become widely criticized by contemporary scholars for being extensively ethnocentric

and naively realist in its underpinnings (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Harper 1988; Ruby 2000; Pink 2006). This paradigm was initially questioned by Geertz's (1973) seminal work that embraced a constructivist ontology.

Thus, through a debate called the "crisis of representation" (Ruby 2000: 30; see also Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Van Maanen 1995; Brown 1998b; Goulding 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2005) has spurred the reconsideration of the realist perspective (understanding the moving image as capturing and representing the 'truth') and a call for interpretive frameworks and reflexivity (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; see also Ruby 2000; Brownlie 2006; Pink 2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007b). This highlights an ontological shift from an ethos of distant observation to emphasize the relationship "between (ethnographic) anthropologist and the subject" (Pink 2006: 67). Even while more recent work is quick to note that the controversy is still present, this debate has spurred new thoughts about the nature of the phenomenon under inquiry warranting new types of epistemic interests for the visual anthropologists (Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007). This has been marked by growing attention in focusing on meaningful stories, situating research in local cultures, and a diminishing interest to observe the exotic 'other' (Ruby 2000).

For the purposes of this study, the contemporary interest in reflexivity and local cultural practices are helpful, when the ethnographic procedure of videography is scrutinized from the CCT perspective. However, CCT scholars do seem to have the advantage due to the absence of some of the realist burden, as the philosophical foundation in their field was inherently interpretative (although it does have its share of lingering positivistic undertones, see 2.3.4).

1.2.2 Art and Visual Culture

Art and the moving image have also had a turbulent relationship, with the early art installations using film media adopting, and thereafter following the modernist tradition of "bringing with it nothing from life" (Bell 1914, cited in Appignasi and Garratt 2007: 25; see also Cubitt 1993). Modernism thus put all emphasis on form and the media, generating differences for the sake of the form and the media themselves (Cubitt 1993: 28). This dehumanized aesthetic focus thus developed as a driver of aesthetic culture, not the pursuit of explaining or commenting on it directly. Videographic art, originating with the Dadaist 'Fluxus' movement in the '60's, began to criticize the elitism and formalization of modernist art (Leighton 2008), in order to, as stated in the 1963 manifesto by Maciunas, to "Promote living art, anti-art, promote NON ART REALITY to be ~~fully~~ grasped by all peoples, not only critics, dilettantes and professionals". Thus, through many streams, vidographic art escaped the

museums and began to embrace contextual installations and societal critique (Cubitt 1993: 38; see also Leighton 2008).

In terms of this study, the prevailing ethos of reflexive expression of the later visual arts tradition can be embraced. However, the modernist logocentric preference of 'finding an originary form' over cultural pluralism may need to be reversed. It seems that for videographic accounts in CCT, instead of emphasizing the modernist quest to experiment on the media for its own sake, the importance of the medium must be better understood so it can be then moved into the background while elevating the rich expression of the cultural practices in social contexts. Yet, this 'backgrounding' can be negotiated only after we can claim to have considerable traction in the problematics of knowledge production on video. At present, videography practitioners in the CCT field seem to share certain liminality with modernist underpinnings by focusing much of the extant debate around the video medium itself, even as they assign their interest in marketplaces cultures and consumption practices through postmodern frameworks (e.g. Brown 1993; Firat, Dholakia and Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Dholakia 2006). There is merit in this, however, as to not experiment is certainly to not discover what can be achieved regarding the medium itself. Yet, as we will soon see more thoroughly, from an interpretive CCT perspective we cannot settle on an originary form or 'truth' waiting to be uncovered through research approaches and rhetoric efforts. Is it not the voice(s) emanating from the social practices and spatiotemporal contexts themselves that are to validate video as a medium of inquiry? Certainly we can utilize reflexivity regarding both form and expression.

1.2.3 Videography in Managerial and Usability Studies

Video ethnography has also received growing interest recently in industrial marketing and product design contexts, with scholars promoting research from an interpretive perspective in B2B marketing by utilizing video ethnography (Borghini, Carù and Cova 2010). Unlike CCT scholars, however, the industry ethnographers tend to underplay the role of holistic understanding and the need for empathy in the interpretation process (e.g. Ellingson 1998; Richardson 2000; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; see also Goodall 2000), as they display a preference in the descriptive rather than holistic. While an interest in social practices surrounding technological phenomena (Greenbaum and Kyng 1991) or the need for interpretative work (Ylirisku and Buur 2007) is recognized, the approach of ethnographers in industry contexts is thoroughly rooted in research designs involving descriptive 'thin ethnographies' (Ylirisku and Buur 2007: 19; see also Sperschneider and Bagger 2003) and brief *in situ*

ethnographic work (Meyer 1982; Rinallo, Borghini, Golfetto 2010; Visconti 2010).

It seems from the outset that if videographic research is to follow the recent developments in CCT, it needs to be considered ontologically and epistemologically to become actualized as something deeper than descriptive work only. In addition, particular attention needs to be paid on the importance of reflexivity, empathy and rich contextual data in order to create convincing representations of cultural practices, as we will soon see. Thus, the 'lighter' approaches of the videographers interested in managerial and usability research need to be addressed and reconsidered.

1.3 A Preface to 'An Account of Essence(s)'

The briefly outlined research streams that have shared various degrees of interest in the videographic methodology have yet to formalize video as a method. One of the most obvious problems for conducting such work has been the relative lack of debate about the philosophical underpinnings of the video medium itself as a methodology and a research practice. From an interpretivist standpoint, it would seem that the CCT tradition would be well suited for these ontological conversations, as this tradition can draw from its contemporary reflexive ontological and epistemological underpinnings. Fortunately, many contemporary CCT researchers seem to carry less of the naïve realist's baggage, which still seems to riddle many of the visual anthropologists' positions. In addition, the epistemological project for an academic account must be different from the (perhaps already passé) modernist's position of videography art, and finally the usability designer's position, where the need to engage into philosophical discussion is less obvious, as their epistemological goals appear to be more utilitarian.

Indeed, CCT scholars seem to be methodologically at a stage that bears some resemblance to the modernist endeavor in video art in both conducting and expressing videographic studies in CCT research. Here I do not wish to imply that a 'positivist' claim is present, but rather, that as research on the video format is still in its infancy, most discussions have hovered on considering what would constitute a good videography technically and representationally. It reflects, indeed, anxiety about the underpinning possibilities of various epistemologies in videographic research. And indeed, the questions themselves may seem taunting:

- What does it mean to express research on video?
- What does it mean to experience it?
- Therefore, what types of expressive efforts is it good for (both in and of itself and contra the textual paradigm of academic writing)?

As much experimentation can be conducted as felt necessary and interesting, but to avoid only conducting implicit ontological and epistemological takes on videographic research, there is an opening for further discussion about these issues. Therefore, let us move on to shed tentative light on the subject with an account of the Essence(s) of the videographic method in CCT. Perhaps a subsequent lengthy debate can be sparked, which could inform the CCT video researchers about some guidelines (albeit not restricting ones) on how to conduct convincing videographic research. At present, only few accounts exist on how such work should be methodologically pursued (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006), as most academic writing on videographic methodology has been predominantly focused on providing descriptive accounts of the field and its promise (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009; Belk 2011). Yet, this research has noted that attempting to merely convert the orders and style of text-based publications risks losing much of the video medium's potential. To provide some initial guidelines, Belk and Kozinets (2006) have presented their criteria for evaluating videographic submissions in the ACR 'Film Festivals'. They are the 1) topical, 2) theoretical, 3) theatricality and 4) technicality criteria of the research work (see 2.3.6). Such criteria, while practical and helpful, say very little about what is in this media that allows for certain types of expressions of research activities. Thereafter, it follows that we should inquire what is it about consumer research phenomena that should be expressed. It is time to add to these criteria, as they were, indeed, brought about to constitute a point of departure and inspiration (Kozinets and Belk 2006). Thus, there is a need for a novel perspective – an exploration of an account of Essence(s). In doing so, the following questions need to be addressed:

- What is it about vidoegraphy (as a methodology, form of representation, expression etc.) that can be conceptualized to allow for something different from text?
- What is it about human interaction that we wish to express on video media?

To shed light on these questions, to date left open by the mystification of the nature of the medium, a philosophical discussion about potential Essence(s) of the video media is constructed in the following chapters. In this study, such construction work is launched from the domain of the considerably abstract and metaphysical. I will adopt many notions from Deleuze's philosophy of the sense (1990/1969) and representation (1994a/1968) as a point of departure and a perspective of what it is in human interaction we could attempt to express in videographic research. The views of Deleuze are fittingly built upon by Thrift's (2008) theory of non-representation, which gives the spatial/material and emergence and predominance (or at least equal agency) over the rational(ized). Thrift can further be compared and contrasted to the practice theoretical accounts of Schatzki (Schatzki 1996; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and Von Savigny 2001; see also Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005).

After these philosophical considerations, Deleuze becomes reestablished via his philosophical work on cinema (Deleuze 1986/1983, 1989/1985) that builds on the established notions of space, embodiment and the potential of emancipating the creative mind.

In conclusion, the challenging nature of expressing videographic studies to various audiences is considered. This section will sum up some of the implications of our philosophical project. Here one of the initial questions for this research is reexamined, as in what does it mean to experience academic research on video media, and how is this form of expression fundamentally different to the textual form which remains the dominant paradigm for representing academic research? What are the politics of the tensions between different mediums? While videography is not set up to 'compete' with or 'denounce' textual representation, the very nature of the medium and the research practice needs to be considered. As Cubitt notes: "the linguistically-inspired semiotic criticism that has proved so productive in the last 20 years needs to be curbed in its ambition to see the world well lost in favor of textuality without end" (Cubitt 1993: 13). Thus the differences between these media must be highlighted.

Finally, a need to consider wider audiences exists. Videography can be seen as a vehicle for popularizing academic research by making it accessible to the general audience over the Internet. This argument enables the questioning of both the forma of academic research, and the institutions that guard the access to it. Through eclectic use of multimedia applications, blogs and Internet video, popularization of academic work could also become an exercise of tempered 'anarchy' against journal institutions, which potentially offer decreasing access to information in the age of digital democratization.

1.4 A Preface to 'Production'

After exploring the possibilities for more philosophically detailed underpinnings for videographic research, I will scrutinize the actual practice of conducting and expressing videographic research in the CCT tradition. To do so, a framework is presented for understanding the various levels of expressive approaches and the subjective (and hermeneutically emergent) nature of each of these levels. These are the 1) social phenomena under inquiry (social practices and spatiotemporal settings), 2) the research group and 3) the audience(s) to whom the research is shown.

In doing interpretive research with ethnographic methods, each threshold of expression between these 'audiences' accounts for an interpretative liminal space. With a holistic approach to ethnography that achieves its reflexive and empathic purposes as understood in the contemporary literature (e.g. Ellingson 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; see also Goodall 2000; Richardson 2000; Brownlie 2006) these levels have the potential to reduce the realist 'otherness' between the audiences – something that can hinder the opportunities for empathic understanding. To mitigate this threat for audiovisual experiences and expressions of the moving image, a novel approach to videographic research team building is proposed to allow for pluralistic voices and shared research experiences. This approach will further blur the notion of distinctions between the social phenomena (emic/etic) under inquiry on one hand and the research group on the other by building a foundation for research group heterogeneity. It will also facilitate high levels of access into the social phenomenon, a challenge particularly relevant for videographers.

Additional considerations are given about the form of videographic studies in consumer research, specifically from a CCT perspective. What should their structure be? What is the role of theory? How should practical challenges such as the 'talking head' and 'voice-of-god' expressions be answered? What possibilities can viewer interactivity solutions now increasingly offered by online video sites give to videographers?

II An Account of Essence(s)

2.1 What Could a Medium Like Video be Like?

> "[Words] can explain in detail, for example, the living conditions of the hummingbird, but actually seeing the hummingbird active, hearing the buzz of its wings are experiences and insights that cannot be replicated by words" (Fuat Firat)

The purpose of this chapter is to begin the work of constructing an ontology and epistemology of academic videography in consumer research, specifically within the discourse of consumer culture theory or CCT for short (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 2007). Video as a way of empirical data gathering and videography as a form of presenting and expressing academic research have been, along with photography (e.g. Peñaloza and Cayla 2006), gaining ground during the last two decades in the field of consumer research. This has especially been the case within the CCT discourse that emanates from constructionist ontologies that have tended to emphasize an interpretivistic understanding of culturally embedded consumption phenomena. Video as both a form of data gathering and as a presentation has been seen as a 'different' medium (e.g. contra textual presentation) due to its capability, for instance, to record the body language, proxemics, kinesics and expressions (Belk and Kozinets 2005a), being more emotional and 'resonant' and grab attention (Sherry and Schouten 2002; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009), being in some sense more 'real' (Spanjaard and Freeman 2007), being able to better record the "bright and noisy" (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 335) nature of consumption phenomena, to be able to "capture the context-rich environment" (Smith, Fischer and Cole 2007: 89), having a "glimmer of the gem" (Sunderland 2006: 378) and having "tremendous possibilities to enlighten, expose, analyze entertain, stimulate, and critique more effectively than other types of conference presentations" (Belk and Kozinets 2004: 6). This short list claims something interesting; there must be something very special about video! Yet, what all the aforementioned descriptions have not systematically uncovered is what this something special really is in a more philosophical sense. Currently we have an implicit metaphysical approach to video – we know there is something particular and peculiar about it, but, to date, we have not seen an in-depth journey to get to the bottom of those

matters followed by an effort to construct a potential framework (certainly only one of many) of what can lie behind this veil of ambiguity.

Thus, in a sense, academic work on the video medium in consumer research lacks ontology. Certainly, most works accept the general ontological constructivist position of CCT, but there is a need to focus specifically on the video medium from a philosophical perspective. The goal of this study is to tentatively initiate such an endeavor from my perspective. It is my wish that this early work will be followed by many more.

Due to the nascence of the field this is by no means a simple task, as to date there is still little to draw on in terms of why and what types of videographic inquiry constitute a 'good' approach in certain research contexts (and in which it would not). Likewise, the criteria for assessing the merit of videographic research in CCT remain at a groundwork level, and as we will further see, perhaps all for the better. To my knowledge, the only criteria available are the 1) topical criterion, the 2) theoretical criterion, the 3) theatricality criterion and the 4) technicality criterion (Kozinets and Belk 2006). While establishing a preliminary normative baseline, these provide little assistance in understanding how each specific criterion should be interpreted. Thus we need an ontology of the video itself in academic research from which such interpretations (certainly a diverse array) could discover resources from. Through such efforts, we can then attempt to problematize and develop a tentative approach to epistemic pursuits with the video media.

Yet, this chapter on the Essence(s) of video in CCT is by no means only philosophical. During the course of the work on this study I have been closely involved with three videography research projects (see 1.1 for an overview and the url addresses to these videos on Vimeo). The first videography, *Brothers in Paint: Practice-Oriented Inquiry into a Tribal Marketplace Culture* (BIP) was conducted in collaboration with Joonas Rokka (Aalto University, Helsinki) and Christine De Valck (HEC, Paris), and constitutes a practice theoretical account of the 'tribal' consumption culture of tournament paintball enthusiasts. BIP won the 'Juror's Prize' in the 2009 Advances for Consumer Research conference (ACR) in Pittsburgh. The second videography, *Pushing the Scene: Tensions and Emergence in an Accelerated Marketplace Culture* (PTS) was conducted in collaboration with Joonas Rokka (now Rouen Business School) and Risto Roman (Helsinki University), and also utilized practice theoretical approaches in understanding the tensions between commercialization and authenticity from a cultural producer's perspective in the 'accelerated' electronic music genre of 'dubstep'. PTS recently won the (curiously renamed) 'Judge's Prize' in the 2011 ACR conference in St. Louis. The third videography (also a contender at ACR 2011), *Post-Materialist Work: Dreams as Fetishes* (PMW) was conducted in collaboration with Hannu Uotila (Aalto University, Helsinki), and provides a

critical account of how vocational dreams of freedom and free creative expression become an unattainable fetish in the capitalist marketplace system. In the course of constructing a philosophical underpinning I will utilize my experiences in these productions to strengthen the philosophical arguments and to provide a bridge between practical accounts and the more abstract positions.

One more founding question warrants a mention here. When conducting videographic inquiry, the first question should always be "Why video?" That is, "What does the production and expression of research on the video medium add that one would not be able to express similarly via textual (or other) methods?" This question should become the "So what?" question often presented in conferences to clarify the contributions of presented research.

2.2 Levels of Analysis: Video as Method

"But how hard I find it to see what is right in front of my eyes" (Ludwig Wittgenstein)

2.2.1 What Is the Video Media?

In this section it is my aim to move forward in conceptualizing the nature of the video medium in CCT. This level of analysis is closely tied with both the technical nature of the medium and what it is that it can selectively record from a 'reality' out there. Thus, what is it that a medium like video can express? Further on, I will explore the question of video media specifically as it relates to text, or textual expression.

Here it is of importance to conceptualize some of our most basic terms, namely the ones used interchangeably in a variety of my sources. In this study, the term video is constructed to mean of the digital video format. However, the medium of video media in itself seems notoriously difficult to define comprehensively (Cubitt 1993; see also Deleuze 1986/1983). This problematic can be broken down into several subquestions regarding the medium itself. The first issue resides at a technical level. Video media cannot be conceptualized as a 'thing' in a static state, but in a continuous transformation with respect to technical development that both manifests and drives it, or being "Embedded in interactive multimedia, as it increasingly is, video becomes an even more active medium" (Lemke 2007: 40).

Video can thus be any electronically recorded and mediated clip that has the potential to express visual and audible presentations. These presentations, however, have a great deal to do with the particular medium used to express them (TV, computer, portable devices etc.) and the medium where they are stored (DVDs, flash drives, solid state drives and 'cloud' storage). Thus, the

concept of video is often used to denote any piece of video footage irrespective the nature of its potential viewing or storage. Therefore, video, in term of academic research, is commonly used to signify raw and unedited (and too often ephemeral) empirical data. Film is profoundly distinct medium as compared to video, even if often seen in the literature as interchangeable concepts. Film is an analog and physical medium – reels of separate static images that, when put into movement at a specified speed, create the illusion of movement. But as Cubitt (1993) states, "the film strip has always actually been where the work of marking/exposing it took place; there has been some physical contact between it and some kind of outside reality (the light through the lens, the hands of the artisan). Video isn't like that" (p. xi-xii). This is not to say light is not used in the process, but what becomes recorded through the process of digitalization can be argued to be technically as much abstracted from (any type of) reality as a visually represented image of an atom – the process of abstraction of 'reality' into binary ones and zeros which can be recorded as such onto magnetic storage devices, and later reincarnated with electronic impulses to reproduce an illusion of what was recorded – an illusion we as humans can perceive to simulate what was seen through the lens at the time of recording. The video medium has technically nothing in common with a 'reality' – other than its software mediated illusionary power of communication (see also Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). This realization seems to have worried many scholars invested in maintaining a special verisimilitude with the medium and the recordings it expresses, for many have become "worried about the gradual erosion of our belief in the indexical link between film (and by extension video) and reality" (MacDougall 2001: 21).

This sort of longing for some unproblematic 'naturality' of the moving image seems to have linkages to several realist traditions of visual media, most notably photography (e.g. Barthes 1981/1980; see also Bolter and Grusin 2000; Leighton 2008) and visual ethnography (e.g. Russell 1999; Ruby 2000; Pink 2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007b). Barthes (1981), in his seminal work on photography, goes as far as to construct the ontology of photography around its veracity itself, when he states:

> "The photograph [unlike painting] is literally an emanation of the referent. From the real body, which was there [...] What matters to me is not the photograph's 'life' (a purely ideological notion) but the certainty that the photographed body touches me with its own rays and not with a superadded light" (p. 80-81)

Yet, video as an electronic medium lives an ephemeral life abstracted from physical reality, whereas film was physically present at the place of recording, and the images transferred to it are of the same physical light (Cubitt 1993). Video is not physical. Thus, this study on videography will follow this more

postmodern avenue in terms of the experiential potential of videographic research. As Russell (1999) argues:

> "as the image is no longer linked ontologically or indexically to something 'out there' in the real world. Unlike the cinematic image, preserved on celluloid, the video image is made anew at every transmission; and digital image processing has opened up the possibility of infinite manipulation. In the light of the TV monitor, the cinema is reinvented as a site of disappearance, loss, and memory" (p. 7)

Equally, and unlike Barthes's (1981) notions on photography, my work here will attempt to maintain the impossibility of representing any semblance of a past 'reality', thus taking an interest in exactly the opposite. If the veracity of the medium cannot be maintained in representation, the *relationality* of video medium becomes of importance in the thoroughly digitalized world of the Internet mediated communications. Likewise, we need to further consider what kind of an epistemological quandary this presents us, and what does the idea that "much video work is simply uninterested in representing the world as it is or might be" (Cubitt 1993: xvii) suggest to us. Thus, cinematographic work on film becomes a similar act of subjective storytelling as videographic work, but video is even more profoundly abstracted from 'any-place-anywhere' due to its sheer technological makeup. The medium's relations to any origins are of pure illusion with its endless potential of discontinuing timeshifts (Cubitt 1991), replication and simulation (Cubitt 1991, 2001) and as Bolter and Grusin (2000) note, its "immediacy" (p. 30; see also Belk 1998) that grasps the viewer and makes for an experience of embodiment, a convincing illusion of reality, making the audience marvel "at the discrepancy between what they knew and what their eyes told them" (p. 31). These, initially innocent definitions, come to constitute of further resources for a profoundly nonrealist ontology of videography, as we will soon see.

To do videography, in this study, as an operative concept, is the production of academically oriented video research – from the empirical fieldwork via the editing table to the distribution of the completed research through a variety of digital media. A videography conceptualizes a complete and finalized unit of video production, the complete montage – the 'whole show' to be expressed to and experienced by audiences. This use of the term is somewhat similar to many documentarists' take on it. As a concept used commonly by authors on documentary, one often sees 'video' to mean the pieces of film footage, while a work of 'videography' would express a whole argument – footage organized in such a manner as to present a perspective through its expression of the world (e.g. Nichols 1991). However, the similarity is in terms of practical composition alone, for the video documentarists generally do not make assertions about the nature of reality, commonly assuming better representation of the world out there as amounting to better representation of 'real' states (e.g. Nichols 1991; Bernard 2007; Artis 2008). As one may have already surmised from my writing up to

this point, our journey will traverse into far different ontological and epistemological territories.

Likewise, video medium is no one 'thing' or element, as technological developments perpetually push the video medium into differing formats allowing for differing practices of viewing and experiencing – the "VHS, S-VHS, VHS-C, V 2000, Betamax, U-matic, Hi-band, Beta SP, Video-8, Hi-8, MII, MAC and D-MAC and so on" (Cubitt 1993: xii). In addition, the recent integration of video into our personal computers has revolutionized the places and occasions of viewing. Such formats of distribution have included the CD-R(W), DVD-R(W), and also completely nonphysically mediated services, such as Torrent downloading, YouTube and Vimeo, just to name a few. The most recent developments have included sharply declining costs for HD (high definition) recording for amateur video makers, especially with the introduction of video shooting capabilities to HDSLR photo cameras and the potential to record video in 3D.

Videography note (1):

Our first videographic project, BIP was recorded in standard definition (SD), while both PTS and PMW were recorded in high definition, dramatically increasing the requirements in equipment, digital storage space and processing power. While the demands both in terms of equipment and the expertise in their usage have dramatically increased, the viewer may note an equally dramatic difference in terms of quality between e.g. the BIP and the PTS project – not unlike any other expressive media, the quality must appeal to the respective audience to enhance its potential convincingness.

Plummeting costs of both equipment and broadband connections have turned virtually every citizen of a developed country into a potential videographer (Cubitt 1993), and the same can be said for academicians alike (MacDougall 2001; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). Also, the availability of editing software that is now often offered pre-bundled into most operating systems and the computing power readily available to run them has placed a mobile video studio in the hands of every single laptop owner. One could speculate that many scholars criticizing video and seeking to maintain the orthodoxy of text have seemed less keen to consider: "So, do you think video will go away any time soon?"

To move on from a more technologically oriented perspective, let us briefly consider (at this introductory level) what the utterly abstracted nature of the video medium would mean for our epistemic possibilities. As I will adopt and further a CCT approach to videography, I will argue that in my account of an ontology of videography we need to jettison all lingering illusions of the

'truth' or 'external reality' that allows itself to be represented. As we have already briefly explored, many epistemic endeavors outside the field of CCT seem to lack a profound discussion about the ontology of videographic expression, thus often implicitly accepting something like a perspective of (naïve) realism – the video (or any visual account, film or photography alike) as a 'verisimilitude-machine', a recorder of objective reality. Such has been especially the case in the history of visual anthropology (see 1.2.1), as it still seems to struggle to free itself from its realist tradition (e.g. Ruby 2000; Pink 2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007b). The antithesis for such an ontology can, as we have seen, be found in the domain of visual arts, that seems to have often been interested in the processes of jettisoning all reality in terms of the form of its expressions (Cubitt 1993; Appignanesi and Garratt 2007). Similarly, it has been argued that, "Video disassembles the ontological pretence of the image (its pretence at presence) by creating a porous and extensible time out of what otherwise is constructed as the irrefragable instant of sight" (Cubitt 1993: 202). For now, it will suffice to note that I am personally inclined to take the route of the latter (while at times facing strong criticism for it), but nevertheless maintaining that through video we can potentially invoke efficacious relations by reproducing convincing illusions of social reality, or as Derry et al. (2010) suggest, "These themes arise as productive tensions that help encourage new and continuing members of our video research community toward a broad middle channel that avoids the Scylla of strict and formal empiricism on the one side and the postmodern Charybdis of 'anything goes' on the other" (p. 41). And again, while my approaches may align more consistently with the latter, a sociohistorical research tradition remains and needs to be taken into consideration. Thus, while this study will primarily follow poststructural pathways, there is a need to establish some notions of what evocative and efficacious videographic research in the CCT may entail from the perspective of pragmatic legitimacy in academia (in its differences to textual expression) – at least in its current state.

We will revisit these challenges in a continuous fashion as we proceed, but for some initial traction, let us make matters somewhat more problematic at this point. What is to researched and expressed via videography so as to take full advantage of the medium is problematic in its own right, but additionally, in terms of expressing any sense of 'reality' in videographic productions, there remains the question of the part of the viewer(s). Video may possibly allow for a wide range of experiences. Yet, aren't these experiences considerably related to the time and place of the viewing of videographic work? What if the same videography is viewed again (and again)? Is it same or different? And what about, not only the shifts of time regarding the viewing and the actual event, but also the effects of sequential shifts of time within the videographic

montage (the order of shots in a sequence)? Also, we must note the superficially trivial matters such as the intellectual/professional inclination of the particular audience (ACR Film Festival/videography shown on a broadcasting network to the 'masses'), the time of day, and the proximity and interestedness of the audience(s) next to the viewer. Now that videos are increasingly circulated online, taken apart and endlessly remashed and remixed, further empirical work is also needed about the evolving social practices of video footage viewing as it increasingly moves from stationary devices into mobile appliances and interactive platforms (see also Kozinets and Belk 2006; Sunderland 2006). This work, while beyond the scope of this study, could provide CCT videographers ideas for approaches in both legitimizing and popularizing their work simultaneously. While we will consider the ontology of experiencing video and the idea of popularizing academic expression of research activities in due course, the culturally changing nature of the social impact of video needs to be also pursued in future work. Indeed, as further conceptualized as a profound *encounter*, perceiving video media is not a passive undertaking. But what is the nature of this encounter, how do such experiences come about?

While taking due note of the substantial technical and practical differences between various media, say film and video, we can explore the many links tying them together – most importantly the relationship between the viewer(s) and an image that is by its very nature of *movement itself* (Deleuze 1986/1983). Embarking on this exploration, we will move on to consider a Deleuzian ontology and epistemology for the cinematographic moving image, for: "With the definitions given, both video and film experience share substantially the same audio-visual semiotic; the same interpretative conventions for their salient sensory features" (Lemke 2007: 41) – the (potentially convincing) experience of a moving medium.

In addition, Cubitt (1993) urges us to consider the special qualities of video by the use of a wedding video as an example, which is a "product of supreme invisibility and supreme formalism [...] every tape must appear fresh and personal as if it addressed this event and no other, never to betray the suspected secret: that it is the same as every other wedding video" (p. 4; see also Bolter and Grusin 2000). Thus the recognition of the uniqueness and indexical function of the event becomes specific to the viewing situation, "promising presence while presenting absence" (Cubitt 1993: 5). But when one views a wedding video in which one recognizes no one, the relation is overturned, or "The sense comes over you of looking in on something rather private, something to which you are uninvited, that excludes you" (p. 5). There is an uncomfortable 'in-your-faceness' about the medium – something if not absent then at least of more distance in textual expression, sanitized with the comfortability of interpretive symbolic abstraction. Thus, the video

can maintain the orders of the world by promising continuity in our social rituals, making it "only surprising that we greet an image of ourselves participating in the wedding not with pleasurable recognition, but with shock and embarrassment" (p. 7). These exemplary recognitions of the particular qualities of the video medium can act as initial clues for us here. There is something interesting going on between the moving image and its viewer(s), something that becomes embodied by the audience in the machinic expression the moving image forces upon us. These matters call for further investigation and will be considered throughout this study.

Video media and videographic expression are complex and perpetually changing and invite us into an emergent relationship. Yet, here we will conclude our introductory 'sneak peek' of what will constitute the following pages. As presented, it suffices to acknowledge how the video media does not lend itself to simple definition. This has tremendous implications to the construction of an ontology of videography in CCT. In doing so, it is not my purpose here to construct a profound history of the moving image – such references abound. Additionally, technical considerations will be only minimally addressed, but a brief exploration of technical matters will be provided in the chapter on Production (see IV). There the focus is not in so much in the technical perspective per se, but rather in an effort to construct a set of notes that flow from our own experiences in the field. Naturally, a purely technological account would become quickly outdated. But now, let us turn to a brief historical elaboration of the CCT approach in the broader gamut of consumer research.

2.3 Consumer Research: Consumer Culture Theory (CCT)

> "The 20th Century was not kind to 18th Century notions of what truth and beauty mean [...] The terms need to be re-examined from a local, quotidian vantage point, with concepts such as 'aesthetic judgment' located within a community" (Kip Jones)

In the following section I will briefly introduce the academic discourse of Consumer Culture Theory (CCT – see Arnould and Thompson 2005, 2007) within the more general paradigm of marketing and consumer research. The field of consumer research can be seen as a nexus of highly divergent discourses in terms of ontological and epistemological underpinnings that can generally be grouped as the more 'positivistically' (quantitative orientation, more on these distinctions in 2.3.3) oriented Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), Judgement and Decision Making (JDM) and the more postmodern CCT (Belk 2009). These research streams emanate from microeconomic theory, cognitive psychology, experimental design, quantitative analytical methods, and more recently anthropological research from constructivist/interpretivist perspectives (Arnould and Thompson

2005, 2007). CCT, from its divergent ontological underpinnings emerged to provide something of a challenge to the other extant paradigms in consumer research – here's a brief overview how.

2.3.1 Background in Alternative Ways of Seeking Knowledge

From the early 1980's, what came to be known as CCT (later noted to be perhaps better described as 'Consumer Culture Theoretics' [Arnould and Thompson 2007]) research has emerged to constitute a broad ontological and epistemological approach; not a unified movement or discourse or even a conclusive set of theories or methodologies (Arnould and Thompson 2005). And while some have put this diversity forth as a critique, CCT could not have come about in any other nature. The reasons for this are multiform and resist a straightforward description. In the following, I will attempt to provide an overview of the developments in this diverse field and continue to how videography as both a method of data collection and a way of expressing research findings may fit in CCT and constitute an outcome of the historical legacy of the field.

While the strands of historical developments that have led up to the contemporary state of the field are diverse, the underpinnings of CCT seem to stem in many ways from the large-scale ontological and epistemological fragmentation in academic research, often attributed to a breakdown of the modernist ideal and a subsequent emergence of a postmodern ethos (e.g. Arnould and Thompson 2005; see also Spencer 2001; Firat and Dholakia 2006). Generally, what has been described as the modernist worldview has since become colloquially known as 'positivism' (e.g. Anderson 1986; Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Hunt 1990, 1991; Denzin 2001a; see also Critchley 2001). The central tenet of 'positivism' is that the nature of reality exists outside of the minds of humans and that it can become known in a truthful way through our tools of representation (e.g. language). Thus a single truth (also known as logocentrism) is at least possible and can be represented objectively (also known as the Cartesian dualism of the separation of mind/thought and body/material reality). The term 'positivism' originates from the scientific movement of the Vienna Circle whose members became known as the logical positivists, who, in a nutshell, proclaimed that through sense experience and the use of a "rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge by means of semantic and syntactic analysis" (Schwandt 2000: 304) would produce truth claims, conclusive and incontrovertible truths that could thus be uncovered and represented (e.g. Schwandt 2000; see also Hunt 1991). What seems often forgotten today is that the logical positivists were the radicals of their day (see also Tadajewski 2010), new idealists of logic revolting against German idealism of the great philosophers Hume and Kant (among others). Also, it is

important to note, that the belief in neutral objectivity and unlimited and ultimate access to the natural world via suitable methodologies for both conducting research (objectively) and representing it emerged considerably later (Tadajewski 2010).

As Hunt (1991; see also Levin 1991; Heath 1992) rightly posits, the contemporary vernacular of 'positivism' (hence the scare quotes) does not have much bearing on the rational reconstruction of theories typical of the Vienna Circle. Rather, it remains as a term of high usage as an umbrella concept to imply a naïve belief in certainty to be achievable by the human instrument or communicable certainty through a language that accurately (or increasingly approximately) refers and corresponds to external states (e.g. Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Shankar and Patterson 2001; Tadajewski 2010). Personally, I would prefer "naïve realism" (Denzin 2001a: 325; see also Hunt 1991; Schwandt 2000), "scientism" (Bhaskar 2008/1975; Critchley 2001), "[naïve] objectivism" (e.g. Hunt 1993: 86), "naïve scientism" (Brownlie 2006: 505) or "trivial realism" (Belk 1998). However, I will, for better or worse, continue using the concept in this study, as it has become so thoroughly established in the contemporary academic vernacular.

The logical positivist program ran into trouble soon as some of its fundamental principles were questioned initially by philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn, who's immensely influential work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Kuhn 1996/1962; see also Anderson 1983; Grant 2001) argued that science was a sociohistorical endeavor (not objective) where some worldviews were of so divergent natures that they could not be unified through reconstructing them in logical language (inconsumerability). Another powerful voice of criticism came from Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose early philosophical work, *Tractatus* (originally published in 1922), seemingly sided with the logical positivists, when, in fact, he claimed that through logic one could never objectify, for example, religion, aesthetics or ethics (Johnson 2001; Heaton and Groves 2005). In his later work, *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 2009/1953) he went further to claim that all what can be uttered through language is always contextual and irrevocably intertwined with the embodied context (thus providing one foundational perspective to practice theory, see 2.9.1). Other influential voices included the newlyfound interest in Nietzsche, who profoundly questioned our capability to access any 'reality' (Deleuze 1989; Critchley 2001; Roberts 2001; Hughes 2009), Quine, who questioned the feasibility of the positivist's analytic-synthetic dichotomy (Critchley 2001); Laudan, who argued that the limit of scientific thought was pragmatic problem-solving (see Anderson 1983); Feyerabend (1999), who took the impossibility of the line of demarcation to its logical conclusion – epistemological anarchy ('anything goes'); Gadamer (2004/1976; see also Arnold and Fischer 1994), who argued against the

possibility of objective knowledge in human understanding, and Rorty (2009/1979; see also Spencer 2001), who developed pragmatism as the sociohistorically contingent limit of philosophical activity, to name just a few. One cannot either forget the originally Marxian Frankfurt School of critical and nonpositivst philosophy heralded primarily by Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas, that emphasized criticism against the empiricist worldview and propounded interest in the sociohistoric analysis of cultural phenomena by emphasizing dialectical analysis (e.g. Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; see also Hammond 2001; Horkheimer and Adorno 2002/1987).

As can be seen, at a philosophical level, important topics that the positivists could not reconcile have to do with the problem of the objective nature of a human as a researcher, the problem of language as a conveyer of objective truths and the problem of the historically changing nature of knowledge. Altogether, these constitute a profound problematic for science as a field when attempting to defend it for its special epistemic purpose and as a stable demarcation contra to other expressive activities, such as art or fiction – this certainly in a philosophical, not pragmatic sense, as we will soon see.

Yet, arguably one of the most notable critical voices came from continental philosophers, in particular French thinkers Jacques Derrida (see Stern 1996a; Bristor and Fischer 1993; Collins and Mayblin 2005), Michel Foucault (see Canning 2001; Heaton and Groves 2005) and Gilles Deleuze (see Bogue 2003; Williams 2008; Hughes 2009), whose work is commonly described under the 'poststructuralist' rubric. These approaches resist logocentric notions of representation, language and objectivity – which would indeed call for resisting such labeling as well. In this study, it is my attempt to construct an (not the) ontology and an epistemology for videography in CCT that is underpinned in Deleuzean thought, and thus Deleuze will be more extensively (yet by no means comprehensively) introduced later.

All these (and other) developments went on to influence a moment of extreme confusion in various fields of academia. Categorized under several diverse rubrics, the tumultuous relations between realist science and postmodernist worldviews (e.g. Firat and Dholakia 1995; Firat, Dholakia and Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Dholakia 2006) have been described as a period of "science wars" (e.g. Franklin 1995: 164), "paradigm battles" (e.g. Arnould and Thompson 2005: 869) and "critique of authenticity" (Russell 1999: xii). In any case, realist and objectivist calls of modernism seem to have been substantially disassembled – even if much of the backdrop from the 'positivist' worldviews is predominant in the mainstream of consumer research and is still lingering and resonating in CCT research (e.g. Holt 1991; Shankar and Patterson 2001).

2.3.2 The Hunt Versus Anderson Debate

> "Truth may well seem to be "a more modest being from which no disorder and nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy creature which is continually assuring all the powers that be no one needs to be the least concerned on its account; for it is, after all, only 'pure knowledge'" (Gilles Deleuze, quoting Frederick Nietzsche)

The field of marketing and consumer research went through its own academic battles as well, predominantly the now colloquially toted 'Hunt versus Anderson debate' (e.g. Kavanagh 1994). Even though the debate about the scientific nature of marketing had been raging for decades alongside the aforementioned philosophical debates and changes in society such as the 'consumer revolution', increasing civil rights, and feministic movements (Levy 2006; see also Anderson 1983), I will enter the historical stream of ideas in consumer research in this study where Anderson and Hunt began theirs. Anderson (1983), a self-proclaimed relativist, later critical relativist (Anderson 1986), follows the dismantling of the logocentric truth claims and objectivity of the logical positivists to argue for relativistic takes in sociological paradigms such as marketing. For him, the philosophical movements summarized above show how all knowledge claims are always theory-laden (non-objective) social constructions that are always paradigm-dependent and change over time, for:

> "Within a program, knowledge is sanctioned largely by consensus [...] Thus, research areas will tend to evolve as changes take place in methods, concepts, values, beliefs, and theories. Whether such changes can be viewed as progressive in any sense, will be judged differently by different research programs" (Anderson 1983: 25-26)

To Anderson (1983), conducting marketing research with the positivist trappings fails to understand the historical nature of any truth claim, and quoting Tucker's famous wording, makes researchers study the consumer "in the ways that fishermen study fish rather than as marine biologists study them" (Tucker 1974: 31, quoted in Anderson [1983: 27]). Thus, for Anderson, the search for a 'truth' becomes a misguided pursuit, as there can never be any truth that is not relative to its political, historical or paradigmatic context – and even if there were, there would be no way to recognize it (notions of truth are thus relative language games). As knowledge becomes diachronic (historically changing) and the lack of our objective access to reality is accepted, there is no longer a single knowable truth about *a* reality out there to be discovered by the (always evolving) scientific method, and therefore:

> "Perhaps the most significant breakthrough in the field of science studies in this century is the recognition that the crucial unit of analysis is not at the level of the proposition, hypothesis, or theory, but at the level of the macrostructures in which these concepts are embedded" (Anderson 1986: 159)

There seems to be a strong implicit pragmatist underpinning in Anderson's relativism, however, as he sides with the Laudanian thought of judging

research by its problem-solving ability. Additionally, there is thus a clear link to the necessary political aim of every research pursuit, and therefore a critical relativist would demand:

> "to know a program's methodological, ontological, metaphysical, and axiological commitments before he or she is willing to grant epistemic authority to its knowledge products. More importantly, critical relativists want to know a program's realizable cognitive (and social) aims before they are willing to give it serious consideration" (Anderson 1986: 167-168)

It should be remembered, that 'positivism' has also been known as the 'received view' (Anderson 1983; Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy 1988; Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Hunt 1993). Thus, Anderson's relativism aims for virtually the opposite, as it seems no one view will be taken for granted or on faith alone.

Anderson (1986) also attacks Hunt's 'positivistically' inclined logical empiricism more directly by pointing out that Hunt seems to be afraid of acknowledging the destabilization of a secure logos, and it seems that this insecurity is what lets the rhetoric of truth incessantly chug along. He notes that Hunt seems not to understand the stakes and therefore can only attack 'straw men', such as when Hunt claims that accepting alternative ontologies would be like equating medical science and palmistry (Anderson 1986: 156). Anderson's (1986) pragmatism intensifies with his critical relativism, when he notes that pluralistic methods and epistemologies could only aid the "pragmatic aims of a theory" (p. 156), due to a headstrong commitment to one approach alone can only produce what he called "knowledge for its own sake" (Anderson 1983: 27), noted also by Levy (2006), or as Arndt (1985) puts it:

> "By limiting itself to the empiricist orientation and logical empiricist paradigms such as instrumental man, marketing has remained essentially a one-dimensional science concerned with technology and problem solving. The subjective world and liberating paradigms challenge the assumptions of empiricism by generating metaphors resulting in the asking of quite different research questions" (Arndt 1985: 21)

The outcome of Anderson's relativism is that science can be nothing else than what "society bestows a high epistemological status [...] because it values its knowledge products" (Anderson 1983: 26). Anderson (1983) believes that marketing departments had been mired by what was later formulated as 'physics envy' (Tapp 2007; see also Arndt 1985) or having been "anxious to cloak themselves in the mantle of science" (Belk 2009: 36). This was a kind of headstrong ethos to pursue research in line with the natural scientists to gain some of the trappings of a "bona fide scientific area" (Anderson 1986: 169). For Anderson (1983), the ultimate irony is that by doing so, most of (pragmatic) relevance is lost – critical relativist approaches could make for better contextual and socially significant problem-solving knowledge, whatever their politics may be. He wants to go beyond the idea of pursuing single unchangeable 'truths' and the falsification and confirmation of

hypotheses through tests that pose as the correct method for logical empiricists, as such design does not offer empirical usability in many avenues of social science. For Anderson (1983, 1986), a relativist approach would allow different paradigms to freely negotiate the most usable methods and theoretical underpinnings to produce best problem-solving capability.

In his numerous writings at the time, Hunt (e.g. 1990, 1991, 1993), a self-proclaimed logical empiricist (later, scientific realist, see Hunt [2004]) takes great exception to approaches not committed to the 'truth' in marketing science. While he does make occasional distinctions where different relativist/constructivist/interpretivist approaches differ, they seem to all remain antithetical to his foundational position of science's objectivity, truth and single reality that waits ever-progressing uncovering. He maintains that inquiry without a pursuit of truth is necessarily nihilistic, incoherent and/or irrelevant (Hunt 1990). In terms of logicality, Hunt may have some solid ground to stand on, for as others have noted, to be critical is to assume knowledge of how to make judgments on knowledge claims – thus 'critical relativism' is inconsistent as a form of 'traditional' relativism (Siegel 1988). Yet, it must be noted, that Anderson and Hunt seem to also profoundly disagree on the notion of relevance, even as both appear to employ a very pragmatist notion of problem-solving. It seems that the debacle is not about problem-solving as such, but, rather, about what type of knowledge has the 'right' to be a problem-solver. In Anderson's relativism, a plurality of approaches is accepted, each answering to its own paradigmatic goals while critically and reflexively assessing the nature of its place in society. For Hunt, problem-solving knowledge must be 'truthful', meaning it must correspond (in empirical testing and thus verification) to a 'reality out there', which through scientific progress or success (e.g. Hunt 1990: 2, 9, 10, 13), can be increasingly mastered.

For Hunt (1990) (and for realists in general), something like a real world 'out there' in a stable sense exists (hence the possibility of synchronic and sufficiently corresponding knowledge of the external reality), and knowledge about this reality is ultimately of the single right type, even if never perfect with certainty. His realism entails the 1) approximate truth of mature scientific theories (those that have withstood tests), that the 2) concepts of these theories genuinely refer to real things in the world, that 3) successive theories retain the ontology of their predecessors, that 4) success entails truly referential characteristics and 5) will go on to genuinely refer. Hunt notes that relativists have found several historical examples to show how 4) and 5) have not consistently withstood the test of time. Yet, he seems to feel completely comfortable in moving towards a scientific realism (which often feels naïve indeed [cf. Hunt 1990: 9]), where the notions of 'approximate truth' of the 'genuine referring' of words to 'things out there' is relatively unproblematic –

even as he has no problem criticizing the use of "loose metaphors" (Hunt 1990: 3) by others. Scientific progress is the measure of things – yet, as we will see, we do not have a measure for it unless we can assume and maintain a stable logos – again one that is always political, but this is not a focal matter for Hunt, perhaps due to his propounding of the ideal of objectivity or neutrality of scientific inquiry. Moreover, this realist criteria seems quite limiting to say the least, as it would seem to extensively exclude much academic inquiry – say historical research about one-time events and all inquiry understood as interpretive altogether (as it is not in the domain of hypothesis testing – unless great leaps of reification are undertaken, which Hunt often seems to pursue himself when, for example, elaborating on ideals of science, such as trust or justice).

Hunt (1990) maintains that without a 'truth' to aspire to, a scientific endeavor can only become nihilist if it wishes to stay coherent (Hunt 1990), and indeed, without a stable logocentric structure, an absolute to aspire to, how could one defend against such a notion? It would seem that nihilism is unavoidable (e.g. Feyerabend 1999) unless one can adopt a pragmatist and thus politically oriented considerations of knowledge products – which Anderson's critical relativism accepts – critically (Anderson 1983, 1986; cf. Siegel 1988). While being wildly inconsistent himself (eschewing religion as a truthful claim), Hunt accepts one for science: "One might ask: Why could science not choose to pursue a 'utopian' goal" (Hunt 1990: 7), thus arguing that such a goal is perfectly in line with constructs like justice in the legal system. Similarly, this allows Hunt (1990) to feel secure in his suspicion of moral relativism. He has a logos: "Importantly, scientific realism helps us understand the actual workings of modern science without mocking it" (Hunt 1990: 10).

In addition, Hunt (2004) seems to use the argument from popularity regularly. He states that no matter which paradigm, researchers "implicitly advocate a form of scientific realism" (p. 5). A similar argument was also put forth by Heath (1992), who applauded the reporting style of some of the first CCT scholars who infused their work with characteristics of lingering realism (criteria for triangulation, member checks, peer audits and the like). Interestingly, he calls this whitewashing of ontological rigor "liberatory humanism" – for him seemingly thus liberated from nihilism. Indeed, while Heath (1992) calls for the building of bridges between paradigms, it would appear that he accepts only those that bring the interpretive research closer to a 'positivist' ideal. While I have not been particular about 'hiding my cards' in this assessment, we must indeed ask, how much implicit realism can be found in our CCT-oriented thinking and reporting?

If we, adopting contemporary interpretivist epistemologies, do implicit realism, it must indeed be a very odd one. It seems for Hunt that the

constructivist notion of multiple realities renders any argument incapable to say anything about anything. And I do agree: to take what has been called "hardheaded relativism" (Anderson 1986: 167; see also Siegel 1988) to its logical conclusion would arrive at Feyerabendian irrationalism. But can some of this philosophy be relaxed without becoming self-refuting? Is it truly impossible to say, while taking the basic tenets of constructivism (if we can move away from the tradition of 'relativism' to consider the debate from a contemporary perspective) seriously, that the notion of constructed worlds takes them out of any type of intelligible conversation? I would argue that the very reason we write convincing stories (Holt 1991) that address multiple realities is very much pragmatic – addressing realities without being realist in a Huntean sense. In line with Shankar and Patterson (2001), "writing is simply means to staging truth effects" (p. 492) that become reflexively negotiated between our scientific and personal selves. Our 'realism' is thus of a reflexive kind, for our 'access' to anything is interpretative, made and postulated rather as a rhetorical device (e.g. Holt 1991; Belk and Kozinets 2005a). The way I see it, we do not go after the inner workings of elusive systems (reified models and theories) as "objects of wonder" (Shankar and Patterson 2001: 494), but rather interpret and present in prose, on a humanistic level how social beings make sense of their realities. To read CCT research, even as sometimes written in terms that can be appropriated to serve various perspectives, as a vault of stable facts is to miss the point altogether; yet they, as knowledge products often do, become to assume factual characteristics when they influence new ideas and thinking. It is necessarily not what is exactly said about these realities (and how could Hunt not agree if approximation is enough, especially in line with all historical disruptions of realist thought), but how such utterances go on to hermeneutically influence new thinking and spatiotemporal outcomes. This thinking will be further developed in my positing of a relational epistemology for videography in CCT (see 3.3) and by addressing some of the limitations of constructivism by adopting notions of material emergence from non-representational theory (see 2.9.2).

As Hunt does not accept the philosophical implications of language as a fundamentally unstable and imprecise expressive game and implicitly does the work of reification in the sense of positing ideas expressed in language as things (which goes for the idea of logic in itself – 'through logic to greater truth'), it seems he is confident in arguing the problem away. His tactics, criticized by many in no uncertain terms (e.g. Brown 1998b, 2005; Monieson 1989), include a flux of *non sequitur* inconsistencies, arguments from popularity (see e.g. Hunt 2004) and 'moving of goalposts' (see e.g. Hunt 1991). What makes his style interesting is that the same argumentation he uses to support his claims he also uses to refute others (even on subsequent

pages, see Hunt [1990: 6-7], on the distinction between 'creation-science' and ideals of 'true' science). The logicality and flow of arguments between Anderson and Hunt alone could be a source for several interesting studies. But regarding this study, by assuming many of the poststructuralist perspectives, I will *not* construct another logos around the logic of words (in the sense that by following it we can reach something 'real' – get to a truthful account of issues under debate or a truthful representation of research), while simultaneously not eschewing it completely.

Making arguments along Huntean lines, Heath (1992) seems to also miss the point entirely by brushing off the problematic nature of language. He assumes that (what he terms) naturalists simply use different labels to describe the same things (astonishingly establishing a parallel: interpretation=causal explanation). What these more 'positivistically' inclined scholars appear not to be able to entertain is that an interpretive researcher does not take language for granted – "staging truth effects" (Shankar and Patterson 2001: 492) does not express the reification of true states but the production of evocative stories. Heath (1992) treats causation as an equally straightforward concept, thus making an implicit argument that 'of course' there is causation, but interpretive researchers only dance around it semantically (cf. Heath 1992). And was this not what Anderson was pointing towards, after all, by advocating that to do 'nonpositivistic' inquiry does not mean one cannot say anything; it means language is a layer of illusion, with a conceptual 'life of its own' (see also Deleuze 1994b; Denzin 2001a) and must therefore be treated with criticality and wariness of its political underpinnings – not to establish true states in a true world. To use 'causation' as an explanation is to argue for something quite absolute – to reflexively speak of possible influences is not (yet to my knowledge no CCT scholar has purported that due to the problematic nature of causation we could not discuss about any conceivable influences of any kind). As causation and objectivity take precedence for both Hunt and Heath, interpretivism is merely seen to whitewash it, or as Heath (1992) puts it, "A cause (influence) by any other name is still a cause (influence)" (p. 111). Thus it is of no surprise that 'positivist' and interpretive researchers often find it difficult to argue with each other. Due to the recognized illusionary nature of text, someone utilizing interpretative frameworks must be very interested in its nuances. For a 'positivist' researcher such 'mockery of science' can be dismissed, as text is seen as a stable and relatively unproblematic structure. Finally, Heath's (1992), the argument falls down already at the offset, as he seems to implicitly presume the goal of an interpretive researcher to be a similar 'progress to a truth' that befalls the 'positivist' inquiry and representation.

One could go on to further assess the Hunt vs. Anderson debate (including other scholars who have made their voices heard in this assessment), but it

would not be very useful for my purposes. For me, it is not a question who is 'right', or if such a debate can (through language and logical argumentation itself, i.e. who grants the truth status of logic itself?) produce 'rightness' of any kind. In addition, Siegel (1998) made a poignant early note: "empirical testability alone is too weak to constitute the sole criterion of scientific adequacy" (p. 132). In this study we will also question other too often taken for granted assumptions (e.g. language, logic and representation). But at this point, for my purposes, it seems noteworthy to consider what these and other voices at the time have contributed to the CCT field. Interestingly, many questions Anderson and Hunt rose up appear to still have much bearing on the reasonably pluralist contemporary state of the CCT field. And far from the proverbial dust settling, a tension remains between the 'positivist' mainstream in consumer research and the 'postmodern' minority of interpretive researchers in the CCT field. Let us very briefly go through some of the points arisen between Hunt and Anderson that seem to resonate powerfully to this day.

First of all, both Hunt and Anderson seem to argue for pragmatism – albeit from different perspectives. The difference is how we recognize the limits of our ability to shape the world (language and deed alike) and anthropomorphize it through humans as thinkers. In a contemporary sense, it would seem fair to argue that everything is, in a sense, pragmatism. The 'truth' (or good academic work) is what we define it to be in our sociohistorical context. Our language (not to mention our senses) as a system of abstracted symbols forces upon us an irrevocable limitation to an unproblematic access to the world (what would a 'pure access' be like – the very problem of philosophy itself). In addition, our contextually emerging imagination tells us to investigate 'easily closable partial systems' to satisfy our pragmatic inspirations (see 2.4.2). The overarching problem is a difference in worldviews – can things (even ideas in the reifications of Hunt) be reduced, and can scientific problems be approached synchronically – can a wholeness of a 'closed' system be assessed in a 'snapshot' fashion (from the outside)? For Hunt it would seem that such systems we can close (can this satellite stay in orbit; medication lengthens human lives), are things in the world to be theorized, hypothesized, objectified and then tested, and that system becomes increasingly an approximate truth. Hunt, as his realism suggests, seems to commonly address the world as this synchronic structure. Indeed, for him, criticizing this notion seems to constitute the 'mocking of science' and 'making science a miracle' (Hunt 1990). Put simply, science for him cannot go beyond these systems that seem to be closable. Anderson, along with many other postmodernist thinkers, seems to see such easily closable systems as intertwined with the contextual and sociohistoric limits of our imagination and language systems. Thus, whatever the collectively

negotiated methodologies may be, we could attain situational knowledge if that knowledge turns out to be pragmatically effective. Yet, such efficacy must always be reflexively seen as a constituent of its sociohistorical context, as everything scientists undertake has a political underpinning. Anderson, as his relativism would suggest, sees the world diachronically as a flux of emergent ideas and undertakings. Anderson and Hunt thus seem to argue between different sets of poles, from inconsumerable positions in a Kuhnian sense.

Furthermore, Hunt commonly uses truth and objectivity as working terms, moralistic ideals that are to be pursued, not necessarily affirmed – later even: "truth as not an entity, but an attribute. It is an attribute of beliefs and linguistic expressions" (Hunt 2004: 7) "let alone an immutable entity" (ibid.: 8). Anderson takes a more philosophically precise stance, which for Hunt constitutes something like the never-ending sophism of the "philosopher's fallacy" (Hunt 1990: 6) or "vulgar absolutism" (Hunt 1993: 87), and thus leaves it at that. In his work, the notion of trust as a moral guideline among scientists suffices (Hunt 1990, 2004). It could be argued that Anderson's shortcoming in this debate is his specificity, for Hunt it has to be vagueness – a kind of 'don't you get it'. Yet, both seem, to use a Kuhnian metaphor, seem to aim for pragmatist approaches of relevance, albeit in very different worlds. Anderson's relevance is one of a reflexive inclination to the meaning-makings of agents in the world, Hunt's is one of utilitarian and pragmatist problem-solving for progress – yet thus the (political) nature of progress is left out of science's magisterium.

For Hunt, the reification of ideas seems to pose no problem, even as he seems to recognize it when it does not seem to threaten his arguments (Hunt 2004: 8), and at other times, "theories and people are, to say the least, 'tangible'" (Hunt 1990: 11) and "In sociology, if a proposition such as 'racist beliefs in a society generally result in the unfair treatment of a racial group' is successful, then we have reason to believe that something like 'racist beliefs' exists" (ibid.: 11). One could argue that for him social science implicitly seems to progress by reification – how else could one empirically test (in order to verify) intangible notions such as 'emotion', 'brand preference', or some such. Scientific 'progress' (or success of science) is also central to his arguments, and this seems to be where a Huntean logical empiricist/scientific realist position is most problematic – in its reification and logocentrification of Western culture as the 'true' perspective to judge human 'progress' from. This logocentric perspective has become widely contested by many scholars, for example by cultural studies (Sardar and Van Loon 2004) and feminist researchers (e.g. Bristor and Fischer 1993; Stern 1993). What Anderson is implying is for, in effect, context-sensitive and reflexive storytelling in the form of pragmatic and convincing academic fictions. What Hunt seems to crave for is what I would call something like 'teddy-bear pragmatism' – a firm

(assuring) belief in the synchronic truth of any closable and testable system with reasonably unproblematic access to it through tools of representation. Hunt criticizes Laudan for providing "not a single example of an acceptable goal for science" (Hunt 1990: 7), because for him one seems truly necessary, as one can be seen in his statement: "researchers can find comfort in the fact that there exist philosophies of science – such as scientific realism – that at the minimum, are not antithetical to truth and its surrogate, trustworthy knowledge" (Hunt 2004: 11, emphasis added). This 'teddy-bear' thus never really becomes questioned.

Still the notion "Unfortunately, however, debates in this area are often carried on at such an abstract level that, once the dust settles, research in the natural and social sciences generally goes on much the way it did before" (Anderson 1986: 158) can, in retrospect, have merit here. Yet, it was these types of exchanges that have truly opened up the field of marketing/consumer research to begin going beyond the notion of stable 'right' and 'rigorous' methods so as to embrace different approaches, and later different forms of expression as well – even as such pluralistic widening of the scope of research has been a long time coming (e.g. Denzin 2001a; Shankar and Patterson 2001; see also Van Maanen 1995; Richardson 2000). This debate, among other numerous philosophical movements, has emergently provided one of the foundations for many divergent approaches in CCT, including naturalistic approaches, critical research, and criticisms of representation (see also Kavanagh 1994). In doing so, even if this particular debate has stagnated (Kavanagh 1994), it would seem important not to underestimate its foundational influence in terms of the subsequent developments in the field.

2.3.3 Constructivist Ontology, Interpretive Epistemology, Emerging Criteria as well as Early and Lingering Realism

Parallel to the Hunt vs. Anderson exchange, what later became the CCT field gradually emerged. What was it exactly what the interpretive paradigm had to offer, and with what criteria was it to become considered a respected field? While seminal early approaches included the production contextual knowledge on consumer meanings (e.g. Levy 1981), there was one event of 'going natural' *par excellence* – the Consumer Behavior Odyssey (e.g. Belk 1987; Holbrook 1987; Sherry 1987; Belk, Sherry and Wallendorf 1988; Belk, Wallendorf and Sherry 1989) during the summer of 1986, in the course of which a group of now firmly established CCT researchers spent their summer off-period by travelling across America in ascetic conditions to seek novel means for contextual knowledge that would radically differ from 'positivist' (Sherry 1987), while enthusiastically confronting the potential of being

accused of scientific heresy (Belk 1987). In many ways it is to them we owe that a field such as CCT is taken seriously in marketing/consumer research today – even if such a project of establishment is of seemingly interminable nature.

Liminally to the beaten trails of the Consumer Behavior Odyssey, some opening salvos in the marketing/consumer research literature for new epistemological perspectives were being fired back and forth. They consisted of attempts to build criteria for evaluating this new (in marketing/consumer research) type of research that was not done in a laboratory or relied on the hypothetico-inductive research design of the more 'positivistically' oriented mainstream (e.g. Lincoln and Guba 1985; Hirschman 1986; Hudson and Ozanne 1988). Initially, the approach was somewhat reconciliatory, with the early writers adapting the criteria of 'positivist' researchers so as to make them conform to qualitatively-oriented ethnographic approaches. The classical, and now much criticized (see e.g. Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Holt 1991; Spiggle 1994; Shankar and Patterson 2001) approach for evaluating ethnographic-style consumer research was put forth by Lincoln and Guba (1985), who called for interpretivist research that would be evaluated based on its 1) credibility, 2) dependability, 3) transferability and 4) confirmability, which would be achieved by use of rigorous techniques, such as audits (independent research data-to-results assessments), peer debriefings (cross checking interpretations among the research team), member checks (cross-checking interpretations with participants) and triangulation (making interpretations across data sources and methods). Similar notions also made their way into marketing/consumer research journals (e.g. Hirschman 1986; Wallendorf and Belk 1989).

While Hunt (1991; see also Heath 1992) praised the formulation of such criteria, criticism was soon to amass. It was noted that Lincoln and Guba had effectively reconstructed the 'positivist' criteria (Holt 1991; Spiggle 1994; Shankar and Patterson 2001; see also Hudson and Ozanne 1988) of internal validity, external validity, reliability and confirmability to constitute credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability (e.g. Hirschman 1986). This was seen as a loosening some of the 'positivist' undertone, yet keeping the logos intact: 'more logic = better, more evidence = better; more consistency = better'. Certainly, on a Huntean level of a implicitly pragmatist adherence to a form of 'truth' and 'objectivity', these are all in line with his 'utopian' ideals – but from a more strictly philosophical position (what Hunt would perhaps call the 'philosopher's fallacy'), such erudition cannot be defended. Thus it is the case for this study as well, as it is much inspired, among others, by Holt (1991) and Thompson (1990), who launched a strong attack against this apologetic form of 'naturalistic inquiry' from the perspective of interpretive anthropology.

Holt's (1991) and Thompson's (1990; see also Thompson 1997) basic argument is that as a hermeneutical being, no research conducted (and thereafter assessed) by human researchers can move towards stable centers of any such claims – 'trust', 'credibility' etc. can only be matters of agreement in the aforementioned sociohistorical context – nothing more! No amount of tools to enhance the criteria, be they prolonged engagement (in the field site), persistent observation, regular on-site team interaction, negative case analysis or debriefing by peers can ever (on a epistemological basis) assure us of any movement to a more stable 'truth' account. While it may be the case that such techniques can make the research more convincing in the eyes of the researchers in a paradigm (not to mention external stakeholders), that again would constitute another pragmatic question, no more. Thompson (1990), drawing from Gestalt psychology, takes an epistemologically similar perspective – for him, the criteria for good interpretive research is the readers' experience of a sudden insight, a sudden altercation of the experiential horizon – in effect the liberation of thought (Eureka!).

However, one must bear in mind that Holt (1991) is quite clear in his remarks about understanding that the ethos in *Journal of Consumer Research* at the time would not have accepted these more radical approaches to epistemology. He also notes that the adaptations from the 'positivist' toolkit to constitute "a valuable storehouse of naturalistic research techniques" (ibid.: 61). Yet, the very event of these diverging voices becoming heard, in both their philosophical ('utopian') and pragmatic (politics of paradigms) sense alike contributed to the very pluralistic notion of CCT as a field where 'received views' are to be perpetually resisted. And indeed, much time has passed and ink has been spilled since these notions were printed.

In addition, in the field of consumer research, Holt (1991) and Thompson (1990) were probably among the first to take a position on the problematics of representational media, as "A word cannot be apprehended directly; it is always inferred on the bases of its parts, and the parts must be conceptually and perceptually cut out of the flux of experience" (Clifford 1988: 38, quoted by Holt 1991: 57) and to bring interpretive approaches to their logical conclusion (one so much unappreciated by Hunt). Thus, there is no philosophical basis for defending any other criteria than its insight-inducing efficacy and the ability to convince a reader (Thompson 1990; Holt 1991). Indeed, how could there ever be a possibility for such stability (or a Huntean 'utopian goal'), if the notion of language as a representational medium and the hermeneutical cycling between the ever emergent researcher(s) and participant(s) is taken seriously on philosophical level? As Holt (1991) notes,

> "The subjective, contextual nature of the researcher's interpretive task can be no different from that of the subject. A 'correct' interpretation of meaning is forever elusive because an infinite number of interpretations, based on differing 'contextual assortments,' are possible. When meaning is construed as a dialectic process between the object and its interpreter, rather than an immanent attribute, evaluation of the accuracy of an interpretation, based purely on the methods used, becomes impossible" (p. 58)

The logical conclusion articulated by Holt (1991) has also much to do with the very 'anti-positivistic' notions of the need to have and express researcher *reflexivity* in conducting and reporting research (e.g. Anderson 1986; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; see also Van Maanen 1995; Ruby 2000; Brownlie 2006 Pink 2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007b), which means a constant effort by the researcher to question his/her assumptions and the foregrounding of the personal voice of the researcher in the written scholarly work. Again, this is not generally intended to produce any type of enhanced veracity, verisimilitude or correspondence, but to allow for more diverse viewpoints, and thus to craft a more convincing story. Even more interestingly, researcher empathy (e.g. Sherry and Schouten 2002; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; see also Goodall 2000; Richardson 2000) has been called for, so that the researcher, in order to produce convincing ethnographic work, should be involved in the consumption phenomena in such immersive ways that s/he would feel an empathic connection to the context and the participants. Obviously, such calls for new approaches that span the whole duration of each research project and beyond, slam headfirst into what remains of the supposed objectivity of the naïve realist backdrop. Yet, could any other approach, even if forever intersubjectively emergent, be more convincing for researchers who contemporarily see their work primarily as rhetorical devices (e.g. Denzin 2001a; Shankar and Patterson 2001; Kozinets and Belk 2006)?

2.3.4 Various Epistemological and Methodological Approaches for Different Takes on Knowledge

> "If social exchanges are the same as Art, how can we portray them?" (Kip Jones)

CCT is such a vast field of methodological approaches, epistemic pursuits and even diverging ontologies (e.g. the recent introduction of Practice Theory into CCT, see 2.9 for an overview) that it resists categorization, and indeed, from its inception, such a resistance follows consistently from its pluralistic underpinnings. Many potential approaches for knowledge production based on these foundations have since been offered, not as competitors for a new hegemony, but as diverse approaches for different kinds of knowledge products and relations. Primarily focusing on various shades of qualitative inquiry (e.g. Schwandt 2000; Goulding 2005) these, often liminal approaches fuse various epistemological and methodological stances – epistemologies

include various ways of 'locating' knowledge and thus producing it through diverse methodological workbench approaches.

Examples include:

- Postmodernism (Firat, Dholakia and Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Dholakia 2006)
- Ethnography (Celsi, Rose and Leigh 1993; Arnould and Wallendorf 1994; Peñaloza 1994; Schouten and McAlexander 1995; Kozinets 2001; Arnould and Price 2006; Üstüner and Holt 2007; Goulding et al. 2009)
- Existential-phenomenology (Thompson, Locander and Pollio 1989; Thompson and Haytko 1997; Goulding 2005)
- Hermeneutics (Arnold and Fischer 1994; Thompson 1997)
- Semiotics (Holbrook and Grayson 1986; Mick 1986; Sherry and Camargo 1987; Arnold, Kozinets and Handelman 2001; Goulding 2005)
- Introspection (Gould 1991, 1995; Wallendorf and Brucks 1993; Brown 1998a; Holbrook 2005)
- Critical Theory (Murray and Ozanne 1991; Bristor and Fischer 1993; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Denzin 2001a)
- Deconstruction (Stern 1996a, 1996b, 1998)
- Practice Theory (Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005; Shove and Pantzar 2005; Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009; Halkier and Jensen 2011; Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011)
- Netnography (Kozinets 2002a, 2009)
- Critique of representation (Smithee 1997 [you may or may not know the man behind the name]; Brown 1998b; Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Bochner and Ellis 2003; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006)

At first glance it would seem that these pluralistic research endeavors fulfill Anderson's wishes in their eclecticism and criticality. Yet, such a diverse field

made it difficult for researchers in the interpretative minority stream(s) to assume a research identity – a critical shortcoming in academia from a pragmatic perspective. Thus, Arnould and Thompson (2005) coined the label Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) to conceptually organize the work conducted during the previous two decades.

As noted by Arnould and Thompson (2005):

> "Consumer culture theory is fulfilling the recurrent calls of consumer research's thought leaders for a distinctive body of theoretical knowledge about consumption and marketplace behaviors. It strives to systematically link individual level (or idiographic) meanings to different levels of cultural processes and structure and then to situate these relationships within historical and marketplace contexts. It presents a continual reminder that consumption is a historically shaped mode of sociocultural practice that emerges within the structures and ideological imperatives of dynamic marketplaces" (p. 875)

Likewise:

> "Interpretive methods are capable of uncovering paradoxes in thoughts and behaviour, and revealing the nature and structure of consumer rationales and justifications, making them especially appropriate for examining this situation wherein people's stated attitudes and behaviours differ. Moreover, this approach allows us to examine the holistic influence of culture, rather than utilizing particular reductionistic dimensions of culture" (Belk, Devinney and Eckhardt 2005: 279-280)

A contrarian view to epistemology:

> "The time for obfuscation and obscurantism masquerading as profundity is past; the time for reasoned rethinking is just beginning" (Hunt 1994: 24)

While on the 'other side', in no loose terms:

> "In social sciences today there is no longer a God's eye view that guarantees absolute methodological certainty. All inquiry reflects the standpoint of the inquirer. All observation is theory-laden. There is no possibility of theory- or value-free knowledge. The days of naive realism and naive positivism are over" (Denzin 2001a: 325)

While rumors of such demise may be greatly exaggerated, CCT has indeed become established as a field of interpretive inquiry into the nature of knowledge uncovered via holistic field site experiences; certainly not in the laboratory. As Belk (1998) states, "As qualitative researchers we are the explorers who leave our desks and go out and observe and talk to consumers in their natural environments. And it is up to us to preserve and present some of the richness and humanity of the consumers we encounter and their worlds, despite the grown-ups [...] who would reduce this complexity to numbers" (p. 309-310). Additionally, CCT is loosely unified through its links to an ontology of constructivism and epistemological interpretivism (of which the former is now somewhat questioned by the recent introduction of Practice Theory) and its interest in understanding profound, rich and culturally complex and overlapping phenomena. This inquiry has consistently defied

'progression', 'truth' or 'reductionism' of the more 'positivistically' orientated discourses, as "Owning to its internal, fragmented complexity, consumer culture does not determine action as a causal force" (Arnould and Thompson 2005: 869).

Earlier attempts to establish a 'field' for interpretive research have been made as well. Hudson and Ozanne (1988) contrasted the interpretive against the 'positivist' and Shankar and Patterson (2001) constructed the 'ICR' (Interpretive Consumer Research) concept in their review of interpretive epistemologies in consumer research. They projected a very poststructuralist future with lessening influence of the 'positivist' backdrop, increasing influence of reflexivity and even artistic approaches (Shankar and Patterson 2001).

More recently, CCT scholars have been characterized as contextually investigating the "sociocultural processes and structures related to 1) consumer identity projects, 2) marketplace cultures, 3) the sociohistoric patterning of consumption, and 4) mass-mediated marketplace ideologies and consumers' interpretive strategies" (Arnould and Thompson 2005: 871), and to situate these ideas of marketplace phenomena into historical marketplace contexts. While both the concept 'CCT' and the fourfold categorization of the research approaches have been criticized for being a totalizing closed system and as trying to establish a new logocentric 'theory' towards which to progress, Arnould and Thompson (2007) clarify their position by insisting that the CCT label was set up mostly to pragmatically improve the academic careers of interpretive researchers by giving them a vernacular rallying point, and that "Our framework for mapping this diversity into four clusters of theoretical interest should be used as an orienting device and nothing more" (Arnould and Thompson 2007: 6). Indeed, the framework is expanding as we speak. A recent Facebook update by Eric Arnould noted: "Most importantly it made me think that the work that Craig Thompson, Zeynep Arsel, Gokcen Coskuner-Balli, Aric Rinfleisch, Markus Giesler, Ashley Humphries, Melea Press and others have been doing, some of Rob Kozinets and colleagues work for instance, about market creation, formation, and reformulation is really an important direction for CCT not captured in the fourfold theoretics Craig and I wrote about almost 7 years ago". It seems that, criticism notwithstanding, the CCT framework is working satisfactorily in providing nonlimiting systematization that is open for extensions – exactly what Arnould and Thompson called for (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 2007).

Arnould and Thompson (2005, 2007) also provide a practical account of the shortcomings of CCT researchers in their jargon and in their ability to construct linkages to other academic discourses in promoting their cause – seemingly persistent challenges, as I was most recently involved in such a

debate at the CCT5 and the ACR 2011 conferences. The current problems of a minority field notwithstanding, there is also a flipside that I feel has constituted much of the driving force behind CCT. Not taking any epistemology for granted and the lack of a single theoretical and methodological focus can (and does) translate into a greater degree of freedom to pursue a diversity of research interests. This position, combined with a brazen approach to take philosophical questions seriously, can allow the CCT field to further evolve rather than to stagnate. Yet, as noted by Arnould and Thompson (2005, 2007), there is a more pragmatic game of institutional politics that needs to be played, as CCT researchers still constitute a small minority in the academic hallways of top-tier university departments.

One movement that has been seen as somewhat problematic by many, has consisted of the 'flirtations' some CCT researchers have been making with other areas of inquiry, for example by incorporating more artistic approaches into the ongoing academic discourse. Such endeavors should not be surprising, as artistic modes of expression, such as poetry, visual representations and ethnographic fictions have certainly made recent inroads into other academic disciplines, such as anthropology and sociology, and, more close to home, into the discourse of organization theory (e.g. Goodall 2000; Denzin 2001a; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Bochner and Ellis 2003). But how can such an intermingling of epistemic pursuits be maintained, after all, is artistic expression not wrapped around a completely different pole from 'science' if seen as:

> "The creation of art is a ritually potent sphere often connected in human history to gift giving, mysticism, animism, irrationalism, countercultural movements, and authenticity" (Kozinets 2002b: 30)

> "Producing interesting theoretical perspectives is, I think, a matter of rejecting the premises of science and embracing those of art [...] That is, in our data collection and representation we should eschew the cold precision and hollow mechanical language of science in order to become both literary and visual artists in crafting compelling documents for today's visual world" (Belk 1998: 331)

And indeed, while some see these movements as posing a risk for CCT in its striving to become further established under academic auspices (Arnould and Thompson 2005), such thinking is well in line with the postmodern/poststructuralist movements. This fear is certainly relevant from a pragmatic perspective, if it is believed that such liberty in academic expression will automatically mean decreased relevance in the political game of academic prowess. Yet, if we continue to move further from the arcane notion of truths-for-certain, or the progression towards a single truth, would it not be curious if different expressive approaches would not be accepted as well, or as Kavanagh (1994) states, "if marketing is to provide new insights [...] it should broaden its attendant philosophical discussion from the

philosophy of science to aesthetics, metaphysics, technology and theology" (p. 36; see also Belk 1986). Bold claims indeed, and perhaps some of the ongoing tensions reflect the insecurities of some researchers in the CCT community, who feel (and rightly so) that they have battled so long for more qualitatively-oriented approaches against 'the numbers as truth' approach that they feel these new types of expressions will jeopardize the ongoing political game, or as Kozinets and Belk (2006) put it in terms of videographic work: "Somehow, the association with art deprivileges and delegitimizes videography, making it seem more entertainment than knowledge" (p. 343). As will be discussed further in this study, there is indeed a pressing need to take the epistemic implications of such 'entertainment' very seriously (see also Martin, Schouten and McAlexander 2006; Sunderland 2006).

A balance between expressive strategies and epistemological approaches will hopefully emerge in such ways that CCT research will not forevermore continue to be touted as consisting of 'entertaining esoterica', something unscientific and without relevance (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 2007; see also Belk 2009). Yet, it seems that CCT researchers often appear to feel that they are *the* producers of relevance in consumer research if anyone is, a notion that we can hear echoing since as early as the 30's, when the first frustrations with the inapplicability of research solely utilizing quantitative methods emerged (Levy 2006; see also Martin, Schouten and McAlexander 2006; Sunderland 2006 for a contemporary perspective). Indeed, it does seem that while it is admitted that there were some shortcomings in the project to market the CCT field (Arnould and Thompson 2007), the relevance question has not received sufficient interest. But what would be 'relevance' for CCT? And how could such relevance be marketed amidst the intercolumniations of prestigious academic hallways? At least in Europe, it seems that ethnographic approaches are swiftly making their way into managers' decision-makings regarding corporate research activities and projects, not to compete, but to coexist with conventional quantitative approaches. Concurrently, numerous market research organizations offering 'ethnographic only' research are beginning to mushroom around us. Indeed, there are many examples where managers seem to have surpassed the creativity of expression which we now pursue in academia e.g. in terms of utilizing ethnographic storytelling and videography (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Martin, Schouten and McAlexander 2006; Sunderland 2006). Is this a promise for future relevance? And yet, is it not the promise of CCT to go much further? Indeed, why do we always seem to be axiomatically indebted to the managers in their respective organizations (see also Holbrook 1985; Sherry 2008)? Should it not be, as stated already long ago by Arndt (1976) that: "The 'self-evident' orientation toward marketing practitioners as the key reference group could well be replaced by an endorsement of a true consumer

frame of reference" (p. 218). It would seem, that one task of CCT could be to continue to go beyond such given positions and to tap into the society around us from the perspective of the consumers and their well-being (Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Denzin 2001a). Could such, still somewhat nascent, approaches open doors for completely new bedfellows, such as non-profit organizations and government interest groups? Would that be a new source of relevance? Time will tell.

2.3.5 Early Proliferations of CCT's Interpretive Epistemologies

While CCT, from its inception some three decades ago, has been on the forefront of interpretive inquiry in marketing/consumer research, we can today see its nascent proliferation to other fields of marketing. These links and growing interests to add more plurality into research approaches are most easily spotted in the often closely related field of retailing (e.g. Arnold, Kozinets and Handelman 2001; Kozinets et al. 2002; Borghini et al. 2009) by bringing in immersive ethnographic approaches and semiotic analysis, in the fields of relationship marketing (e.g. Gummesson 2000, 2003, 2005) and business-to-business marketing (e.g. Cova and Salle 2008; Borghini, Carù and Cova 2010) so as to generally advocate for the recognition of interpretivism and its openness to various methodological approaches as epistemologically relevant for the production different types of knowledge.

In addition, CCT has become to incorporate some perspectives from other fields of marketing, notably from the field of relationship marketing with the advent of 'Service-Dominant Logic' (e.g. Vargo and Lusch 2004, 2006). This work has been initiated by Peñaloza and Venkatesh (2006), who, in line with the basic tenets of S-D Logic, stress the value of market offerings *in use*, to further the notion of markets as historically contextual social constructions, where the producer/consumer dichotomy is becoming increasingly problematic as consumers become seen as social collectives that are active producers, not only 'receivers' of value (see also Cova and Dalli 2009). Similarly, Arnould (2006) explored the concept of the consumer in accordance with S-D Logic and found linkages between value creation in active experiencing and consuming for the construction of more managerially-oriented possibilities into the CCT toolkit.

I wish to end this admittedly brief overview of CCT research with some very recent echoes from the field. By attending both the CCT5 conference in Evanston and the ACR2011 in St. Louis, I have come to sense some recent developments that are bubbling under the surface, perhaps to emerge in the near future.

Growing interest seems to be amassing around inquiry into the material spaces and temporality, that would allow for some reconsideration of the

established epistemological approaches anchored in symbolism and retrospective meaning-makings. These approaches move the unit of analysis from meaning-makings into the spatiotemporal emergence and evolution of consumption without forgetting the agency of the material (nonhuman) realm. Additionally, interest in consumer well-being and 'transformative consumer research' (TCR) seem to be gaining considerable ground as well. These shifts are accompanied with further interest in the critique and experimentation with various types of representational approaches. It seems to me that critical research, videography and even neoromantic approaches, such as poetry and more mystical aspects of consumption, may continue to be growing hot topics. Recently, the proverbial grapevine has been buzzing with talk about reigniting the more philosophically oriented debate in the *Journal of Consumer Research*.

Additionally, evolutionary aspects of marketplaces and consumption are seemingly emerging as a new locus of interest. There is a noticeable movement from synchronic 'snapshot' research approaches and representations to longitudinal assessments of marketplace dynamics of consumption and consumer communities (e.g. Giesler 2008). This would appear to relate to the aforementioned Facebook quote by Eric Arnould (see 2.3.4).

And while there has been considerable debate about which academic discourses could team up with CCT approaches, it would seem that nothing very impactful and lasting has so far come about. From my perspective, what would seem to be most promising at this point would be the increasing adoption and cross-pollination of practice theory (e.g. Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009; Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011), organization theory (first suggested by Deshpande and Webster 1989), consumer well-being from critical theory perspectives (first suggested by Murray and Ozanne 1991; see also Denzin 2001a), and even post-materialism (e.g. McLarney and Chung 1999). Certainly, these are my own fleeting ruminations, but at the very least it would seem that CCT is filling its promise of continuing to be a divergent and evolving field.

2.3.6 Videography in CCT

> "Someone needs to do for film what William Ivins did for prints (1953) and Estelle Jussim did for photography (1983) – that is, explore the transformative potential of film on the human self-image. Now that human beings can see themselves in a way not possible with the unaided eye, what do they see and what are the consequences? [...] I know of no scholarly literature dealing with the uses of image technology that does not suffer from a naïve belief in the objective quality of photographed data or concentrate on the technical [...] For ethnographic film to succeed, audiences must understand that they are looking at an introspection – a thick description – by an ethnographer based on his or her experiences in trying to understand the social reality of those portrayed and not a 'copy of nature'" (Jay Ruby)

> "Reworking memory and tradition as fantastic forms of cultural desire – rather than sites of authenticity – ontologies of loss can become allegories of desire" (Catherine Russell)

> "We believe that this issue [first CMC DVD special issue 2005] will break several bounadaries toward a better future of scholarship. It is a first of its kind but will not be the last" (Fuat Firat)

With the initiation of a videographic session at ACR in 2000, consumer research utilizing the audiovisual moving image has now traversed a journey over a decade long (Belk and Kozinets 2010). However, utilizing video as a way to produce ethnographic data in consumer research goes much further, in fact, to the very beginnings of CCT-oriented research approaches, as video cameras were present in the 'consumer research odyssey' (e.g. Belk 1987; Sherry 1987; see also 2.3.3). In addition, the field of documentary-type videographic work has already spanned a period of close to a century, from when the anthropologist Robert Flaherty conducted his seminal film study *Nanook of the North* about the Inuit life near Hudson's Bay (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009; Belk 2011). More recently, with the proliferation of affordable technologies and an emergence of a more video-oriented culture (Belk 2001; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006), the submissions to the ACR 'Film Festival' have become increasingly internationally diverse and technically proficient (Belk and Kozinets 2010). Yet, to date, one is at a loss to find more than a handful of publications considering the methodological issues of this medium and its expression at academic venues (see Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009; Belk 2011, for notable exceptions). Moreover, while these extant articles have been informative and useful, time still seems to await for a more thorough and systematic consideration about the medium's possible ontological and epistemological potential as well as practical workbench approaches. This state of being became the driving force behind this work.

As we have seen, CCT embraces inquiry with diverse epistemologies and pluralistic methods and has already made inroads into potential alternative modes of expressing research than the proverbial 'academic technical style of prose'. To go further, the fact that most research in the field has been

represented in a textual format alone is beginning to seem regrettable (De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009), and moreover, "even with fewer exceptions it has been silent" (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 335). It is certainly striking how little normative (not in the 'there is one right form' sense) work has been published on the workbench level of making of ethnographic research on video medium (Russell 1999; see also Marcoux and Legoux 2005 for a notable exception), probably a symptom (and perhaps a great opportunity) of the field's continuing nascence and the difficulty of defining it.

In fact, accounting for the history of the videographic method in consumer research is a surprisingly irritating task, if one in looking to find any videographies dating before the first *Consumption, Markets & Culture* special issue in 2005 (see Appendix 2 for a table of the two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; Vol. 10]). What seems that we are left with are some miscellaneous ACR addresses and personal conversations with the pioneers to go by (as I attended my first film festival as late as in 2008), together with the abstracts of the ACR and CMC special issue video submissions that often have very little to do with the making of the video itself (rather resembling 'mini-articles'). Initial concerns, somewhat typical while indeed very pressing, concerned the possibility of peer reviewing videographic research and the ability of tenure track boards to evaluate them, but they also recognized the potential for video media to reach wider audiences, as compared to written research papers in academic journals (Belk 2001). Throughout the subsequent years, the international submissions were quick to outnumber the American-based, and a multitude of expressive approaches and increasing technical skills have emerged (Belk and Kozinets 2011).

While few in number, the publications in the field have outlined an easily approachable foundation to build on. The most pressing question is certainly why to engage in this type of methodology at all – what is that is different about video that warrants its utilization?

In extant work on videography, CCT scholars have attempted to establish an initial foundation regarding a general need for video as a medium via which to express research. Kozinets and Belk (2006) noted the life of consumers to be distinguished "not merely by thoughts, attitudes and concepts, but by the colors, shapes, noises, motions and sounds of people and things in constant interaction [...] consumer culture is bright and noisy" (p. 335) and video "can be resonant, emotional, vibrant and humanizing [providing audiences a] vicarious sense of experience that deepens understanding and fosters empathy" (p. 340). Likewise, it has been noted that while ethnographic data production makes wide use of visual aids and contextual settings, researchers have commonly only included such images in the appendixes of published textual work, almost as an afterthought (De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009;

see e.g. Peñaloza 1998 for a notable exception). Some have made inroads into other videographic approaches as well, utilizing multi-methods for the consideration of more metrics-oriented research on how to better produce 'accurate' representations (Spanjaard and Freeman 2007), and while not exactly in line with the CCT underpinnings of this study, illustrate the multiple ways of how video could be utilized in research stemming from diverse ontological and epistemological underpinnings.

The problematic epistemic nature of the video medium has also become widely recognized. Kozinets and Belk (2006) raise this issue by acknowledging an inherent dualism regarding the medium: "As a grounded reality, videography could be thought to be much more like the real world [...] these arguments tend to mistake videographic simulation for reality [...] videographies are narratives just as surely as are written texts" (p. 339). Thus for them, the comparison of video work with the realm of art rather than of science does not constitute much of a menace; in fact "seeing research as equal parts art and science can be extremely liberating" (p. 343). Then again, along with some 'positivist' notions of CCT as "entertaining esoterica" (Arnould and Thompson 2005: 870; see also Belk and Kozinets 2005a), or as the 'appetizer' (Belk 2009; see also Sunderland 2006) for 'real' science, this is hardly a surprise. Legitimization may have to be arrived on by internally expanding the field together with the ever-intensifying proliferation of video technologies, as we seem to have firmly come past the adoption-of-positivist-trappings by now. Where might this acceptance of artistic pluralism take us? Is there any rescue from our academic practice becoming art? Should there be? Many contemporary scholars have begun to reject this 'danger' and are starting to embrace it (e.g. Belk 1998; Denzin 2001b; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Ellis and Bochner 2003; Kozinets and Belk 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; see also Van Maanen 1995; Russell 1999). We have seen from the modernistic and realist inclination of some visual anthropologists, that a historical commitment to objectivity renders the moving image too easily into the realm of 'empirical evidence' alone (e.g. Russell 1999). The same would seemingly be the case regarding some of the lingering realism in CCT and the ideas to 'better capture the reality' in terms of videographic work. Certainly, there will be no conclusive pragmatic solution to these issues here – rather, how can we maintain our philosophically intricate positions in the future, while remaining relevant in a world (still) seemingly too hesitant to accept them. What seems to be sometimes insufficiently discussed is that such a movement for gaining political ground for relevance is perhaps not one of argumentation or articulation, but of carving our own established positions in academic auspices. Let us be reflexive when undertaking such uninvitingly hegemonic pursuits.

As we have seen, at a workbench level, Kozinets and Belk (2006) crafted four criteria as a stating point for discussions to assist CCT videographers in their work – the 1) topical criterion the 2) theoreticality criterion, the 3) theatreticality criterion and the 4) technicalty criterion. Their concerns were that videographies in CCT need to focus on consumption phenomena (while the field is certainly broad), that the finished works should go beyond mere descriptions and also incorporate theory-building, that videos need to take advantage of the medium by telling convincing and evocative stories, and that the technical expertise needs to be sufficient so as to not undermine the potential insightfulness of the work (as is surely the case with textual expression as well). They go on to recognize that such criteria are intended as liberating rather than restricting – something of guidance and on which to build – as we will later attempt (see 3.3.1).

In the literature, one also finds a more pragmatic backdrop. It is not only that video opens new avenues for producing, analyzing and expressing research, but it also seems that many companies have increasingly become interested in using it both for internal communications and for learning about the contexts of consumers' consumption practices, not to mention that video has become virtually expected as a teaching aid in classrooms (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 2005a; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). Yet, there is still no firmly established, respected and citable repository (or 'journal') of quality videographic work in consumer research, and the field is still in its early stages in terms of making its voice heard and in building its influence from within (Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). This renders extant work to offer very little academic traction – and even a persisting ephemerality (Belk 2011). But while printed work may have more physical gravitas, we may remind ourselves of Cubitt's (1991) arguments and reconsider the nature of the medium, so that it does not compete with text in a futile attempt to mimic, for example, journal publication structures, but rather, to embrace the potential differences and put them to full use.

Contemporary videography, by its very digital nature, is not confined onto pages or within incumbent journal institutions – it is free to express and popularize academic research through the Internet. Video is not text, it is not a faithful image of reality, and it will most certainly resist a lockdown by the modern gatekeepers of academic knowledge production. It is of pure illusion, but has the potential to be very convincing due to its inherent experiential, resonant and vibrant nature. Video is not a 'representation' or 'reproduction', it is an expressive 'encounter' (see also Deleuze 1994a). The question is how we can understand what this encounter is like (the 'bright and noisy' the 'more real' etc.) and how this nature can be put to use for it to be convincing in whatever pragmatic sense we are striving for.

Let us conclude this section by briefly considering the two special DVD issues of *Consumption, Markets & Culture* (see Appendix 2 for a table of the two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; Vol. 10]). These constitute some of the first examples of videographic work in consumer research that have been published in a refereed academic journal. The form (from what I hear due to publication reasons) was the following: the authors were instructed to produce brief 'printable' textual accounts of their videographies that were published in the issues alongside a DVD disc. However, perhaps due to the nascence of this form of publication, a distinct separation between the textual accounts and the videographic works seems to have emerged. The brief textual accounts seem to resemble 'mini-articles', where the role of the video is not brought to the forefront. There seems to be a considerable emphasis on presenting the video only as a part of the research, or seeing the videography as a supplement to the textual account (again as something of an 'afterthought'). In fact, in many of these studies, 'videography' is not included in the keywords at all. Only a few studies reversed this practice and gave predominance to the videography by giving the text a more explanatory role – usually for establishing descriptions of background information (Henry and Caldwell 2007; Smith, Fisher and Cole 2007). Some went even further to problematize the nature of videography itself in the textual account (Marcoux and Legoux 2005; Smith, Fisher and Cole 2007).

In fact, only Marcoux and Legoux (2005) make their concerns explicit regarding the reasons for conducting videographic research in academia. Instead of a companion or an account of theoretical or conceptual background information, their text provides an interestingly detailed description of their practices of videography production, from the *in situ* empirical work to their decisions on the editing table. In their descriptions of video practice, the emergent and iterative (even haphazard) nature of video work takes precedence, as their original visit to the site was not initially intended to become the videographic production under review, the idea for which emerged from only three minutes of data through sudden realization facilitated by the "show up effect" (Marcoux and Legoux 2005: 243) of video material (see also Hastrup 1992). As video expresses contextual relations it goes beyond the reflections in fieldnotes, thus making for the possibility to foreground unconsidered contextual relationships *post facto*. MacDougall (2001) sees similar advantages to video contra costly and cumbersome film production, as "This kind of unexpected by-product – the possibility of going off tangent – is, I think, one of the further benefits of the turn to video" (p. 20). This difference in the medium contra other expressive forms will be further developed as we proceed, and concluded in chapter III. Practical considerations regarding utilizing the special properties of the medium will be further considered in the Production chapter (see IV).

To move on to consider how producing and viewing videography can provide convincing illusions and experiences, let us finish this chapter with two quotes from Deleuze, whose work on ontology, epistemology and cinematographic film we will turn to next, in order to further our perspectives on what aesthetics videographic researchers in CCT could employ to make video in consumer research an ever more convincing medium.

> "What the artist is, is creator of truth, because truth is not to be achieved, formed or reproduced; it has to be created" and "Like the cathedral, its only quality is to have been made by men. Thus it is not hidden by appearances; it is, on the contrary, which hides appearances and provides them with an alibi" (Deleuze 1989: 146)

> "Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but a fundamental encounter" (Deleuze 1994a: 139)

2.4 Videography in CCT, a Deleuzian Perspective

> "The image itself is a the system of relationships between its elements, that is, a set of relationships of time from which the variable present only flows" (Gilles Deleuze)

In the previous sections, we have briefly explored the nature of the video medium as a 'thing' in and of itself, as well as some preliminary approaches to videographic research (as a work of interpretive production and as an academic expression of research). I intended for these considerations to work as 'awareness raisers', initial considerations as we continue towards considering video as an aesthetic, reciprocal and experiential medium that is potentially very different from the experiences of textual accounts of inquiry. However, in constructing an ontology and epistemology for videography in consumer research, specifically in CCT, we first need to mine for some more resources from possible philosophical underpinnings. To do so, I will adopt something of a Deleuzian ontology for understanding the experiencing of video and 'being' in general. Gilles Deleuze, one of the prominent French philosophical thinkers of the contemporary era, has written extensively on the ontology of being from the perspective of 'sense' (Deleuze 1990/1969), representation (Deleuze 1994a/1968), philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1994b/1991) and, fittingly, cinema (Deleuze 1986/1983, 1989/1985). One disclaimer begs to be mentioned here: this study concentrates specifically on videographic research, and is therefore by no means an attempt to do any justice to the voluminous writings of Deleuze. Rather, as I will later suggest, I merely wish to appreciate some perspectives of the Deleuzian approach(es) that I can adapt and incorporate to my exploration of videographic research.

As a thinker, Deleuze is notoriously inaccessible and complicated, even frustrating (Bogue 2003; Colebrook 2006; Williams 2008; Hughes 2009), and it is suggested that his texts are not meant to be read and deciphered, but

rather read "along with Deleuze" (Bogue 2003: 2). Or as Conley (1993) exquisitely puts it:

> "The sentences do not reflect a law, but vary on their implicit form. They are declarative; often composed of two or three independent clauses connected by a colon or conjunctions; unlike a classical concept, they do not seek to recall the origin of a signatory stamp. Attention is shunted away from their composition to the logical process that makes their linkage appear as an unfolding of ideas and shapes [...] The chapters can be read in any order; their conclusions are enveloped everywhere in the 'machinic' manner of the text" (p. xix)

There is a very distinct reason, however, for Deleuze's elliptic and indirect style of writing, a form that often embraces the incomprehensible. While Deleuze might resist this classification, due to an aversion to being compartmentalized into any overarching 'ism' or structure, his ontology often seems thoroughly postmodern or poststructuralist, many a time seemingly borderlining the profoundly nihilistic, while simultaneously retaining some forms of vitalism and emancipatory possibilities that extend to mysticism (e.g. Colebrook 2006; Williams 2008; Hughes 2009). Yet, there are several structures Deleuze utilizes in his complex analysis. In fact, the whole universe is a structure in which relational 'molecular becoming' emergently undergoes. This materialism becomes elevated in the creative thought of humans, where creativity itself transcends the system, but an inherent part of it goes on to resonate with it further. Thus, he does not deny a structural underpinning (or the usefulness of structural thinking), but rather focuses on the transcendental nature of our access to them (through language), and that our knowledge of them is forever uncertain (and never beyond the system but constitutive in and of it – why I use the concept 'expression', see 1.1). Yet, he is certainly "not anti-science, but opposed to an often concealed philosophical restriction of thought under the banner of a defense of fact-based science" (Williams 2008: 32). Indeed, while most philosophical accounts have to do with knowing the world and the justifications for that knowledge (facts), the notion of subjectivity or the meanings or intentions, Deleuze's primary interest is in something more fundamental that underlies these structures. Facts, while important, are merely ephemeral ideas/concepts, and in inquiry, mask more profound inner states on the lower levels of consciousness. It is for these reasons that Deleuze is opposed to any stability in concepts, such as 'meaning', 'truth' or 'being' in itself. Rather than 'cognition', 'understanding', 'knowledge' or 'truth', Deleuze's ontology is substantially more fundamental – an indefinite becoming of relational events.

In his account of being, Deleuze (1990) initially operates on a level beyond consciousness or cognition – to him, all experience is an emergent becoming of senses in a constant interplay of increasing and decreasing intensities on the lowest levels of consciousness or in the realm of the precognitive (Deleuze 1990; Hughes 2009). To exemplify this complexity, he gives an example from *Alice in Wonderland*, where, in a particular scene, Alice increases in size as

compared to what she previously was, but as Deleuze notes, she simultaneously decreases in her sense of her smaller Alice (Williamson 2008: 28). Through this notion, we can immediately see the nonlinearity of the Deleuzean perspective – all sense shifts in intensity simultaneously between two poles. A similar relation is present in the simultaneous fear and joy when we open an old photograph album, as we fear to see how distant we have become with respect to our childhood, all the while we are content with becoming closer to our fond memories (Williams 2008: 29). Such shifts in experiential intensities go on to pose a fundamental problem that is central to Deleuze. Our language fails in describing them. As Hughes (2009) states, "We then realize it is impossible to speak of intensity and precisely because "we have no language to express what is in becoming'" (p. 20). Thus, we see that language in itself poses a problem for Deleuze, as well as the notion of constant ephemerality of the shifting experience – a shift that is unutterable and always occurs in between two poles, moving away from something while approaching something else. As Williamson states:

> "Supposing that we do not – and cannot – say what we mean (the full sense we generate as a presupposition), the regression is then that each time we attempt to capture our presupposed sense we generate another one, to infinity [...] 'We always have more sense than we think' [or can ever express in language]" (Williamson 2008: 54)

This is becoming and emergence for Deleuze, an unsettling qualitative shifting between intensities of the past and the future, making our present an emergent flux on the move.

While some hastily label Deleuze's work as utterly unbecoming sophism, for the more contemplative it should now come as no surprise why he was compelled to write in such a fashion. He is constantly testing the limits of language, for:

> "We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write. To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until tomorrow – or rather, to make it impossible" (Deleuze 1994: xxi)

Thus, his wordplays, sentences, and chapters that begin out of nowhere and seem to end similarly, are seemingly his way of proving the point. As he analyzes the unutterable and this ephemeral and eternally elusive experience that is constantly on the move (no stable structure to utilize or return to), he brings it forth in text that is composed of indirect discourse (Hughes 2009). As there is no center, logos, or structure to represent, he goes on to show this by only attempting to seed new becomings and new relations, within his text, between the text and the reader and between the reader and the world. The text thus aspires not to situate itself or the reader, but to bring about new experiences by moving the reader from his/her comfort zone. This comes about in indirect, elliptic and circular writing, by contradicting himself and by

extensive use of paradoxes (like the Alice example) and humor. The text strives to make the reader puzzled and uncertain in order to invoke new experiences of becoming that stretch infinitely to new relations beyond the reader.

2.4.1 Sense, Event, Series, Singularity

Central to Deleuzean philosophy are the concepts of sense, series and the event. Put simply (if this only were possible), the sense is a change in intensity in the lower levels of consciousness. Within the changes of intensity in these shifting senses, our being and action becomes lunged forward in social and cultural settings and in all forms of life. The sense always stretches into two directions, toward an increasing intensity and away from another. It is never cognition that speaks, because there is always sense before it (Williams 2008: 91). Indeed, cognition expects a 'completed' and static state whereas sense is prior (i.e. the emerging sensation) in becoming.

Videography note (2):

Emerging intensities of senses and their expression can be interpreted in BIP as the second author (the autoethnographic researcher) explains defeat while being close to tears. In this scene he moves toward a realization of defeat but equally constructs possibilities that may lie in the future.

Additionally, in the course of the both the PTS and the PMW projects, the autoethnographic member expressed multiple feelings of distancing, while becoming more analytically aware of the social practices he used to enthusiastically engage in his community, he simultaneously notes a melancholy sense of disenchantment. While moving toward understanding, intensities seem to carry with them a simultaneous emergent distanciation, even melancholy, banality.

For Deleuze, senses become constituted into events, and the event is something that lunges the subconscious to experience new intensities, a "novel selection in ongoing and continually altering series" (Williams 2008: 2). All of experience, the collective being of all things thus becomes a resonating and indefinite rhizomatic mesh of senses and events that connect and interconnect into an infinite series where one event changes one sense and its becoming in the series (say, action in a social setting), which causes events in other series (how the sense of other beings [human and nonhuman] in the setting is altered), resonating and creating new senses in relations without end. There is a sort of structural-poststructural distinction about sense and its intensities here, as we see (somewhat paradoxically) how Deleuze breaks out of the stability of cognitivism to connect it with the structures of material (and bodily) emergence. Rational pursuits are thus deemphasized, as there is more in how both the subconscious (through shifting intensities of sense and subsequent affects) and the conscious (interpretation and the subsequent qualitative distinctions) intertwine. There is more than rational understanding, and this understanding is a material and bodily one, allowing us to "associate this material inscription with an emotional one; to generate affirmative change that runs through each replaying of the initial event" (Williams 2008: 18). This seems to point out that changes in material emergence (and in our embodiment) evoke shifting senses to which we then assign affective qualities (was a change e.g.

'good'/'bad'). Sense in itself, in its indefinite unfolding, is always neutral, the qualities we assign to them determine how (always socioculturally shifting) they influence new relations "*reverberating forward and back in time*" (ibid.: 4, emphasis in the original), or:

> "Like the cathedral, its only quality is to have been made by men. Thus it is not hidden by appearances; it is it, on the contrary, which hides appearances and provides them with an alibi [...] What the artist is, is creator of truth, because truth is not to be achieved, formed or reproduced; it has to be created" (Deleuze 1989: 146)

For further consideration, we need to add the concept of the singularities, which "are a matter for the surface, that is the surface between the depth of bodies [in a very literal and physical sense] and the height of ideas, where 'between' means operating in both" (ibid.: 107). Singularity could be seen as the physical indication of an event that connects embodiment to changing shifts of senses and thus changes ideas (e.g. the first gray hair or "It was the morning when my father stared back from the mirror" [ibid.: 93]). One must not confuse the singularity as a mere physical attribute, however, as "The singularities aren't the actual knots and bends in the stick [the physical attributes of a piece of wood that determine its potential for usage], but the relation between these and the ideas surrounding them" (ibid.: 110). Thus, senses change in intensities in resonating series as events change their reverberating relations. These events have a physical 'surface' that attaches the continuum of emerging embodiment to the other end of the pole and of ideas to the other. The surface is the condition for open renewal of the relations between the two poles (ibid.). Such abstract notions find more grounding, as we go on to consider the potential of material agency in non-representational theory (see 2.9.2).

Events and singularities reverberate with the intensities along the series, yet are simultaneously transformed by the series themselves causing new senses of individuation. Series should not be confused with sequences as there is no prior ordering (Williams 2008), and neither can an experience emerge from emptiness, for there are no novel starts (something loosely comparable to a hermeneutical notion). There is thus no center and no linearity in any series or the subsequent agency arising from it. Neither does this notion imply reductive possibilities in any way – the changes of the intensities of sense and subsequent human agency have nothing to do with choices or free will, only the outcomes of resonating intensities of experience. There are two poles in the manifestation of the shifting senses, there is always both depth and surface – deep emotional states, and how these states go on to constitute relations with the embodiment of the spatiotemporal and material arrangements. Thus:

> "Relation is not the property of objects, it is always external to its terms. It is also inseparable from the open [all material and experiential emergence], and displays a spiritual or mental existence. Relations do not belong to the objects, but to the whole, on condition that this is not confused with a closed set of objects [e.g. an experiment design]. By movement in space, the objects of a set change their respective positions. But, through relations, the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively. We can say of duration itself or of time that it is the whole of relations" (Deleuze 1986: 10)

This we can also see from the aforementioned *Alice in Wonderland* example (Williamson 2008: 27). The actual event is thus a spatiotemporally manifesting material occurrence (e.g. spilling of coffee in an increasing state of aggravation [ibid.]), and that event is also of depth as in its changing of the spiller's sense of aggravation extending to his past of the reasons for his easily aggravatable nature and to the future of how this aggravation brings about new senses with relation to this past. Through videography, we can potentially produce spatiotemporal illusions of emerging relations at both the deep and surface levels by utilizing certain forms of visuals, considered further [see 2.5]). Furthermore, for Deleuze, an individual is not a distinct entity, but rather a process of individuation, as novel events bring about new intensities of sense that instill action (Williams 2008: 89). There is no stable or static state of being, only constant becoming. This is true of videography as well, as we will later discuss. Social settings in spatiotemporally embodied surroundings offer glimpses of this becoming, this shifting of intensities that resonate across all individuating series. One must note that textual accounts cannot express the resonant emergence in similar ways, as they rather describe one particular perspective into phenomena (see also 3.2). Text is the emergence of a perspective put forth via a certain textual structure, whereas video is an expression of multiple ones, each with emerging spatiotemporal agency (including the perspective, but reaching beyond, as we will soon see).

Videography note (3):

Thus, when we film social settings, what we see are the altercations in intensities in indefinite resonating series that go on to constitute new relations both within and beyond the setting that our video illusionarily expresses.

In PTS, we do not see tensions contained in the social settings – we see a glimpse of the global resonance of intertwined series where shifting senses constitute resonating series that emerge in a complex and emerging negotiation of cultural meanings. We attempted such illusions by not constructing and expressing interviews (or 'interrogations') of 'talking heads', but rather we produce perspectives into conversations within meaningful spatiotemporal contexts – this might potentially create more convincing illusions of the emergence of both intensities and meaning-makings (see IV).

Additionally, via videography, we can see glimpses of both the depth and surface in the emergence of shifting senses. The depth is one of changes in intensity that are the altercations in affect (the expression of emotional states, see also 2.6.2) and the surface the relations of these changing senses with the spatiotemporal and material arrangements that both constitute and restrict the social settings.

If we draw parallels to the CCT discourse, we can see how these infinitely resonating series of senses (albeit precognitive) can be recognized in hermeneutical frameworks (e.g. Thompson 1997; Gadamer 2004/1976) that note on the becoming of subjects through their interaction, the 'fusion of horizons', and call for the need for reflexivity and empathy in ethnographic research (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; see also Van Maanen 1995; Ruby 2000; Brownlie 2006 Pink 2006; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; Goodall 2000; Richardson 2000). But these notions are fixed in the cognitive constructions of realities, and, with the conceptual tools of Deleuze, we can add ideas of experiential subconscious becoming and material agency. Indeed, when the researcher enters into and learns about the social context and relations s/he is changed, but likewise, so are both those under study and the very constituent material context itself (through action or relations that will bring about future action). In both, these events cause shifting senses and altercations in their series that go on to call for reflexive consideration in research and empathy in the act of interpretation. And, as it should be clear, these processes never reach a consummation, but rather manifest in a moment where the work of interpretative perspective is reported as a work of research – for us, at best, a narrative of convincing academic fiction. See 3.1 on how videographic research in consumer culture theory is conceptualized as an emergent becoming of relations simultaneously within and beyond the research settings.

2.4.2 Deleuze on Empirical Inquiry and Research

Due to his work of constant decentering, emergence and shifting intensities that draw from a chaotic multitude of series and stretch until infinity (not to mention his moral holism, as there is no structure to draw a moral reference from [Williams 2008: 11]), it is easy to erroneously see Deleuze as someone whose philosophy is overwhelmingly steeped into nihilism. While such a reading may hold for a scientific realist with the inclination to construct science as a process toward some specifiable goal or 'progress' (e.g. Hunt 1991), this would be too hasty a judgment. While it seems certain that Deleuze is on many fronts incompatible with hypothesis testing, falsification or statistical validation, he is certainly not opposed to empirical pursuits – only

his seem to veer into an offbeat nature (Williams 2008: 49). Rather, he focuses on more fundamental questions of ontology, as "It could never be enough to give an empirical or naturalistic account of these processes as different practical extensions, since this could not account for the metaphysical basis for the multiplicity, for its relation to the unconscious, to language and sense" (Williams 2008: 194).

Contemporary 'positivism', or naïve realism, as a pursuit of reductive knowledge products can certainly work in a pragmatist sense, but as we have seen, only in 'easily closable systems' that our epistemic imagination sociohistorically allows for – while often disregarding the political underpinnings of any such research endeavor. Thus, in line with his notions of liberating creative thought, Deleuze's empirical work would not try to affirm a result, but rather his 'higher empiricism' (or 'superior empiricism', an example of Deleuzean playfulness in wording [Williams 2008: 103, 106]) would be one of uncovering multiple and divergent perspectives into phenomena (ibid.). Deleuze is not an advocator of 'knowledge' as his philosophy eschews such logocentric cores, rather one could see him as a proponent of the eternal extension of the human mind – stretching the imagination to its broadest limits, because:

> "'Mankind always sets itself only such tasks it can solve' – not because practical or speculative problems are only the shadow of pre-existing solutions but, on the contrary, because the solution necessarily follows from the complete conditions under which the problem is determined as a problem, from the means and the terms which are employed in order to pose it" (Deleuze 1994a: 159)

Similarly to Deleuze's notion of not directly opposing traditional science, his thought on empiricism is rather intended to expand and offer novel perspectives so as to add to the existing ones and "to interact with them critically and constructively" (Williams 2008: 49) and to experiment with language while conducting research. In a sense, there is no denial of the pragmatic value of empirical science here either, rather a shift in the level of ontological and epistemological approach. What thus becomes interesting is not any measurement or its accuracy, but their relation to sense (how scientific experiments resonate in the series of relations between actors through singularities and events). This is their effect on our world as a whole (and beyond).

As a further notion on empirical work, for Deleuze, one important question is what it is that can be quantified. Due to his interest in the subconscious (intensities of sense) emergence of individualized relations that have efficacy ad infinitum through their reverberations, it is not surprising that anything as unstable as language cannot be of value unless the spurious 'realness' of imagined closed systems is taken axiologically. As stated, we can certainly do so, and in many fields pragmatic outcomes can be surely derived from such work as there is, albeit only provisional and commonsensical, tendency for

matter to form isolatable systems (Bogue 2003: 24). However, for Deleuze, intensities cannot be quantified, as in his philosophical system based on emergence, the comparison of, for example, psychological events as static and complete objects autonomously and simultaneously present in a fixed system makes little sense. It is exactly the changing (the different and intertwined) relations of these states what would interest Deleuze. It also follows, that we would forever lack any plausible access to such entities both cognitively and through the impossibility of language to describe their shifting emergence. Similarly, these shifts individualize in affects and then into qualitatively distinguished emotions. The changes in the intensities of sense that bring about the actualization of the shift of one affect into another cannot be quantified, as they are not changes of one quantitative state (such as more loneliness) but of qualitative (linguistic) difference ('small amounts of estrangement' to 'wrenching and hopeless solitude'). As interpreted by Bogue (2003), "To quantify psychological states is to change a sequence of heterogeneous complexes unfolding in time into homogeneous units in timeless space [...] by comparing psychological events to one another as static and completed objects simultaneously present in a fixed space" (p. 13). And as we have seen, these states are not in the same continuum but extend towards different pasts and different futures.

For his nonlinear and nonreductionist positions, Deleuze seems to have been considerably influenced by the mystical metaphysics of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. From Durant's (1961) lively account, we can infer that Bergson forcefully rebelled against a 'positivist' ontology and a reductionist epistemology. In his metaphysic, he reversed the binary of life as a deterministic and reductionistic machine process originating from an ancient cloud of particles (he saw this as the greatest incredulity, rather than as any form of defendable 'rationalism') by foregrounding not the matter but a cumulative temporal flow (*durée*) instead. Life, especially in reflexive thought that emerges from instinct alone, is thus not reductionistic, as, through creativity and multiple layerings of both intuitive and reflexive faculties, it becomes a compounding flux of ever proliferating states, which are not synchronic but ever emergent, as ideas are mere points selected by the memory in the eternal flow of experience. For him, language is the expression of understanding (rational), and while it can be granted that it has its uncontestable place in such a realm, it does not extend to exemplify intuition and life in its vividness – and often (regarding realist science) makes the study of 'life' that what a scientist says when experimenting on a frog's carcass. Or as Deleuze quotes him, "Modern science must be pre-eminently characterized by its aspiration to make time an independent variable" (Deleuze 1986: 4).

Thus, to maintain a metaphysic of an irreducible 'Open Whole' (all material and experiential being, the infinitude of relations in the universe), Deleuze, drawing from the Bergsonian *durée*, constructs how temporal durations are not fixed, even if we often tend to think about time as a homogenous fixed flow (past-present-future) (Deleuze 1989). Yet, Deleuze argues that our psychological experience cannot be reduced in such a fashion, as (borrowing Pierce's firstness-secondness-thirdness) "the three kinds of images are not simply ordinal – first, second, third – but cardinal: there are two in the second, to the point where there is firstness in the secondness, and there are three in the third" (Deleuze 1989: 30). Thus, virtual resonances of past events compose the 'present' states, which actualize potential futures present both now and in the past. Firstness refers to itself only as a pure possibility (or, as we have seen, an intensity), secondness refers to itself through something else (for example a linguistic binary – interpretation), and thirdness refers to a comparison in a relational sense (combinations of resonances, rhizomatic series), or:

> "The present and former presents are not, therefore, like two successive instants on the line of time; rather, the present one necessarily contains an extra dimension in which it represents the former and also represents itself [...] The passive synthesis of habit constituted time as a contraction of instants with respect to a present, but the active synthesis of memory constitutes it as the embedding of presents themselves. The whole problem is: with respect to what? It is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a given former present is reproducible and the present present is able to reflect itself" (Deleuze 1994: 80-81)

In Deleuze's metaphysics, time is of sense and experience itself (not an external objective entity), and is thus not reducible to parts, as all history and future (in relation to sense) occupy every fleeting moment emerging into the next one. In my reading of these notions, we can uncover something that is structural-poststructural simultaneously (as this is at times difficult to distinguish in Deleuze). For while there is a temporal flow in the surface (material) event (such as spilling water on a burning house), this event only reverberates in series through intensities that transcend into the depth of affects (become interpreted [e.g. 'good'/'bad' event]) – where sense is always nonlinear and rhizomatic, always between two poles of intensities in past and future (sorrow for the devastated childhood home – hope for the future edifice that will be the home for so many new senses and events). So in a way there is temporality, but it does not suffice, as it is of surface only, not in the entirety of emergent becoming. This is another case of Deleuzian resistance to the possibility of reductionist epistemology. One could also read similar potential in videography in CCT, as such work draws simultaneously from the senses of the past and future if we construct relational moving images where the participants negotiate the sociocultural setting (both the researchers and the participants), its further actualization as interpretation and videographic

expression (both at the video editing [researchers] stage) and its viewing in various contexts through various technologies (audiences and their relations to other audiences beyond the immediate viewing contexts).

Furthermore, my notion of videographic research does not entail the eschewing of any existing forms of expressing academic research (indeed, data in video format can be utilized as a basis for text-based reporting of research findings in potentially convincing and diverse ways), but rather offer new insights capable of producing broad new resonances within itself and beyond in the academic community (see 3.4). Research by CCT scholars, as an interpretative discourse relying on postmodern frameworks goes on to provide further parallels. As we have seen (see 2.3.4), many such research approaches can be seen to intersect Deleuzean thought, as the emphasis is focused on elaborate contextual interpretations that have the potential to bring about new ways of thinking about consumption phenomena. Additionally, the criticism of representation in the form of both videographic (the ACR conference 'Film Festival') and poetic (the CCT conference 'Poetry Session') research approaches illustrate different ways of bringing about new experiences that go beyond notions of academic text as a sanitizer and compartmentalizer of thought.

2.4.3 How Deleuze Brings about New Relations through Humor, Paradox and Free Indirect Discourse

As we have seen, Deleuze utilizes language in writing so as to not approach any form of a stable understanding. For him, all language is inadequate and unstable and thus is but a means to inspire creative outcomes that bring about new relations of experience. This is poststructural Deleuze *par excellence*, or as Williams (2008) puts it "nonsense is not the absence of sense but rather a presence of an important kind of sense that can only operate through nonsense [...] breaking with the demands of denotation, manifestation and signification, and opening an additional realm of sense" (p. 68). For Deleuze, breaking with the logic of signification and the accurate ('correct') representation and understanding of an expression thus liberates experience and thought into new creative possibilities.

Similarly, Deleuze, in an artistic fashion, attempts to affirm his philosophical position also in the form of his writing, which is constructed in the form of illusory free indirect discourse (Hughes 2009: 15) – writing as an aesthetic tool in and of itself. In addition, Williams (2008) notes that humor was not a mere desirable intricacy for Deleuze, but rather "a central aspect of philosophical teaching and learning" (p. 17). This is very fitting for Deleuzean philosophy, as he is primarily interested in the emergence of new relations in

such ways that do not approach any center, a structure of logos of truth or 'right opinion'. For him:

> "The truthful man in the end wants nothing other than to judge life he holds up a superior value, the good, in the name of which he will be able to judge, he is craving to judge, he sees life an evil; a fault which has to be atoned for: the moral origin of the notion of truth" (Deleuze 1989: 137)

For Deleuze, humor and paradox are suitable vehicles for this, as they do not assume a position of superior knowledge, but rather inspire surprise and new thought in a destabilized way, liberation through initial discomfort and puzzlement (see also Thompson 1990). "Humor selects the eternal side of the event" (Williams 2008: 152), or, "For if irony is the co-extensiveness of being with the individual, or of the I with representation, humor is the co-extensiveness of sense with nonsense. Humor is the art of surfaces and of the doubles, of nomad singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point" (Deleuze 1990: 141). As we will see, this is contrasted by his view on irony, which he sees as a destructive force for similar reasons, as to be ironic presupposes a superior position in relation to something else – it subjugates becoming rather than liberates it. In addition, there is also a physical element in humor that our reactions in its presence bring about. When we react, we affirm that there is more to sensing humor than mere intellectual tasks and rationalization (Hughes 2008: 18).

Videography note (4):

We utilize humor in both BIP and PTS to raise the consciousness of the viewer into the artificial and constructed nature of the videographic illusion we express. In BIP, the closing scene is of the autoethnographer stepping on the paintball field in France. He asks the first author: "Are you in an ethnographic state of mind?" With this utterance, the idea of representing any form of reality is eschewed. Also, it highlights how the autoethnographer is becoming distanced from his former state as the immersed practitioner toward an interpretive researcher.



In PTS, in the interview with a New York based DJ/promoter, his final statement of quitting and mailing his most valued records to Finland is left in the videography to show the hermeneutic and emerging relation between the researchers and the participant. Thus the researcher has become relationally recognized and been 'put on the map' of these powerful cultural agents manifesting in such colorful utterances.

In terms of the moving image, Deleuze (1986) sees the cinematographic expression of clichés as contributing to something similarly negative, as a subtraction of the creative potential of creative use of the moving image. “But how can the cinema attack the dark organization of clichés, when it participates in their fabrication and propagation, as much as magazines and television?” (ibid.: 210). For Deleuze, much of such creative opposition has become overwhelmed by the marginalization of experimental cinema under the realist cinema (comprising mostly of commonsensical expressions of causal relations in unsurprisingly framed spatiotemporal settings) of mainstream Hollywood – such that would, like the great classics, challenge the audience to think beyond the audiovisual ‘representation’. And in line with Cubitt’s (1991) criticism of the never-ending banality of contemporary television, neither can a work of irony overcome this uncomplicated form of cinema, for “the rage against clichés does not lead to much if it is content only to parody them; maltreated, mutilated, destroyed, a cliché is not slow to be reborn from its ashes” (Deleuze 1986: 211) – where the parody itself becomes sanctioned as another expression of cliché itself.

In addition to the examples from our projects, even when not directly attempting to express humorous relations, we can draw more other types of inferences to videography in CCT. As stated in 2.2.1, video has a peculiar relationship with surprise and intimacy that can potentially account for very different intensities and experiences of embodiment as compared to other types of media (e.g. text and photography, see 2.8). Due to the convincing agency of the moving image, it allows (or forcefully imposes) videographic illusions of ‘reality’ – even if the moving image is clearly a fiction (e.g. a horror movie). Reading about ‘tensions in a community of consumption’ is more detached and more tempered by interpretation and textual aesthetics than seeing it ‘in-your-face’, simultaneously before and within the viewers’ embodied experience. For example, “when we squirm and twist in embarrassment and amusement at Allen’s predicaments (a character in Woody Allen’s Annie Hall), it is not because they are fixed, but on the contrary, because they are open” (Williams 2008: 63). These possibilities for discomfort, similar to Deleuze’s notion of humor, open doors for the intensification of new senses through novel events and can thus have the potential to be very evocative, moving and impactful. Thus, consistent with a Deleuzean view, it is this very potential for discomfort that needs to be taken very seriously, possibly even cherished, and video indeed holds this promise. These ideas will be further developed later in the sections problematizing the embodiment of video experience (see 2.8) and further accounting for the ontological and epistemological differences in experiencing the audiovisual moving image contra text (see 2.8 and 3.2).

We have also seen similar approaches in CCT with the aforementioned works on representation (e.g. Thompson 1990; Holt 1991) on poetry (e.g. Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002) and on art (e.g. Belk 1986, 1998; Ellis and Bochner 2003). For example, the work on poetry, as it "releases sense by breaking the bond to syntax" (Williams 2008: 69), foregrounds a relational possibility for my further work of constructing one possible epistemology for videography – which is due to its less textual nature (even though there can be narration and text objects onscreen) a different kind of experience with much potential for the aforementioned 'eternal', rather than the 'sanitized and contained' side of experience. We will turn to this in due course (see 2.7), but now let us continue 'reading alongside Deleuze'.

2.4.4 Deleuze on Representation

> "After all, the output of most marketing research exercises still comprises a representation (verbal delivery) of a representation (academic paper) of a representation (data analysis) of a representation (survey instrument) of a representation (sample) of a representation (respondents' response) of a representation (respondents' mental schemata) of a representation (the researcher's assumption that the topic is worth researching) of a representation (the context – published papers, established theoretical frameworks, etc. – from whence the assumption derives)" (Stephen Brown)

> "In the era of imagology, there is no sovereign 'real' against which to measure the model, or the copy, the fake, the representation" (Douglas Brownlie)

> "The goal is evocation rather than representation" (John Sherry and John Schouten)

One central consideration, when applying Deleuze to a possible ontology of videography in CCT research, is to explore his approaches regarding the concept 'representation'. Up until this point I have been very hesitant to use this concept and have instead utilized the concept 'expression'. Let us now consider the nature of representation further, as both a concept and as an epistemological proposition. What could it mean to represent something? What could we represent in a meaningful way? What meaningful work could this concept do for us? How would we go about it?

As we have already seen, the given position of textual accounts as 'containers' of stable meaning has already been widely questioned by CCT scholars. Such work has included the ACR conference 'Film Festivals', the CCT conference 'Poetry Session' and articles exploring the nature of these types of media and articulations (e.g. Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). These movements emerged from the postmodern/linguistic turn that swept through a broad range of academic disciplines in the late 20th century. This turn emphasized the unstable nature of meaning and texts as well as a similar destabilization of notions such as 'truth' and 'objectivity'. Notions of the possibility for unchanging truthful

knowledge or the possibility for 'true' representation (objective replication of the 'Same') had fallen into crisis (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Van Maanen 1995; Belk 1998; Brown 1998b; Ruby 2000; Goulding 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2005).

But what is the problem in terms of academic video or text? Couldn't we simply take them as some stable accounts of a reality out there? Why hasn't such a definition sufficed? Representation, at a quick glance, seems to us a completely mundane and acceptable concept in academic research. Naturally we represent our research findings according to some criteria of scientific rigor in order to uncover and disseminate academically relevant knowledge of the world! And certainly we do so in accordance with the rules of the most respectable academic outlets of knowledge – journals and conferences! But what does this notion, this concept of representation, render opaque? What does its banal simplicity envelop?

Through our admittedly hasty pass through a Deleuzean ontology and epistemology we have already constructed ideas for constant and diachronic displacement and destabilization of any center, be it knowledge, (the) self or being in general. If this is taken seriously, it raises substantial difficulties for the concept of representation as a conveyer of stable meaning. Wouldn't representation necessarily entail a signification of something stable, a 'right' or 'ultimate' meaning – a truth to be understood by its 'correct' reading (or viewing in terms of video media)? As Deleuze notes:

> "In short, representation may well become infinite; it nevertheless does not acquire the power to affirm either divergence or decentering. It requires a convergent and monocentric world: a world in which one is only apparently intoxicated, in which reason acts the drunkard and sings a Dionysian tune while none the less remaining 'pure' reason. [...] The damage is done not only by the requirement of finite representation, which consists of fixing a propitious moment of difference, neither too large or too small, requirement of infinite representation, which purports to integrate the infinitely large and infinitely small of difference, excess and default themselves" (Deleuze 1994a: 265)

Thus, a meaningful representation assumes a 'knowable' and communicable center, something to evaluate as its objectification. This is systematically at odds with a Deleuzean ontology (see also Coleman 2011). But neither is this to say that we do not constantly attempt to represent in a pragmatic sense – and similarly that we could thus not say nothing. The realm of inquiry is rather on a philosophical plane here. However, 'representation' as a desirable goal (e.g. in academia) is static, a synchronic illusion in the emergent becoming of the shifting intensities of sense and relation. Thus, "where only difference returns eternally while the same never returns" (Williams 2008: 114). It becomes a logocentric concept, as the same can never occur in the becoming and resonation of sense in Deleuzean series – every event makes up for new becomings in both matter and thought, and every attempt of representation must entail an attempt of both replication and its own notion of doing the

representing (of some past or future event). The same applies to academic production of knowledge as well. In a very foundational Kuhnian sense, science is the production of a consensus of meaning (Kuhn 1962). In this play of meaning an academic concept of knowledge often assumes a realist 'truth', but as we have seen, any such truth is an expression of an unstable language game, and language can never describe what is, or how senses resonate and become emergently embodied. Indeed, "there is no doubt that we have the means to distinguish between repetition [the reoccurrence of absolute sameness], since things are said to repeat when they differ even though their concept is absolutely the same. [...] It (language) repeats because it (the words) is not real, because there is no definition other than nominal" (Deleuze 1994a: 270-271). Thus, in a Deleuzean philosophical sense, all we are left with is the embodiment of the resonations of relational emergence – the relations between people, ideas, and the material arrangements constituting them in constant flux. And as we have seen, this framework constructs the individual not as a stable being but rather "a temporary and illusory entity drawing together much wider processes" (Williams 2008: 163) in the process of constant individuation.

One must note that Deleuze does not argue against the attempts to 'represent' something, or indeed argue that 'representation' does not happen when we express language (or video, for that matter). Rather, as we have seen, his position on empirical science, he does not deny its pragmatic value or outcomes. Here again we see Deleuze being instead interested in more fundamental questions of knowledge – what does it mean philosophically to represent? Indeed, a necessity of a pursuit of representation in our pragmatic practices (as people, as academics) remains, as that is what we aspire to. However, in line with Deleuzean thought, the logocentric value of this work is destabilized as not a particularly interesting level of analysis (as we can never describe the sense through which representation emerges as relation). Yet, representation must be understood as inclined to the French sense of the concept 'performance', a dramatic theatre (Williams 2008: 149). Thus, when considering the meaningfulness of representation, we succumb to illusions of stable meaning, primarily as we cannot distinguish the concept from the subjective abyss of the thinker, the emergence of representation in spatiotemporally bound (and liberated) space, so as to never be grounded in the identity of indeterminate concepts (Deleuze 1994a), or:

> "A representation designates an object or an event and associates it with signification or meaning, for example when we describe a situation in response to the question 'Tell me what happened?' But, for Deleuze, this representation is necessary lacking, with respect to an event, without an expression of its significance – not what it is, or what it means, but how it changes values or infinitives, that is how it alters relations of intense investment (for example, when we try to dramatize the effect of a meeting rather than describe who we met and what was said, and then everything changed...)" (Williams 2008: 143)

Any solution (a stable answer, a truth) is a problem, as "They entice us into a comfortable world of concrete fictions and resolutions imposed upon a reality of perpetually shifting relations" (Williams 2008: 205). Thus, in line with postmodern frameworks commonly adopted in CCT, my account of academic work on video media and its expression as videographies has to reflect on why we attempt to 'represent' as we do. There is a need to consider the end of stable signification – one that could persist in the tremors of emergent events and singularities as they extend from yore to the future in the unfolding chaos of the present (see also Denzin 1995). But, having said that, where do we go from here?

What of it then, of such a 'ruin of representation' from an ontological perspective? For my purposes, it raises a new perspective for seeing the role of video in CCT research. By understanding how the concept of representation is used in its original language – more like 'performance' (Williams 2008), and in line with Belk and Kozinets (2005a), Sherry and Schouten (2002) as well as Ellis and Bochner (2003), we need not be afraid of the conceptual linking of videographic work with art. This can open potential for videographic research as:

> "Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats all repetitions, by virtue of an internal power (an imitation is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses copies into simulacra). Even the most mechanical, the most banal, the most habitual and the most stereotyped repetition finds a place in works of art, it is always displaced in relation to other repetitions, and it is subject to the condition that a difference may be extracted from it for these other repetitions. [...] Art thereby connects the tableau of cruelty with that of stupidity, and discovers underneath consumption a clattering of the jaws, and underneath the most ignoble destructions of war, still more processes of consumption" (Deleuze 1994a: 293)

If we need to cast doubt on the knowledge value of representation (and indeed the question of the sheer possibility of its rigorous evaluation), we need to reconsider our relations with the concepts we utilize when speaking about the value of videography in CCT research. As Cubitt (1991) notes, "Video work is about difference, about dialogue, about place and about time" (p. 175). Indeed, "representation is never enough, since real movement in the present involves changes in values, or more precisely in the intensities of values" (Williams 2008: 143). Here we see what CCT scholars, such as Thompson (1990), Holt (1991), Sherry and Schouten (2002) Schouten (1998) and Belk (1998), are approaching, but should we not be even more interested in what our efforts at inquiry influence the reader/viewer to become (in terms of both thought and action alike) (see also Denzin 2001a). If we can produce convincing experiences that, through shifting intensities, first grasp the viewer in embodiment, and then allow for thought to enter new series and becomings, we have produced potential for new resonating relations. To express research on video thus becomes focused not on description and representing a world out there, but on a possibility of convincing and moving

fictions – necessitating the researcher to reflect on the reasons (every expression [every 'utterance'] is an exercise in power [political]) such production is founded on. And there were indeed noted 'false' starts in visual anthropology (notions of capturing the 'real') and even in CCT (applying 'positivist' criteria to interpretive research). CCT videography may just be a novel enough of a research approach to sidestep these modernist landmines. Especially, now that we can help ourselves to plentiful accounts on the problematics of representing 'real' phenomena through expressions of the audiovisual moving image, or:

> "the camera/film-maker also had his identity, as ethnologist or reporter. It was very important to challenge the established fictions in favour of a reality that cinema could capture or discover. But fiction was being abandoned in favour of the real, whist retaining a model of truth which presupposed fiction and was a consequence of it. What Nietzsche had shown, that the ideal of the true was the most profound fiction" (Deleuze 1989: 149)

It now seems hardly surprising why, for Deleuze, it came to be cinema that constituted such an important topic of contemplation and writing. The moving image itself, in its incessant emergence of the fiction that, when understood as relational becoming through the intensities of sense and thus in imagination and thought, maintains the most 'truthful' relation – not to represent reality, but all thought, for the moving image:

> "expresses a whole which changes, and becomes established between objects: this is a process of differentiation. The movement-image (the shot) thus has two sides, depending on the whole that it expresses and the objects between it passes [...] from the dual point of view of specification and differentiation, constitute a signaletic material which includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and even verbal (oral and written)" (Deleuze 1989: 29)

Representation thus has become subsumed by differentiation, and differentiation thus becomes movement, when it becomes expressed via the audiovisual moving image. We must now further strive to uncover where such distinction may lead us in terms of this mysterious medium. Thus, through out brief visitation into some of Deleuze's writings, we have arrived at some juncture of a Deleuzean ontology that I will further adapt to videography. As we have seen and as many a reader may have noted, Deleuze, even at a glance, can seem either 'terribly complex' or 'wonderfully abstract'. But our task is one of considering video, so let us proceed to topics more closely related to the audiovisual moving image, or:

> "As language is pursued into tail-chasing rhetoric, video, [in this now emerging ontology] freed from the representational burden, becomes philosophical. And indeed, it now need no longer limit its themes to the relation to reality – the epistemological – but can entertain other issues" (Cubitt 1993: 205)

Deleuze also offers us conceptual tools for continuing on this journey, for we can next follow through by adapting selected parts of Deleuze's philosophy of

cinema. Thereafter, reflection on cinema can move us toward more difficult, yet simultaneously potentially pragmatic notions on videography making in CCT. Let us thus turn to Deleuze on cinema.

2.5 Deleuze on Cinema Applied to Video

> "A theory of cinema is not 'about' cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices, the practice of concepts in general having no privilege over others, any more than one object has over others [...] So that there is always a time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, 'What is cinema?' but 'What is philosophy?'" (Gilles Deleuze)

In addition to his other philosophical considerations, Deleuze wrote plentifully on cinematography, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1986/1983) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1989/1985) constructing an entire philosophy of cinema. This project, as an intellectual exploration, was seemingly of great importance to him, as "The great directors of cinema may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects and musicians, but also with thinkers. They think with movement-images and time-images instead of concepts" (Deleuze 1986: ix).

Much of Deleuze's deliberation on cinema emerges closely paralleled with his earlier philosophical endeavors described above, as several concepts overlap and apply. Deleuze's starting point is a modification of semiology (the theory of signs) founded by C.S. Pierce, and whereas a Saussererian linguistic structuralism has its basis in the linguistic opposition of the signifier and the signified, Pierce's semiotics is based on the non-lingual system of the "representamen-object-interpretant" (Bogue 2003: 66), where the signs themselves are autonomous, not subjected to an external representational language, for example a narrative (ibid.). A sign can only point to another sign, *ad infinitum*. What Deleuze is attempting, is to go with the latter, to let images stand on their own as autonomous and distinct of their linguistic counterparts (ibid.). Thus, and as we have earlier touched upon (see 2.4.4), Deleuze's philosophy of the cinema must be understood as being beyond how the moving image represents something (the logocentric position), and rather about how it, in and of its own, has the potential to eventify experiences and relations, as an autonomous whole, which constantly spills beyond itself through intensities that emerge into relations. Thus, the audiovisual moving image has a propensity to surge beyond itself, and in such a capacity "can create new movements and new times that break with our expectations in terms of 'ordinary' space and time; in turn these are accompanied by new thoughts and ways of thinking" (Williams 2008: 30). The notion of time (and its creative 'production' via montage or "montage-cut" [Deleuze 1989: 13]) will be of special interest here, as Deleuze distinguishes the moving image

from other expressive media by making the ontology of moving image the *movement itself*, as the unity of the moving image is not constituted by the frames that can be 'freezed' from it, but rather the relation between "near and distant parts produces the unity" (Deleuze 1986: 26), especially in the creative ordering and reordering of time in expression and interpretation, or:

> "Montage [...] precedes the filming, in choice of material, that is, portions of matter which are to enter into interaction, sometimes very distant or far apart (life as it is). It enters into the filming, in the intervals occupied by the camera-eye (the cameraman who follows, runs, enters, exists: in short, life in the film). It comes after the filming, in the editing room, where material and filming are evaluated against one another (the life of the film), and in the audience, who compare life in the film and life as it is" (Deleuze 1986: 40)

We can see this in his treatment of photographic media, which (though certainly relational as well) "is a kind of 'moulding': the mould organizes the internal forces of the thing in such a way that they reach an equilibrium at a certain instant (immobile section)" (Deleuze 1986: 24). This seems to be one of the important distinctions between a stationary and a moving image – a photograph is already shot – forcefully separated in immobility from its spatiotemporal emergence, whereas the moving image retains its agency *vis-à-vis* the audience in its mechanical becoming.

Though not linguistic per se, the instability of language can be seen as a metaphor for the moving image as equally destabilized and ephemerally subjective. Similarly to Deleuze's discontinuous and creative use of language in his texts (see 2.4.3), he sees cinema as consisting of a vast potential of such liberating (in)consistency through montage of filmic scenes that, through cuts, become nonlinear (creatively constituting relations of past, present and future) to demand and inspire novel thought (Williams 2008: 30). This use of textual form seems to be connected with the aforementioned relationship between the moving image and photography, as Deleuze (1989) notes:

> "But at the very point that the [moving] image is replaced by an utterance, the image is given a false appearance, and its most authentically visible characteristic, movement, is taken away from it [...] The movement-image is the object; the thing itself caught in movement as the continuous function. The movement-image is the modulation of the object itself" (p. 27)

Although most of Deleuze's work on the moving image is from the perspective of cinema, several of his concepts can also be applied to videography. Additionally, he does draw occasional parallels to visual anthropology.

Deleuze's project on cinema can be seen as consisting of three approaches. First, in line with his subsequent work on the nature of philosophy as consisting of the construction of concepts (Deleuze 1994b), he wants to produce concepts, a philosophical language, that relates only to cinema as an originary and autonomous foundation (Bogue 2003). As we have seen, for him, language and concepts are an ever-mobile means and ends themselves (Deleuze 1994b), as in a poststructuralist fashion they cannot signify any

higher ideal thing (logos), and this pursuit is depicted in his two volumes on cinema. In his first work (Deleuze 1986), he constructs an ontology of the 'movement-image' and a taxonomy of the various types of movement-images – i.e. how different types of cinematographic expressions connect the thought of the director to the experience of the viewer and what types of potential intensities certain camera views (shots) express. In the second volume Deleuze (1989) discusses the nature of the expression of time with 'time-images' – i.e. how the illusions of (different types of) time are constructed through the combinations of various 'time-images' that break down the traditional spatioteporally oriented 'realist' images into deterritorialized dreams that can only cause relations outside of themselves as they do not express clear-cut visual fields for description and orientation. In the following I will attempt to summarize some of his insights and provide approaches for adapting his thinking to videography in CCT.

2.5.1 What is Cinema when Seen as the Movement-Image?

In line with his undergirding ontology, Deleuze sees film as a collection of separated durations, where each shot is a "slice or chunk carved out of the matter-movement of the open whole" (Bogue 2003: 3). The shot in itself is a spatiotemporally limited duration of the 'Open Whole', but is always intertwined with it, as it retains its meaning through the resonances with all its externality (new relations through the production of intensities of sense) *ad infinitum*. Thus, through frames (spatiotemporally constructed sections), shots (the movement and agency of these sections) and montages (sections or clips in temporal relations) the Open Whole and its ongoing duration "unfolds itself in movement-images" (Bogue 2003: 4). The movement-image denotes the unfolding of spatiotemporal settings where movement takes precedence. Thus, unlike photography, there is no single instance or equilibrium (a possibility of a synchronic moment of meaning), but, rather, the ever-changing movement of events can itself be seen as the most important nature of cinema.

Before Deleuze can construct a system of concepts to describe the types of cinematographic expressions of illusion, he must first construct an account of what the images, when set in movement, become to constitute. He starts his argument with a critique of Bergson, who, even as he sees no 'things' in the universe, but rather emergent vibrations in the Open Whole in constant transformation and emergence into some other ephemeral state (Bogue 2003: 24), still goes on to describe the cinematographic experience as a series of snapshots (Deleuze 1986), where the 'ideal' image (the single frame) takes precedence. Not surprisingly, as being for Deleuze is constant emergence, he reverses the level of analysis from 'images added with the component of

movement' to 'movement where any particular image is arbitrary' (similarly to his approach to concepts). Thus, it is the relations between the images in movement which are experienced, not any particular frozen frame as all frames become 'any-instants-whatever', where movement itself (not a designated context) takes precedence (Deleuze 1986; Bogue 2003). And if all singular poses are interchangeable, it must be the movement through its relations that has the potential to bring about novel outcomes. Thus:

> "The movement of the tortoise must be taken as and indivisible, qualitatively changing whole, and the same is true of the movement of the hare. Equally important, however, is that through this shift in positions a qualitative change takes place that affects the tortoise, the hare, and the space they have traveled – a change in the whole" (Bogue 2003: 24)

This is another example of Deleuzean non-reductionism, what can be linked to hermeneutic emergence of human agency and how it always unfolds in spatiotemporally relational performances (see 2.9.2). This applies to all storytelling, even if many past streams of moving image works have mistakenly attempted to 'capture' reality by having become dazzled by the illusion of spatiotemporal 'representation'. Rather, it would now apply that every social practice, including the act of filmmaking, is a spatiotemporal performance in and of itself (see also 2.4.4 and 2.9.2):

> "we notice in the first place that the character has ceased to be real or fictional, in so far as he has ceased to be seen objectively or to see subjectively: it is a character who goes over crossings and frontiers because he invents as a real character, and becomes all the more real because he has been better at inventing [...] But what we are saying about the character is also valid in the second place, and in particular, for the film-maker himself. He too becomes another, in so far as he takes real characters as intercessors and replaces his fictions by their own story-telling, but, conversely gives those story-tellers the shape of legends, carrying out their 'making into legend'" (Deleuze 1989: 151-152)

In line with Deleuzean perspectives to open and closed systems, through notions of considerable Bergsonian influence (see 2.4.2), and relations that reverberate beyond these conceptual systems, the cinematographic moving image has a relation to the Open Whole (first through those involved in the production and then through audiences) and also to the other shots of the moving image (through the medium and the composition of the montage). As Bogue (2003) notes, the shot is the "provisional and commonsensical" (p. 27), an isolation in the whole *durée* of qualitative change – which indeed then, through creative recombination of times and places, goes on to 'change everything'. It can be seen here how far Deleuzian thought has taken us from anything resembling the Cartesian dualism of a defendable dichotomy of body (matter) and mind (thought). Similarly, perception is never an isolatable act, even in its sensory-motor (commonsense causality in definable contexts, see 2.6.3 and 2.7.1) interpretation of possibilities for future action, as it does not see in any completeness what surrounds us, but, in fact, subtracts to constitute the objects of interest – intertwining the limits of our

biology and past experience (Bogue 2003: 30; see also Raichle 2010). It always extends to the *durée*, to the Open Whole, which is always the emergent intertwining of meaning, sense and spatiotemporal relations (see also 2.9.2). And as we have seen, this change is of non-linguistic character, or:

> "The first is to distinguish them from things conceived as bodies. Indeed, our perception and our language distinguishes bodies (nouns), qualities (adjectives) and actions (verbs). But actions, in precisely this sense, have already replaced movement with the idea of a provisional place towards which it is directed or that of a result it secures. Quality has replaced movement with the idea of a state which persists whilst waiting for another to replace it. Body has replaced movement with the idea of a subject which would carry it out or of an object which would submit to it, of a vehicle which would carry it" (Deleuze 1986: 59-60)

Thus, we arrive at three fundamental conceptualizations of the closed and open systems in cinematography, the 1) frame or immobile cut (a sequence of still frames denoting spatial coordinates between things), the 2) shot or mobile cut (the transfer of relations between the things with relation to the *durée*), and the 3) montage or the assemblage of the various types of movement-images (the *durée* itself which encompasses all the resonant relations) (Deleuze 1986).

The frame abstracts an instant cutout of its spatial coordinates of the world, thus making it a site of "deterritorialization of the image" (Deleuze 1986: 15; see also Pisters 2003). This deterritorialization can be simply geometrical (separating it from the out-of-the-frame) or dynamic (when the frame changes in shape, e.g. when resembling a first-person view from a blinking eye), and always implies an angle of framing – the implicit point-of-view of the camera lens (Bogue 2003: 43). This viewpoint, the perspective of the camera lens, can potentially even act as an active onlooker or a fetishizing voyerist, yielding considerable powers of agency to such potential points-of-view (see also Denzin 1995). In these ways, the frame both includes (the closed set) and excludes (the out-of-field). The shot brings the frames into motion, and has two potential frames of reference or movement. First being the bodies themselves in altering spatial coordinates in relation to one another, and the other being the perspective of the camera lens. Whereas the single frame, not unlike photography, is a fixed mould of the world, the shot is a ceaselessly varying one, where cinematic consciousness is not the spectator, but the always autonomous camera perspective, be it of human form (first person view), inhuman (e.g. a descriptive shot from outside) or superhuman (e.g. camera perspective flying over or climbing walls of skyscrapers) (Bogue 2003: 47). Finally, the montage is the determination of the whole *durée*, as it combines cuts with one another in relation (spanning inward to the film) and to the audience and beyond (spanning outward from the film). There is, however, a perpetual mystery about this – how do distinct shots become combined through simulations of time? We will return to this question in our consideration of the time-image (see 2.7).

Thus, through its relations, the moving image becomes ontologically more than what a realist might call capturing reality through 'representation' (it stretches beyond), or a thing of completion of isolated contours (as it is never complete in and of itself). Things around us are constituted via their sense-inducing arrays of light (from which perceptions are subtracted from), and thus "what we call visual images, whether directly perceptual or cinematic, are made of the same 'matter'" (Bogue 2003: 34). For Deleuze (1986), their becoming in movement, the arbitrary cuts of the montage, and their relations to each other and their relations beyond the immediate audience becomes a metaphor, "the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema" (p. 59). Through this detour, we can thus now return to our primary task – the possibilities and limits of meaning and relation in the movement-image. We must note, that Deleuze enters a very profound (even at times quite bewildering) work of proposing a conceptual taxonomy of the types of movement-images and all their expressive 'signs', the specialized images that compose the higher order of the movement-images. For our purposes, we cannot do justice to his complex system here, and, in fact, most of Deleuze's cinematographic ideas, let alone his categorization of signs, would be very difficult to apply to discussions and publications on CCT videography. Thus, while I will attempt to consider most of his concepts to bring about novel ideas for future videographic research, it may suffice to concentrate on the more applicable ones in more detail.

2.6. Types of Movement-Image

> "The movement-image is the object; the thing itself caught in movement as continuous function. The movement-image is the modulation of the object itself" (Gilles Deleuze)

One of the central tasks for Deleuze is to construct a taxonomy of cinematographic concepts of the movement-image. He starts by postulating that all the types of movement-image are composed according to the 'sensory-motor schema' (or the sensory-motor situation) (Deleuze 1986; see also Deleuze 1989; Bogue 2003) – the relation any particular movement-image has with spatial coordinates within the frames and shots. Thus, the sensory-motor schema denotes spatiotemporally organized and chronologically understandable movement that "coordinates the perceptions, feelings and actions of each living image" (Bogue 2003: 4). These are organized as 1) perception-images, 2) affection-images, and 3) action-images (Deleuze 1986, 1989). Each movement-image denotes specific types of aesthetics that compose their potential sense and experiential characteristics. While cinematographic work differs in various ways from more ethnographic pursuits (predetermined scripts, predetermined scene elements), an

exploration of these various types of movement-images and their potentials for various kinds of expression may yet also be of interest for aspiring CCT videographers. From this perspective, a Deleuzean cinematographic philosophy can provide novel tools in a plentiful fashion, while much of the profound granularity in his arguments may be afforded a lesser amount of emphasis for our purposes here. But let the curious reader beware (or perhaps be further intrigued by), the amount of different concepts for the types and contents of the movement-images is truly voluminous (Bogue 2003). Having said that, the publications by CCT scholars on videography are, to date, virtually void of differing approaches for frame and shot composition at such a workbench level. We will return to the practicalities of constructing these kinds of varying movement images in the chapter on Production (see IV). For now, let us attempt a brief exploration of how Deleuze conceives them conceptually in his philosophy of the movement-image.

2.6.1 Perception-Image

Through shots, which Deleuze (1986) conceptualizes as perception-images, the moving image connects to the Open Whole of other images and the outside world (Bogue 2003: 4). It is the aesthetic of the subjective view of the camera lens, a shot where something is perceived, a perspective into the mobile slice that has been cut out of the Open Whole. This can present a very realist perspective (e.g. a motionless camera showing what happens in a room) or a very subjective and fetishistic camera where the perspective assumes agency (e.g. a first-person viewpoint or a 'sinister' viewpoint – the looming first-person [camera lens] perspective of an evil gaze – an ominous subjective onlooker without a character). Whether of more neutral disposition or of particular subjectification, these images allow for various kinds of audiovisual experiences of seeing 'what's going on'. Yet, the camera perspective is always semi-subjective, a point of view of something among those in the frame (Bogue 2003: 72). For Deleuze, this seems to consist of a parallel with his style of writing of "free indirect discourse" (Deleuze 1986: 73), as in his texts, the form of the writing, in its inaccessibility is this 'third' entity – something not of the writer or what he writes about but rather of new potential relations. So perhaps even further than semi-subjective, this is a process of double subjectification as there is a viewer (the camera) and the viewed, both autonomous but within the same heterogeneous system. This is in line with the hermeneutic emergence of the storyteller (the researcher) and those of whom the story is told (the 'objects' in a crudely spatiotemporal sense) – but there is always also the third, a kind of triple hermeneutic, as the camera viewpoint lurks under a veil of powerful agency as well.

This 'perception' of a 'perception' Deleuze calls a "dicisign" (Bogue 2003: 73). This sign extends to the perception of the audience and the perception of their audiences – and again finally to the Open Whole of the *durée*. There seems to be an additional and interesting reversal of binaries here. What we as viewers tend to think of as the 'objective' image (the camera as the recorder of real-life events), consists the most subjective one for Deleuze, and what we think of a 'subjective' image (e.g. an artistic representation of a hallucinogenic dream) is the most objective one (Bogue 2003: 73), or as Deleuze (1986) states:

> "*a subjective perception is one in which the images vary in relation to a central and privileged image; an objective perception is one where, as in all things, all the images vary in relation to one another, on all their facets and in all their parts*" (p. 76, emphasis in original)

One could interpret the reason for this being the nature of any reference point (a camera view) as subjective and 'political' (there is a reason for every shot and every camera angle), and that only when the (artistic) scene makes no attempt to connect with realistic spatial (sensory-motor schema) coordinates it becomes 'objective', as it then belongs into the realm of the *durée* where all relations connect first in the image and then through the audience and beyond. The sense (shifting intensities making for potential audiovisual experiences) is real as it makes its attempts to connect directly to infinity, not to an illusion of reality.

Yet, for Deleuze, there is more to the perception-image. It simultaneously consists of opposing and intertwining signs as its components. The 'dicisign' (perception within a perception) denotes a kind of subject-object position, where the perspective of the camera becomes of importance in its deliberate assuming of a perspective (Bogue 2003: 74). Through the sign of the moving image called the 'reume', that flowingly leads the perception within perception, it extends to perception within things (the objects in the image), which he calls the gramme (ibid.). In the 'gramme', perception has shifted to the perceptions between the objects (human and nonhuman) in the shot, and the original perceiver(s) have become constituted by the agency of their spatiotemporal surroundings (e.g. how the knife and the dark alley constitute the to-be victim). This can be viewed as a linkage to the inherent agency of the material surroundings in line with non-representational theory, which we will explore further (see 2.9.2). One can also go further by saying that our experience hovers between the 'dicisign', 'reume' and the 'gramme', thus rendering them entwined shifting powers that produce an infinite array of potential changes in intensities and therefore indeterminate possibilities. This moves the perception-image from Sausserian signifiers and signifieds into emerging and diachronic experience of shifting relations.

Videography note (5):

As examples of the use of perception-image in our PTS project, we show the presence of researchers and the cameras in operation and interaction with the context, making the illusions of video more than a research setting. Rather, it becomes elevated from a viewpoint into the emerging relations and hermeneutic understanding. Thus we illuminate that the videography is an incessant performance and that even while *in situ* a sense of artificiality remains – a fiction we attempt to tell a convincing (while nonrealist) story about. We can see glimpses of the perceiving lens fetishizing the 'objects' (both human and nonhuman) and their stories. Furthermore, the first-person camera view, while expressing a viewpoint into such a possible world, simultaneously shows its inauthenticity – thus extending the intensity of the 'dicisign' into a 'gramme' by fetishizing the fetish itself (the videographic production of academic fictions).

The perception-image is about objects (on nouns from a linguistic perspective), but these objects are actualized not only as themselves but also simultaneously in a human form (e.g. the eye) only when external perception (sensation) and internal affection come together in a "center of indetermination" (Bogue 2003: 37). This connects the neutrality of any shifting of the intensity of senses to interpretation. Thus we move from an increasing perception (from focusing on something distant to recognizing it for what it is for us) to affection (and later resolute action).

2.6.2 Affection-Image

Affection-images connect "the living image's outer perceptions, inner feelings, and motor responses to other images" (Bogue 2003: 4) with the intermittent state of incoming perception and outgoing action. It "is the close up, and the close-up is the face [...] an intensive series which marks an ascent towards...or tends towards a critical instant [...] it is a reflecting and reflected unity" (Deleuze 1986: 87). The affection-image thus often occupies the cinematographic interval in the montage between a perception and action – it separates these entities by assigning an emotive sense to the action that follows. They bridge intensities of sense to qualities of interpretation. The 'face' is of special interest here, as it is:

> "this organ-carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed its global mobility and which gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny local movements which the rest of the body usually keeps hidden" (Deleuze 1986: 86-87)

and,

> "There is no close-up of the face. The close-up is the face, but the face precisely in so far as it has destroyed its triple function – a nudity of the face much greater than that of the body, an inhumanity much greater than that of the animals" (ibid.: 99)

Thus often (though not necessarily), such moving images are particularly focused on the close-ups of facial expressions abstracted from spatial coordinates, as it is this surface through which human emotion (the quality of changing intensities) is imprinted and explicated as a pure quality (Bogue 2003: 38). This allows for the affect to become expressed as a fluid moment removed from 'causal' (or spatiotemporally realist) relations in the moving image. As the close-up of the face, it becomes an emerging 'pure possibility' (sense) of affect, abstracted not only from its spatial but also temporal coordinates and thus becomes an immobile surface upon which motor tendencies bring about affective qualities or powers (Bogue 2003: 78), such as the increasing twinkling in a persons eyes, or the affirming broadening of a smile, when something amiable is perceived. One could simplify by purporting that such shots have a sort of momentary aloofness, hovering above the immediate setting to impart emotional becoming. Thus, without a

definite context (in the shot), the quality denotes the shifting intensities of an affect to another (e.g. a reflecting face transcending from slight resentment to intense loathing), and the power connects to the subsequent action (what spatiotemporal doings will the hate then amount to).

The affection-image also assumes two qualities that in cinematographic expression usually follow to make the bridge between perception and action. A reflexive face uncontained by spatiotemporal coordinates "expresses a pure Quality" (Deleuze 1986: 90). This does not suggest that this type of expression is of the 'object' in thought, rather, it is of relations of a more abstract sensation for the audience to experience, as if an expression of an intensity that anxiously is awaiting to shift to a new quality. Through qualitative shifts in intensities, the reflexive face is intertwined with an opposite sense, "the intensive face [that] expresses pure Power" (ibid.) – in a sense the fluid movement from a neutral reflecting unity to, for example, intensive desire – perhaps what Deleuze suggested above as the inhuman animal nudity as it is of affect itself without perceptual referents. Thus, as a decontextualized, now a "state of Entity" (ibid.: 96) in itself, the affection-image moves from shifting emotive expressions to a sense of what is going to happen when the moving image becomes recontextualized.

The signs of the affection-image are the 'trait icon', which denotes the movement of the quality of the affect on the 'face' of the object, and the 'contour icon', that denotes the interrelated movements of multiple elements that again emerge on the 'face' (Bogue 2003). Again we see two poles here, one that orients itself centripetally inwards (the 'pure Quality') and one that extends relationally beyond (the 'pure Power'). Thus, while the affection-image may be a close-up, it is not only limited within the frame but rather extends relationally beyond – as "affective energies embedded in real situations" (ibid.: 84). While the affect is localized in the frame of its simultaneous decontextualization, it is nevertheless:

> "independent of all determinate space-time; but it is none the less created in a history which produces it as the expressed and the expression of a space or a time, of an epoch or milieu (this is why the affect is the 'new' and new affects are ceaselessly created, notably by the work of art)" (Deleuze 1986: 99)

Such facial close-ups have been rarely used in CCT videographies. The reasons for this may be at least twofold. Apart from the potentially more obvious lack of workbench approaches to video aesthetics, constructing videographic data with affection-based close-ups of this type are both difficult to shoot in uncontrolled *in situ* videography, and also the technologies (often expensive lenses with adequate amounts of zooming capability) have commonly been beyond the reach of many aspiring CCT videographers. We have attempted to conduct some limited experiments with the affection-image in our videography projects, as the following examples illustrate.

Videography note (6):

While commonly pertaining to cinematography, the editing of videographies in CCT constructs similar visual expressions that occur during the emergent relations in the process of fieldwork. Yet, their usage in creating videographic expressions is always of intent – to tell a story. One can find examples of this in the videographies that accompany this study.

In PTS we experiment with various affection-images to express the affectious intensities of the followers of the 'dubstep' music scene at party venues. While not necessarily affection-images in the strict sense (as something connecting to subsequent action), they can potentially bring about affective experiences by focusing on the affective motor surfaces of the face.

In PMW the make-up artists express their thoughts about the tension of others not appreciating their occupation in the video industry. After this utterance, they fall silent and extend a sullen gaze that surges outside the shot. While this shot does not remove the spatiotemporal coordinates of the affection-image in their entirety, the intensities of the affect can be seen as potentially very relational.

As noted in the agency of things regarding the perception-image, qualities and powers are not only limited to human faces for Deleuze, for whom "making visible, say the 'glistening' of a leaf, the 'sharpness' of a knife [...] the close up is the face in that the close-up facializes, or converts a concrete entity into a decontextualized immobile surface with motor tendencies that express the quality/power" (Bogue 2003: 79). One must note that this kind of material agency needs to be purely aesthetic and devoid of textual representation, for the description of such power will *a priori* close the power's potential within the author who wishes to express it – making the potential not a Deleuzian affect, but rather a predetermined state. Thus the opportunity of relations between perceivers (persons, objects) becomes curtailed in limited possibility (see 3.2). As stated before, we have very little vocabulary for expressing these emergent relations.

Finally, the affection-image can be seen not to necessarily consist only of the one of close-up, for it just requires the decontextualization of the object and the foregrounding of quality/power. When this expression emerges, we see the potential of an "any-space-whatever" (Deleuze 1986: 109), denoting only the shifting intensities of the affect and how it becomes separated from the sensory-motor schema (a realist image) by connecting its intensities to somewhere beyond the frame (e.g. a gaze toward the virtual future). Put in more simplistic terms, it occurs when the affect denotes something beyond what can be directly seen in the image – when the shifting emotion connects to the *durée* and thus becomes of pure undetermined possibility.

2.6.3 Action-Image

The last type of movement-image in this higher-order tripartite is the action-image, "which structures the space surrounding the living image" (Bogue 2003: 4) and "concerns determinate milieus and actual behaviors" (ibid.: 85). This is the moving image, where the causality of the world comes into its explicitness through the agency of the 'objects' (human, nonhuman) and their material surroundings. This occurs when "The realism of the action-image is opposed to the idealism of the affection-image" (Deleuze 1986: 123), or when the agentic action provides for more clear-cut relations with 'outside' forces:

> "Qualities and powers are no longer displayed in any-space-whatevers, no longer inhabit originary worlds, but are actualized directly in determinate, geographical, historical and social space-times. Affects and impulses now only appear as embodied in behaviour, in the form of emotions and passions which order and disorder it" (Deleuze 1986: 141)

Additionally, the action-image denotes determinate causal relations and "entails an encompassing milieu of forces and the related actions/reactions of an individual or individuals" (Bogue 2003: 86). Thus, in this type of image, which one could argue to be a more philosophically straightforward

movement-image, more explicit relations between objects and the spatiotemporal emergence of forces that affect them take place (e.g. a shot of a car chase depicting the distance between the partaking cars). Here 'objects' are located in discernable milieus, not 'any-spaces-whatever', act upon it or are acted upon by it, thus altering the original state of things. For Deleuze, the action-image is constructed as an expression of either the 'Large Form' or the 'Small Form' (Deleuze 1986).

The 'Large Form' is cinematographically composed of an initial situation, a duel of forces in action and thereafter a changed situation (S-A-S'), which can be exemplified as an hourglass where all the relations of an originary situation reside on the top part, but are transformed to novel situational relations through a specific act of action in a duel that is "simultaneously correlative and antagonistic" (Deleuze 1986: 142; see also Bogue 2003). For Deleuze, the two poles of the action-image are these oppositional, yet simultaneously flowing signs of the 'synsign' and 'binomial'. Here the 'synsign' expresses the power-qualities of the objects relative to the milieu, and the 'binomial' expresses their designation as a duel of forces. The 'Small Form' reverses this sequence, making it local rather than global. For Deleuze, this moving image expresses action, which transcends into a situation and thereafter into a change in action (A-S-A'), illustratable for example by detective films where fragmentary acts intertwine into mysterious situations that change the nature of subsequent actions leaving the audience to pick up the pieces of the plot as clues pass by, or often in the style of situational comedy. Its sign is the "index" (Deleuze 1986: 160), which one could describe as the emerging clues that potentially let the viewer infer 'what is actually going on'.

In our fieldwork experience, constructing shots of straightforward action-image of either the 'Small' or the 'Large Form' would often have a scripted and well-managed scene as a prerequisite. While such scene management is the very nature of the cinematographic moving image, we as CCT videographers do not operate in such controllable circumstances with predefined outcomes. Deleuze, in fact, makes a note of this when deliberating on the classic anthropological film *Nanook of the North* by Richard Flaherty, where many heroic acts of the Intuits actually emerge as an incessant struggle against the relentless nature – without the subsequent situation changing the overall context (a situation, action and a persistent similar situation calling for endless struggle, or S-A-S). This difference notwithstanding, possibilities remain for such videographic expressions, when the shots are of relational nature, entailing, for example, multiple participants interacting with the contextual material surroundings in an emergent performance relevant to the account we (as videographers) wish to construct from the particular social context of consumption. This would be another suggestion to go beyond the

commonplace 'talking head' interview form of videographic expression in further efforts to recognize the potential of the methodology for expressing spatiotemporally emerging performances; not only retrospective interviews with (at worst) decontextualized 'heads' (not to be confused with the affection-image).

Thus, as I will further argue, videography could move towards two poles to become of more a relational medium in CCT. First, by bringing about new types of 'realist' action-images by adopting ideas from practice theory (see 2.9.1) and non-representational theory (see 2.9.2), so as to express the emergence of relations, not only between the 'researcher' and the 'researched', but the spatiotemporal, cognitive, and indeed affective relations of the agents constituting the social phenomenon the researcher(s) are attempting to empathically and reflexively understand. Second, in line with novel approaches for expressing research (e.g. Belk 1998; Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2003; Ellis and Bochner 2003), CCT videographers could further embrace artistic expression and to rid themselves of quasi-realistic underpinnings by utilizing, for example, metaphoric images (to transcend the purely descriptive naively realist video), to allow for the possibility of viewing experiences that not only resist the confinements of the audiovisual moving image within the frames, shots and montage, but would, without hesitation, encourage new relations beyond them. This consideration will be our project in the subsequent section on the time-image.

Videography note (7):

Even if not in a strict action-image (as the change in the situation is not contained within a shot but presented as an outcome through montage, we can illustrate an example of the Large Form (S-A-S') in PTS. Here we shot a radio show featuring two DJ/producers, including our autoethnographic participant (third author). We can see glimpses of how the show starts by the DJ/producers introducing themselves to the audience, negotiating their cultural position by sharing exclusive cultural knowledge, and finally thanking their quasi-virtual audience by commenting about their buzzing activity on the internet forums during the show – thus expressing another contextualized (even if translocal) cultural performance.

Scene of 'Basso Radio' broadcast – with the show about to begin.

Scene of Basso Radio – end of the show.

Similarly, in BIP, we see a montage of a game in an international tournament. We see how the players of the team assemble their equipment, enter the field, commence with the game play and emerge victorious – thus finally congratulated by the opponents – again expressing another contextualized cultural performance.

Scene of a match in BIP – the game play about to begin.

Scene of a match in BIP – the game is over, Helsinki Cyclone (the autoethnographic member's team) congratulated by the opponents.

2.6.4 Reflection-Image

Apart from the tripartite movement-images, Deleuze also constructs additional ones that he situates in the interstices of the three that make up his grand scheme (the 'impulse-image' is omitted in this consideration because it is difficult to see how one could apply it in videographic research, unless the whole scene is considerably predetermined by scripting). The reflection-image denotes the space after action that, for Deleuze, often begins to assume more artistic takes on the medium. It expresses the situations where the illusion of the sensory-motor causality of agency and its surroundings is broken (Bogue 2003: 92), which "goes from action to relation, [and] is composed when action and situation enter into indirect relations" (Deleuze 1989: 33). The reflection-image seems to often constitute a kind of metaphoric clue stretching to the past action and directing the flow of the narrative to oncoming action. It thus often seems to emerge as elaborate combinations of the 'Large' and the 'Small Form', pushing the action-image beyond its limits. Bogue (2003) highlights a scene from *Ivan the Terrible* where Ivan is to confront his enemies. Yet, before this outcome is to actualize, there is a sequence of dance and pantomime where the "boyars [are] sanctifying their companions who have been beheaded [...] with an infernal performance by clowns and circus" (Deleuze 1986: 181), so as to select the oncoming action (although a musical, Žižek [2006] notes the vulgarity of this scene as a celebration of the madness of violence in its primitive nature).

The reflection-image, as the moving image of metaphor, or as "in allegory, hyperbole, and irony" (Bogue 2003: 94), thus seemingly serves as a Deleuzian space for the actualization of new relations through humor or by other indirect means (see 2.4.3). Metaphor, in its visual form assumes an image, a discursive figure denoting something else beyond the frame, and is thus "the direct reflection of an indirect relation between action and situation, the explicit presentation of what is implicit and presupposed in all the figures of the reflection-image" (Bogue 2003: 96-97). Such techniques can have a powerful impact, as they can propose many a question that "haunts the situation" (Deleuze 1986: 191) and thus opens possibilities for new intensities of experience.

Videography note (8):

In the PTS videography, we have attempted to establish something of a reflection-image in the final section that contains the narrative of 'discussion', the visuals are blended together to depict the 'dubstep' electronic music scene blending together in its state of 'cultural acceleration'.

Sneak peek: In our, as of yet up-and-coming, idea for a videographic project in the context of the musicians of a symphony orchestra, we hope to uncover some emerging tensions and storytelling specifically from the perspective of 'demonization' in an organization-theoretical vein. The stories of tensions are planned to be supplemented with reflection-images from the orchestra playing in a concentrated fervor – highlighting how the tensions within the community establish connections throughout in emerging series.

Reflection-images could constitute another underutilized possibility that can open up opportunities for CCT videographers to construct evocative and convincing scenes of more artistic nature. Even though such narrative visuals of the moving image can be most readily applicable to cinema, we can explore the potential ramifications of the usage of metaphoric images (even as this does require a brazen move from the descriptive to more narrative storytelling in videography research). Indeed, from a descriptive perspective we will continue to pose questions about social practices in consumption contexts (sensory-motor expressions), but what remains to be further discussed, as we have seen, is the role of the artistic moving image in our research that could utilize other elaborate and evocative storytelling techniques (Sherry and Schouten 2002; see also Shankar and Patterson 2001), in order to raise awareness and surprise (Thompson 1990; see also Brown 1998; Goodall 2000), and go further to potentially convince the reader (Holt 1991).

2.6.5 Relation-Image

The last form of the moving image is the relation-image, the one where all what was before is subsumed into meditation, interpretation, thought and representation (Bogue 2003: 99) (though never in a single logocentric sense) – and thus enter into a flux of relations that relate to the audience connecting to notions of familiar habits or habits in the making. For Pierce, from whom Deleuze adapts the notion from, the nature of this relation is the intelligible relation between the object and its interpretant (Bogue 2003: 100). This is where the relationship between the constituents of the moving image and the audience becomes analyzed (while still being underpinned in the intensities of senses) in terms of thought and new ideas – the evoking of intellectual feelings.

The concept of the relation-image is by far the most complex and abstract. It does not note any specific shot but rather a cinematographic stance, where nothing is presented as causally simple or obvious. In a relation-image there is always a 'third' (often mysterious) relation that constitutes the perception, affection, and action, or the like. This is also where the subjectivity of the 'camera eye' plays an especially powerful relational role. Through its viewpoint and the cuts it expresses, it often reveals more to the audience than any cinematographic character (in fiction or nonfiction), or as Žižek (2006) notes, that even when we implicitly sense the fictitious nature of the scene and even when we know what will happen, we still choose to believe it – sometimes even more so. This is very much in line with the overall Deleuzean perspective discussed above, and he uses the following allegory to depict it:

> "The forger will thus be inseparable from a chain of forgers into whom he metamorphoses. There is no unique forger, and, if the forger reveals something, it is the existence behind him of another forger" (Deleuze 1989: 133-134)

The compositional signs of the relation-image are the 'mark' and the 'demark', where the 'mark' is a semiological sign of a natural relation, an expression to become understood as commonsensical, whereas the 'demark' brings about an obscure relation that upsets this obvious harmony to arouse an unfamiliarity in the moving image, and thus potentially brings about new ways of thinking (e.g. Hitchcock's windmill turning against the wind in *Foreign Correspondent*) (Bogue 2003). Then there is also the genetic sign, the 'symbol', that points to the abstract relation to express reasons for the upset of the otherwise 'normalized' order of the 'mark' through the 'demark' – which ushers the audience to think (ibid.).

Thus, the relation-images are of the relations emerging beyond the frame of the moving image, indeed to what is beyond the montage of shots – the open potential that goes beyond any notion of 'representation' or anything 'contained' by the frame itself. It is the space of relational potential, the Open Whole extending to us through its intensities, and then beyond – both connecting us and extending us simultaneously. Through these symbolic and complex images, the entire cinematographic story becomes a higher order metaphor – an endless string of relations within the moving images cut from the Open Whole. Yet, this layer of relations is the layer that asks the audiences to ponder and meditate, again to allow for new relations that extend beyond through the relations they encounter and enact in subsequent events. Such forms of videographic expression have not commonly been utilized in CCT, but such constructions that can potentially 'make strange the everyday', could constitute powerful ways of encouraging the audience to reconsider that what is often deemed to be 'normal' social behavior. Our tentative attempts at this follow:

Videography note (9):

For example, in PMW, to construct relational images in a Deleuzean sense, we utilized images that bring about dialectical expressions, where the role of the viewer is particularly foregrounded.

Two commercially successful video makers enter into a dialectical relation with their pursuits of authenticity (seemingly surprising even themselves in this moment of realization). While perhaps not a relation-image in the purely cinematographic sense, the 'mark' could be seen to be the natural everydayness of the interview, and the 'demark' the sudden realization of the impossibility of an authentic persona in the industry ('commercializing what we are'). This dialectic is expressed in the videography for the audience to discover it themselves – the audience as the 'third eye' in the potential for emerging new relations of thought – thought that now sees the impossible in the success of the authentic in the context of video industry.

In making interpretations of the dialectical relations in the concluding section, we made attempts to express the fetish of authenticity by showing the protagonist, the autoethnographic member observing a video ('mark') shoot from the shadowy sidelines ('demark') – as a cultural agent attempting to maintain his authenticity via a heroic narrative of striving, even as the very nature of this negotiation is a fetishistic pursuit, where he is always bound to remain in the liminal ('symbol'). He is now the active agent stripped into the sidelines of his quotidian presence. The scene ends with a taunting relational question directed at the 'third eye' of the viewer – "what is the fantasy we make do with?"

Through these three categories (six, the liminal types not excluded), and a totality of possibly more than 14 signs (as it is often difficult to make the distinction) of the movement-image (Bogue 2003), Deleuze has constructed a taxonomy of signs of cinematographic expression. Furthermore, each of the movement-image types is composed of its constituent signs, producing a truly exhausting multiplicity of concepts that break cinema into a wealth of conceptual orders and categories. While any taxonomy is structural, this should not be seen as Deleuze's purpose. Rather, "his taxonomy is a generative device meant to create new terms for talking about new ways of seeing" (Bogue 2003: 104). Therefore, one must be ever vigilant to avoid a grand misunderstanding – while the images can be conceptualized in such distinct categories, the event that undergirds and originates the relations for such expressions through video media always contains elements of them all, or:

> "The essential point, in any event, is that of action, and also perception and affection, are framed in a fabric of relations. It is this chain of relations which constitutes the mental image, in opposition to the thread of actions, perceptions and affections" (Deleuze 1986: 200)

All relations are transformed into symbolic acts through emergent performances, and thus the subconscious emerging through the shifting intensities of sense becomes always woven within and beyond action and its subsequent consideration in thought. The categories of the movement-image become, when used in aesthetically convincing and evocative ways, workbench level building blocks for the creative construction of relational videographic work. They entail, in (and beyond) their very nature, a relational function of the three: the producers and the context, the medium, and the audience.

Like most of Deleuze's writing, his taxonomy of the moving image is difficult to get around, fluid in its ontology, and littered with novel and complex concepts, to the point where "the branchings of Deleuze's schema may resemble a Porphyrian tree, [yet] his complex discussions of specific images and signs ensure their interplay is acentered, rhizomatic combinations" (Bogue 2003: 104). It may not need to be reiterated here that this indeed can be considered to be his ultimate purpose – to conceptualize meaning while simultaneously liberating its unstable nature. In so doing, Deleuze seems simultaneously structuralist and poststructuralist in his underpinnings. While many of the Deleuzean concepts on cinema resist straightforward and simplistic application to ethnographic research on video, a more stratified and fine-grained consideration of how different types of movement-images may have powers to express and relate experiences could be of assistance for CCT videographers concerned about the aesthetic potential of their work. Furthermore, outside a (in a simplistic sense)

superficial consideration of embellished shots alone, there may be something to be said about how such aesthetic work enters far more profound realms in its potential to connect to powerful embodied experiences. Let us turn to these questions after briefly considering another side of Deleuze's philosophy of cinema – how it transcended from movement to the question of time itself – the time-image.

2.7 Types of Time-Image

> "Art in post-modern times is concerned with occupying time, rather than occupying space" (Kip Jones)

> "For to see what is in front of our eyes requires thinking – and thinking about thinking – in different ways" (Nigel Thrift)

Even as the nature of video can be conceptualized as movement itself, the 'shock to thought' (e.g. Evens 2002) it provides is through the *displacement of time* – how the notion of time itself becomes transcended in the flux of shots in the cinematographic montage (Deleuze 1989). At the outset, this seems fairly obvious. Through speeding and slowing the shot, through combining various shots (to construct nonlinearity of time), and utilizing the dark moments between them, the moving image enters into completely different epistemological relations as compared to its qualities of movement alone. In so doing, it becomes no longer fixated on specific movements and their relations, but indeed the abstraction and collapsing of commonsensical and rationalistic notions of time and the novel relations this entails. In a simple sense, the abstraction of time occurs when the sensory-motor (the 'causal', the 'realist') schema breaks down, or:

> "What has happened is that the sensory-motor schema is no longer in operation, but at the same time it is not overtaken or overcome. It is shattered from the inside. That is, perceptions and actions ceased to be linked together, and spaces are neither co-ordinated nor filled" (Deleuze 1989: 40)

The montage has thus come to incorporate more relational content than its directly movement-oriented signs, which we saw in the movement-image. These abstract manifestations of time go beyond previous analysis in as much as they can now be seen as how the "movement-image [that] offers an indirect image of time as the open whole" (Bogue 2003: 107). This is the time-image, or:

> "This is what happens when the image becomes time-image. The world has become a memory, brain, superimposition of ages or lobes, but the brain itself has become consciousness, continuation of ages, creation or growth of ever new lobes, recreation of matter as with styrene [...] The image no longer has space and movement as its primary characteristics but topology and time" (Deleuze 1989: 125)

What we also see here is the foregrounding of thought and imagination. What started from the subconscious relations of the shifting intensities of sense has extended to the creative relations of thought put in novel motions by the abstract time-image. And to continue his taxonomic work, again, Deleuze goes into intricate (and at times exhausting) detail in his conceptualizations of the various forms and signs of the time-image. Similarly to my reading regarding the movement-image, for the purpose of videography in CCT, I will only attempt to provide a brief overview, while attaching the most applicable parts to extant and future research on video.

What the time-image brings about, is the destabilization of the commonsensical and causally descriptive images of objects (both human and nonhuman) in the artificially closed in the system of the frame, set in movement in the shot. To contrast this form of the image and to further enter into the consideration of montage (how shots are linked together in cinematographic expressions), we can first briefly consider the most straightforward breach of 'linear' time in a montage sequence. Thise are the 'recollection-images', which could also be called 'flashbacks' that "intervene in automatic recognition; they insert themselves between stimulation and response, and contribute to the better adjustment to the motor mechanism by reinforcing it with a psychological causality" (Deleuze 1989: 47). The flashback operates with a linear narrative, exposing a history that has a correspondence to the present situation in the montage (a memory, a expression of destiny). Even as still contained in a narrative sequence, this is when we begin to see the breach of linear time, as:

> "Subjectivity, then, takes on a new sense, which is no longer motor or material, but temporal and spiritual: that which 'is added' to matter, not what distends it; recollection-image, not movement-image" (Deleuze 1989: 47)

Recollection-images (flashbacks), as they would seem to assume expressive forms of the narrative script, and like most of Deleuze's philosophy of the moving image, have their most obvious place in cinematography. Yet, such visuals could also be employed in videographic research in CCT, even as such aesthetic perspectives have not been widely utilized to date. One possibility for this could be historical footage (such as from one's childhood) that could be added to the montage so as to build a potentially more convincing and evocative story. At present, I am involved in the planning of one such project that would explore how 'retired' paintball practitioners negotiate the 'loss' of a social consumption practice that they were profoundly invested in for over a decade. Footage from past tournaments, and other experiences involving the whole team could be inserted to supplement (and deterritorialize) present day narratives of how former players negotiate this fossilized past (see also Videography note 13 in 2.8.2). Yet, in their potential spirituality, these moving images do not only point to a recognizable past. They have the power

to bring about new thinking – both in terms of aesthetics and infinite potential circuits of expressive orders. This is where the time-image opens up and breaks its conceptual ties to the movement-image.

While there is a great amount of interesting Deleuzian conceptualizations in his work on the time-image, the concept of images of convincing non-realist time, the "powers of the false" (Deleuze 1989: 126), seems to have the greatest bearing on how we understand the nature of the moving image in terms of any corresponding link to 'captured reality'. Deleuze conceptualized the 'organic regime' as the images where 'representation' and thought play a game of tag with each other. This game sets the moving image on two poles, the 'representational' actuality and the emergence of consciousness in the virtual – in other words, what the moving image expresses (as 'truth-like reality') and what creative thought such expressions can bring about.

These powers are also linked to particular aesthetics, the most important being the break-down of the realist conceptualization of the moving image (e.g. an artistic image of abstract texture). Here is where the actuality of the 'representation' and the creative potential of consciousness intertwine to bring about new intensities and potential relations. Deleuze conceptualizes this as the 'crystalline regime' or the "pure optical and sound situations" (Deleuze 1989: 9), which consist of nonobjectified optical and sonic images in which the sensory-motor schema breaks down (Bogue 2003), or, in other words, moving images devoid of a spatiotemporal frame, so as to be recognized 'as this-or-that type of expression'. Thus, we now have a completely different type of expressive schemata of moving images, ones in which:

> "We no longer have an indirect image of time which derives from movement, but a direct time-image from which movement derives. We no longer have a chronological time which can be overturned by movements which are contingently abnormal; we have a chronic non-chronological time which produces movements necessarily 'abnormal', essentially 'false' [...] If time appears directly, it is in de-actualized peaks of the present; it is in virtual sheets of the past" (Deleuze 1989: 129-130)

The point seems to be that when our montage-cuts assume the roles of shifted time (the 'past', 'present' and 'future' blending almost seamlessly), we are producing an entire viewing experience that is removed from any linear narrative and spatiotemporal order. We are producing stories, where the problem is no longer of discerning between the 'true' and the 'false' moving image, but rather constructing an aesthetic and a narrative "labyrinth of time [...] the line which forks and keeps on forking, passing through incompossible presents, returning to not-necessarily true pasts" (Deleuze 1989: 131). A montage thus becomes of a purely symbolic order, distanciated from a correspondence with reality, not only in terms of subjective perspectives (of the 'camera eye'), but of (impossible) orders of nonlinear time itself.

As with the movement-image, Deleuze's conceptualization of the time-image consists of various types of aesthetic expressions of time. These are the crystal-image, or 'hyalosigns', which breaks down time in an object or person, the 'chronosigns', which have to do with the nonlinear orders of time, the 'noosigns', which connect thought and images, and finally the 'lectosigns', which manifest in the new relations between the visual and the sonic (Bogue 2003: 107-108). Let us briefly visit each of these in turn.

2.7.1 Hyalosigns: Time as a Break in the Sensory-Motor Schema

The most approachable concept of the breaking down of the sensory-motor schema is the 'hyalosign' denoting visual storytelling (cuts and montage), where the linearity of time seems to no longer apply and the objective causal relations in the setting become ambiguous – where the "world takes responsibility for the movement that the subject can no longer or cannot make" (Deleuze 1989: 59). Something more than the linear, commonsensical and rational emerges. "For when the sensory-motor schema begins to disintegrate, and with it the interconnecting links that hold action and the situation together, the only totality remaining that can provide coherence and coordination of space and time is either a network of circulating clichés or a conspiratorial system of surveillance" (Bogue 2003: 108). With 'hyalosigns' we enter into metaphoric, even artistic visuals brought about to construct something more than simple sensory-motor relations between the objects (human and nonhuman) in the frame.

As one might expect with Deleuze, 'hyalosigns' come in many forms, the first (and the conceptually simplest) being the 'opsign'. In such visual moments of the moving image, the setting becomes decontextualized to reveal something beyond the immediate realist space and agency – a character or the subjective camera suddenly becoming aware of the Open Whole. Bogue (2003) describes an example of Rosselini's *Europa 51*, where a wealthy housewife undergoes a series of purely optical moments as she sees the misery of poverty when she is made to stand afore "housing projects [...] grim buildings and razed wastelands" (p. 109). In effect, the 'camera eye' extends into her contemplation of how she sees humankind as the wreckage of the slum stares back at her. It may resemble the perception-image (see 2.6.1), but it goes further as it extends beyond the immediate perception and into the Open Whole of all being and relations. One can find the same type of thinking in Žižek's (2006) analysis of Hitchcock's Birds, where in the opening scene (an accident and a fire at the gas station), the camera suddenly lunges into the sky (revealing the whole town), and suddenly a flock of birds emerges hovering towards the town. This is the 'eye of evil', an overarching malevolent

force surrounding all of humanity in transcendence into something concrete (Žižek 2006).

As with these examples, the 'opsign' differs from a perception-image in its potential to connect beyond the immanent contextual situation. This connection is marked by the overflow of intensities, something so unbearable that it exceeds our sensory-motor capabilities through its connections to affects beyond the immediate situation (Bogue 2003: 110). The difficulty here is one of distinction. Indeed, it can be difficult to construct when an image becomes an 'opsign' by connecting to the Open Whole in its unbearability. More similarities can be noted between the aforementioned recollection-image (see 2.7) and the 'purely optical and sound situations'. But whereas the recollection-image, like other movement-image has its primary domain in some spatiotemporal relations between the shots that accompany it, "it is not the recollection-image or attentive recognition which gives us the proper equivalent of the optical-sound image, it is rather the disturbances of memory and failures of recognition" (Deleuze 1989: 55). Thus, "*there is at a deeper level and insuffiency in the recollection-image in relation to the past*" (Deleuze 1989: 53, emphasis in the original), and here the 'hyalosign' goes conceptually further, beyond the causality of the narrative, or the linearity of destiny. This is to draw further attention to the comprehensively abstract and artistic nature of the 'purely optical and sound situations' that make up the time-image. They are completely deterritorialized from the spatiotemporal flow, thus enabling the viewer to enter beyond them in thought – to uncover and establish wholly new relations. These have less to do with any attentive recognition and identification of a narrative flashback, but on the contrary, the forces of unbearability of not remembering.

As academic research in the videography form has primarily followed what could be described as a documentary format, it may seem easy to dismiss this type of abstract and even artistic use of the moving image. Certainly, my videographic productions that accompany this study are commonly engaged in making use of the sensory-motor schema and, therefore, (too) often a kind of implicitly 'realist' imagery. In my published work, the understanding of the non-realist illusion of the videographic methodology has been mostly concerned with my (and my research fellows') interpretations and our ways of constructing a narrative form of storytelling from our emergent perspectives. Additionally, as with fieldnotes, I have argued that the very nature of the video technology gives us no privileged access to any reality – only an interpreted abstraction that is nevertheless very powerful in the sense that it expresses highly convincing illusions of our emerging relations in the field and the role of the spatiotemporal context in the social relations among people.

But, if we take a more artistic approach to videographic work seriously (which is certainly my goal), what could it mean? If we could express convincing and novel relations with metaphoric and artistic moving images, could our research become to constitute more evocative efficacy? In academic text we conventionally do this through (often dry and rationalistic) accounts of interpretations – connections to what our participants 'really mean'. Also, on video, if interpretation is made in narrative 'voice of god' format, we similarly redirect ourselves back towards textual expression. The future will show if we can (or should) be liberated from such objectivist images.

2.7.2 Chronosigns: Time as a Break in Linearity and an Extension into Relation

Deleuze's 'hyalosigns' are of shots of cinematographic expression that have to do with the "mirrors or seeds of time" (Deleuze 1989: 274), which by going beyond the sensory-motor schema, reveal relations of the Open Whole by stretching to past relations of memories and the future yet to emerge.

'Chronosigns', on the other hand, are similar in that they visually combine relations of the past and the present, but they are denoted by the trueness or falseness of the images as they break the linearity of time (Bogue 2003: 135). They break down the relation between the realness of the present and the virtual memory of the past so that it becomes "undecidable or inextricable" (Deleuze 1989: 274). Thus, whereas 'hyalosigns' have to do with the breaking down of the real and the imaginary, 'chronosigns' break down the distinction of the true and the false, "in other words, a narrative's verisimilitude, *or truth likeness*, depends on its adherence to the commonsense coordinates [the sensory-motor] of space and time" (Bogue 2003: 147, emphasis added). Thus by breaking both Euclidean space and chronological time, they render the present abstract – one that may only peak intermittently from shot to shot.

'Chronosigns' come in two forms that intermingle to no longer represent linear time, or even true or false events, so as to be no longer of a "coexistence of sheets of the past, but the simultaneity of the peaks of the present" (Deleuze 1989: 101). The moving image thus becomes something of a kaleidoscope of potential possibilities, where many events take place, but where we as the viewers have little guidance for understanding their ordering or actuality. We must thus by ourselves construct an imagination out of these possibilities. The two forms of the 'chronosigns' are the 'aspects' (regions, layers) and the 'accents' (peaks of view) (Deleuze 1989). While Deleuze does not offer much specificity for these concepts, I read them to entail something like the following. The 'aspects' are expressions of a moving image where different events are contextualized so that their ordering becomes obscure (did this event already happen, is it happening now, is it going to happen at

all). The 'accents' are the different constructed realities for each of the 'aspects' (e.g. through narration), so as to make them occur simultaneously, but always without a distinction in terms of their actual ordering or veracity. They emerge simultaneous and distinct at the same time, something of a relativist image, "*Distinct and indiscernible*" (Deleuze 1989: 104, emphasis in original).

Similarly to 'hyalosigns', this type of abstract imagery that could be seen to denote the breaking down of the expression of both time and the true and the false, has not been utilized in CCT research in videography form. While acknowledging the fictional basis of any logos or truth-effect of our expressions, the most common moving image we see consists of contextual (or worse, decontextualized talking heads) social practices in their directness, the image thus emerging into a description of the 'real' situation. Perhaps this is what the academic community has deemed convincing, an implicit connection to a type of storytelling that sets up a type of verisimilitude with the context. Yet, while our focus as videographers commonly remains at the level of the sensory-motor schema, our constructions of linear time are naturally mere illusions, as we construct interviews by combining different sentences and reshuffling the order of fieldwork to create more cohesion in our narratives.

Videography note (10):

Indeed, in our PTS project, we have deliberately reorganized the order of temporal events. While our videography portrays the sequence of time as a spatiotemporal movement from Finland-London-New York-Finland, the order of London and New York was, in actuality, reversed and the Finnish material was shot intermittently. Yet this ordering of time, from our perspective, creates a more compelling truth likeness, at the same time displaying the powers of the false in audiovisual expression via the moving image. By constructing a videography that would entail 'chronosigns' and 'hyalosigns' can offer much potential in future work, especially if the more abstract and artistic expressions can be seen as evocative and compelling and can therefore be foregrounded.

In 1.1, I raised several often-resurfacing questions posed to me when attempting to argue for videography in CCT. The form varies, yet the content always seems the same: "Isn't it possible to fake everything on video by (re)creating the scene and the ambiance, by picking and choosing the truth you wish to tell?" At this present point, I will no longer linger on defining the ontology and the possibility for any stable and lasting 'truth', but, in addition, is not the same exactly true, and additionally accomplished with relative ease in textual representations of research? What stops one from writing whatever

they want (and perhaps more alarmingly, what they assume as the 'truth')? As Belk and Kozinets (2005a) note, our writings (in CCT) are to be understood as rhetorical devices, and therefore it may be possible that the "'cults of criteriology' that lobby for the regulation of inquiry and removal of doubt" (Sherry and Schouten 2002: 220) are finally on the vane. At least, they have not been successful in maintaining any philosophically defendable positions via postmodern frameworks.

2.7.3 On the Limits of the Time-Image: Images as Thought, Sight and Sounds

The last of the signs in the Deleuzean taxonomy of the time-image have to do with audiovisual moments where all expressive coordinates of space, time and causality are broken. These time-images no longer take place in any type of directly signifying system of cinematographic expression, but rather extend to take place in pure thought itself, in the intense experience and cognitive recollection and thought of the viewer(s). In so doing, and somewhat confusingly, they are also 'chronosigns' – but it is in this category of the moving image in which a Deleuzean ontology leads us furthest, yet never disconnects, from the subconscious of the sense and their emergent intensities. For these are not images that extend to thought, they are embodied thought in and of themselves. So what could such further-moving image categories add to our conceptual resources? In entering into the potentials of creative imagination, these types of 'chronosigns' denote the "thinking image [...and a] readable image" (Deleuze 1989: 165). This effort makes linkages with Deleuze's takes on material becoming and the becoming of the mind and imagination, for now, like a Deleuzean 'poststructuralist' perspective to language itself, we can conceptualize cinema as an emerging flux of audiovisual concepts, or "from the image to the thought, from the percept to the concept" (Deleuze 1989: 157). This seems one of the most important 'shocks to thought' in Deleuzean thinking, for he postulates that 'noosigns' and 'lectosigns' extend beyond thought, to and beyond possible thought, and this shock comes about due to the agency of the moving image itself, an inescapable and captivating "subjective and collective automaton for an automatic movement" (ibid.: 157) that gives rise to a spiritual automation in us, the 'shock to thought' itself, or:

> "what constitutes the sublime is that the imagination suffers a shock which pushes it to the limit and forces thought to think the whole as intellectual totality which goes beyond the imagination" (Deleuze 1989: 157)

Thus, these types of moving images are not about visuals and affects that are of the 'possible' kind (the world as we know it to be in our everyday experiences), but rather come about to portray unfathomable and impossible

combinations of times, pasts and presents. These glide throughout our experience in a flux of audiovisual expressions that do not form stable images that could be directly read as a realist image. While photography certainly moves one's thinking, it is not animated (Barthes 1981/1980), and thus, in this sense, does not consist of the spiritual automation. One could say that while the photograph (or the text) invites the viewer/reader, the audiovisual moving image goes on, in its own agency, to engulf or even kidnap the viewer. Whereas "the movement-image constitutes time in its empirical form, the course of time: a successive present in an extrinsic relation of before and after, so that the past is the former present, and the future is the present to come" (Deleuze 1989: 271), this schemata now breaks down to give us more radical 'hyalosigns' and 'chronosigns' that make the cinematic montage thus always a collision of individual-like expressions of a "vague and non-rational, as much felt as thought, a kind of dreamlike, intuited affective totality that gives each image its sense of 'rightness'" (Bogue 2003: 169). This false illusion of 'rightness', through the convincing and evocative 'shocks to thought', can potentially "inspire action, that critical awareness should lead to a revolutionary consciousness" (ibid.: 169). Here, in the liberation of thought, we can spot some similarities even to critical theory (Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; cf. Hetrick and Lozada 1994), but more in line with Deleuze, this consciousness is not necessarily one of emancipation of a system of politics – rather a creative liberation of thought from any stable conceptual system. Now with such breaks from representation and causality that was the hallmark of classical cinema, as Bogue (2003) notes, we are not only faced with the reading of 'impossible' images, but, in fact, we become faced with a our relations to what was previously an understandable and stable experience of the world. Therefore it can no longer consist of any type of potential 'representation' of a possible world, but indeed the opposite, forcing us to negotiate and think along impossible worlds of discontinuous time and relation, or:

> "there is no longer any movement of internalization or externalization, integration or differentiation, but a confrontation of an outside and an inside independent of distance, this thought itself and this un-thought within thought" (Deleuze 1989: 278)

We have been thrust into new possible imaginations, the "intolerable and unthinkable" (Bogue 2003: 170), but this does not consist of some great horror; rather the opposite – we become faced with the banality of our ordinary experiences as if we, in our realities, "are living in a second rate film" (ibid.: 171), where "The intolerable is no longer a serious injustice, but a permanent state of a daily banality" (Deleuze 1989: 170). And is it not the hallmark of CCT videographies (or CCT research in general) to venture into the contexts of social practices, and 'make strange the everyday' in order to overcome banality by dialectically reversing itself? After all, we can

potentially produce impossible illusions of banality that have novel and evocative senses and meanings (even theoretical) in our banality as researchers. Yet, the impossibility of the image, the orchestration of the montage in ways that invokes new thinking and relations, presumes that we can intellectually relinquish our grasp of the realness or the purely descriptive nature of the moving image.

These new images of thought come in montages simultaneously separated and linked by the following forms: the 'point-cut', the 're-linkage' and the 'white or black screen' (Bogue 2003). These denote the various interstices between shots, where the 'point-cut' is the irrationality of the combination of distinct (and seemingly disconnected) shots, the 're-linkage' is the irrational interstice and its possible non-arbitrary relations from shot to another then made visible by the 'white or black screen' (the interval or the transition between shots). Thus, the moving images become possibilities of times and places, held together by these interstices that extend to and beyond thought. In contemporary moving images, we have become faced with these spaces between the shots themselves, as they are no longer there to ensure the smoothness of causal actions, but rather to be relational differing spaces that in their emptiness open up the possibility for associations between the discontinuous and irrationally cut shots of the montage (Bogue 2003). Thus, "The interval is set free, the interstice becomes irreducible and stands on its own" (Deleuze 1989: 277). When the black space between shots gains autonomity, the viewer is thrust into an internal space with an origin in consciousness that is no longer a mirror or 'representation' of anything that needs to be signified. This is conceptualized as the "*crystal*" (Deleuze 1989: 274, emphasis added) of the 'chronosign' that fragments rather than focuses thought and launches it into new series and trajectories – not a mirror of 'representation', but rather a prism of possible relations. "The direct time-image or the transcendental form of time is what we see in the crystal; and hyalosigns, as well as crystalline signs, should therefore be called mirrors or seeds of time" (Deleuze 1989: 274). These dreamlike states are succinctly described by Bogue (2003):

> "In sheets of the past, diverse planes of past time, each a slice from the great cone of the virtual past, are juxtaposed and interconnected through transverse passages that produce incompossible combinations of coexisting past times. In peaks of the present, incompossible presents-of-the-past, presents-of-the-present, and presents-of-the-future are treated as simultaneous present moments, and through abrupt leaps from peak to peak mutually exclusive points of time are put in relation to one another [...] True and false are also undecidable in the *chronosigns* of time-as-series, those signs in which the vital becoming of time subsumes a retained past and a projected future within a mutative present" (p. 200)

While considerably abstract, this also applies directly to videographic research. According to this account of Deleuzean reading, the future is open in a resonating rhizome of relations, under constant negotiation, drawing

from all events, whether true or false (in a cinematographic sense) – our 'truth' on a videographic expression must be an illusion – an endless simulation, and simultaneously it must be the 'truth' in all the relations it goes on to bring about. These 'truths' while unstable and nonrepresentative are thinkable and readable through and beyond a creative imagination. But this is as far as we will take the Deleuzean ontology of cinema regarding this current project on videography in the CCT. One more consideration remains, however, and it seems to be one of the most neglected kinds. So before we wrap up the section regarding an account of Essence(s), let us briefly visit the aural, the sonic, the sound of the moving image.

2.7.4 Relinkages of the Aural Dimension of the Movement-Image

"who can conceive a voice without a body" (Mary Ann Doane)

Let us move on to consider the notion of sound with respect to the moving image. Here I will primarily follow Deleuze to provide a brief overview of how sound gives us new potential to escape the linearity of the realist image. In terms of a Deleuzian reading, sound adds to the potential of the moving image by expressing new possibilities for escaping the notion of 'representation', or as Evens (2002), elaborates:

> "To the extent that something moves in music, something which makes it more than a measureable aggregation of continuous sounds, but brings it together, relates to its outside, to that extent, music is expressive. It is the expression in sound which cannot be measured, the expressive dimension that operates in conjunction with a person a listener who brings something to the sound. Where sound involves percepts and affects, where it presents a world one could be in, there is only a person can go" (p. 173)

A more practical perspective on sound and the visual experience is provided in the Production chapter (see IV). Deleuze reminds us that in sound(s) "there is just one soundtrack, but at least three groups, words, noises, music" (Deleuze 1989: 234), which, in line with his relational epistemology, "rather than invoking the signifier and the signified [...] all form together one component, a continuum" (ibid.: 235). Through the addition of the sonic layer, the moving image entered into a vast new spectrum of possible relations. While there are many perspectives into experiencing sound and its relationship with the visual moving image, many scholars on cinema and communication studies agree that the aural has been conventionally subjugated to the visual (Doane 1980; Metz 1980; Jones 1993) or too hastily assumed to be an "equal partner with the image in some grand democracy" (Branigan 1989: 311) and "constructed largely as a function of the representative realism effect" (Pisters 2003: 178).

Videography note (11):

While retorting to staging and expressing performances that would imply a realist take on epistemology is certainly inconceivable for this project, there is an interesting affective nature of the sound accompanying the moving image. Why is it that we, as an audience, seem to be willing to accept granulated and low-quality footage as long as the soundtrack remains undistorted and unvarnished to some substantial degree? Could we speculate that we, as audiovisual perceivers and embodiers of our perceptions have evolved a certain generosity towards visual experience that does not apply similarly to what we require from auditory experiences? In situations of corporeal danger (say darkness), have we not acquired the capacity to 'make-do' with distorted and compromised visual cues (say, escaping in the dark)? But is it not the very nature of sound experience itself, that when dubious (say digital distortions of a shoddy recording), tells us exactly the opposite – that the event is not 'real'; does that not scream fabrication? The problem with 'bad' sound is that it rids us of our embodied experience, and makes us reconsider the situation. The sound could thus be the 'realism-check' *par excellence*. While this may be to the videographer's advantage when constructing 'purely optical or sound situations', it acts as a potent disturbance in, for example, action-images. In this perspective "your audio is more important than your video" (Artis 2008: 145).

While we often film in demanding contexts (e.g. electronic music clubs) in terms of the sound, we have decided not to introduce 'lavalier microphones' (i.e. microphones attached to the participants' shirts), as we feel that such a procedure would do much to take away much of the fluid relationality of the settings by turning them into something too much interview-like (rather than 'conversation-like' in an emergent sense). Instead, we have used high quality microphones and the *post facto* services of professional audio engineers to 'resurrect' some of the audio files that have suffered from too much background noise. The reader may evaluate the results by viewing, for example, the PTS videography.

However, in addition to contextual tremors, sound may have many qualities that can stand alone in and of themselves, for it is the addition of sound (music as well as autonomous speech acts and narration) that is "an act of myth or story-telling which creates the event, which makes the event rise up into the air, and which rises itself into a spiritual ascension" (Deleuze 1989: 279).

Sound can thus be seen as a part of the moving image, but also something that simultaneously stretches beyond the visual, while bringing back to the visual relations its nonarbitrariness – its 'eventification'. As already seen above, taking a stance contra text, Christian Metz's (1980) seminal work proposes that the very nature of Western culture (the embeddedness of the subject-predicate-object structure) emphasizes the visual and 'adjectivises' the aural as a property of some existing object, but never a state of being as its own. In his terms, objects have a tendency to become explained when described linguistically, whereas a sound that is heard is understood only when its source is objectified, as "Culture depends on the permanence of the object, language reaffirms it: only the adjective is varied" (Metz 1980: 28). Importantly, however, he sees sound as an "autonomous aural object" (ibid.:

24), something that is not part of the visual experience, but rather something imprecise (see also Branigan 1989), a presence that readily diffuses into the surrounding spaces and is thus not in any way contained by the visual. Doane (1980) notes that the expression of recorded voice is, in its fluidity, in perpetual contradiction with the two-dimensional screen, and, therefore, there is always a divergence between bodies and voices. In addition:

> "sound [...] acts as it does because of the space it has as its context [...] all around us and from within us. Analogies to visual experience break down, for the visual only comes from within us when we are hallucinating" (Jones 1993: 248)

He adds, in line with Baudrillard's (2006/1981) simulacra, that we have come to accept the most authentic sound experience as something recorded in the abstraction of studio environments, then only later imprinted on the moving image and engineered so as to sound like reality. It thus becomes, like the video image, doubly abstracted.

As we have already seen, it is what these scholars have often left as the metaphysical (what is the nature of the dissolution of the sound and the dream-like 'hallucinatory' moving image) that Deleuze focuses on. It is these notions of the illusory nature of sound and how it transcends the visual of the frame to defuse in the surrounding space of the moving image that particularly interested Deleuze. While scholars have also concentrated on what would consist of a more realistic representation of sounds emanating from localized bodies (e.g. Doane 1980), Deleuze would again emphasize the nonlocalized and relational (nonrealist) as more real, as what opens a connection to the infinite Open Whole (see 2.4.1). For Deleuze, this distinction is again relational, as all soundscapes and visuals blend together. And yet more strikingly, Deleuze's (1989) point is that the aural experience is always autonomous from the visual moving image, as:

> "What constitutes the audio-visual image is a disjunction, a dissociation of the visual and the sound, each hetautomous, but at the same time an incommensurable or 'irrational' relation which connects them to each other, without forming a whole, without offering the least whole. It is resistance stemming from the sensory-motor schema, and which separates the visual image and the sound image, but puts them all the more in a non-totalizable relation" (p. 256)

This has to do with the final time-image, the 'lectosign', and, even if it was only vaguely conceptualized by Deleuze, it has been interpreted to closely associated with the ways sound connects and actualizes new relations as it is intertwined with the moving image (Bogue 2003). The 'lectosign' is described to be the incommensurable limits of visual and sound – instances that reattach them together, yet the place where they stay perennially apart, such as when "the common limit: the visual image become stratigraphic is for its part all the more readable in that the speech-act becomes an autonomous creator" (Deleuze 1989: 279). As Pisters (2003) notes; "when the sound takes over from the image, this opening is created, an opening to something beyond

the image, a connection with the earth or even the cosmos" (p. 190). Indeed, here Deleuze is speaking about how sounds (such as autonomous speech) teach us something about the visual, as "a sonic continuum accompanies the visual image, a continuum that includes dialogue, sound effects, and music in both the relative and absolute out-of-field; and on the other hand that music has the 'specific autonomous power'" (Bogue 2003: 186). In my view, we see Deleuze arguing for paying special attention to the aural realm, not as secondary to the visual, but independent and opening new potential to go beyond the visual frame, and into the relations that surge beyond. Indeed:

> "consider sound in its potential force to engender all kinds of molecular becomings. Furthermore, an important aspect of music is its power to create territories and, by the same token, its power to deterritorialize" (Pisters 2003: 188)

In contrast, other scholars have drawn dichotomous lines between the signified and nonsignified sounds. In Zettl's (2008) terms, sound can have a diegetic directional and assignable point of origin (whether directly visible or not), such as a cat's purr or the sound of traffic in a city flat, or a nondiegetic origin that cannot be defined (comical sound effects, mood enhancing background music) (cf. Pisters 2003). In any case, for Deleuze, sounds and music "encompasses a gamut of possibilities, ranging in function from sonic component of the onscreen scene, through harmonious reinforcement of the film's rhythms, to autonomous 'foreign body'" (Bogue 2003: 186). The sonic continuum can thus enhance the sensory motor experience and also again connect to the Open Whole through difference, nonlinearity and the irrational incongruence with the observable. For Deleuze, music is indeed about the Dionysian, as it creates immediate moods in and of itself while being potentially completely incommensurable with the visual moving image (Deleuze 1989; Bogue 2003). With the breakdown of linear time in modern cinema, both the visual and the sonic become autonomous (when the moving image assumes the 'purely optical and the sonic' to express complete noncorrespondence to the spatiotemporal coordinates), thus becoming first experienced through the intensities they invoke, then to be read and interpreted (Bogue 2003). They must be reconnected with some world by the mind, as they have become stripped of their own spatiotemporal coordinates or the sensory-motor schema. There will thus never be a commensurability between the sonic and the visual, but rather a complimentarity where there is always a space that has the potential to connect to the infinite, or how "incommensurability denotes a new relation and not an absence [...] which forms the non-totalizable relation, the broken ring of their junction, [...] this is a perpetual linkage" (Deleuze 1989: 279).

In the time of silent films, speech was always subordinate to action (Bogue 2003). With the advent of the 'talkie', a new realm of affect came about, as the characters were now able to lie, hint and misspeak, as "the naturalness of the

characters' expressive bodies is thereby infected with a potential artificiality and deceptiveness" (Bogue 2003: 185). In addition to other nondiegetic sounds (including music), narrative voices occupy the 'absolute out-of-field' by bringing about the nonlinearity of no physical presence of reminiscence, reflection and commentary (Bogue 2003) – thus again connecting the experience to the Open Whole. The modern cinema, and with it all contemporary audiovisual expressions of the moving image, thus has the potential to "[through 'lectosigns' to] exploit the power of a disjunction of sound and sight" (Bogue 203: 194). As is the case with video media altogether, there is no "clear origin or final destination" (Bogue 2003: 195), and no clear beginning or end of a videographic expression.

Here we can take a quick glance back (see 2.3.6), as it must be noted that we have mostly been covering cinematographic considerations on the film format. Yet, Deleuze also anticipatorily touches upon the digitalized video format:

> "And the screen itself, even if it keeps a vertical position by convention, no longer seems to refer to the human posture, like a window or painting, but rather constitutes a table of information, an opaque surface on which are inscribed 'data', information replacing nature, and the brain-city, the third eye, replacing the eye of nature" (Deleuze 1989: 265)

Likewise to the aforementioned notions of thinking the unthinkable when faced with the automaticity and agency of the audiovisual moving image, digital video as a relational, rearticulatable, and remashable medium holds tremendous potential, in both creating and making us question the nature of reality. Unlike film, video is not merely a relational medium in its aesthetics, art, and possibilities for compelling fictions; it becomes a medium of relation through its endless possibilities of recreation. Thus, we seem to have come full circle to return to the famous 1967 McLuhanian pictographic handbook, "*The Medium Is The Massage*" (Joseph 2008: 101). Yet, in digital expression, this must also be considered in a relation to the 'hyperreal', the generation of 'real' experiences without origin or actuality (e.g. Baudrillard 2006; see also 2.9.2), where we see "a double logic of remediation. Our culture wants both to multiply its media and to erase all traces of mediation: ideally it wants to erase its media in the very act of multiplying them" (Bolter and Grusin 2000: 5). As we have seen (see 1.1), video, in its impossibility to be situated to stable locations or structures, is by nature truly inherently deterritorialized, and, from a more optimistic perspective, evermore democratic.

Videography note (12):

In our PTS project we wish, in our road trip format and a tentative stab at producing 'noosigns' and 'lectosigns' , to bring about readable and thinkable moving images. The central argument of this work was one of cultural acceleration facilitated by the digitalization of cultural artifacts (music files, online discussions) in the 'dubstep' electronic music genre.

By, at times, utilizing a 'mosaic' image, it is our aim to express thinking about the hectic speed of the evolution of the cultural relations. In addition, these 'chronosigns' attempt to express an account of our involvement and hermeneutical development in these cultural relations. We attempt to recreate the flux of the cultural phenomena in a flux of imagery.

In addition, the commonly utilized narrative form of videographic expressions in CCT warrants some further considerations. In line with Deleuzean thought, such 'voices-of-god' can do much to break with the representational 'truthlike' realist underpinnings – yet only to the extent that they open up possibilities for thought, and not to construct a declarative 'final' argument. If one wishes to conform to the present epistemology, these narrations can now rather consist of "voices of reminiscence, of reflection or of commentary [...] In this way the spoken word enhances the visual movement-image by emphasizing its continuity with the open Whole, of which each shot is an expressive unfolding" (Bogue 2003: 185). Doane (1980) makes a distinction between the internal monologue of cinema narrative and the 'disembodied voice' of documentary narrative. For her the first is a representation of the inner life of a character that expresses the homogeneity of the diegetic space, the latter "is necessarily presented as outside that space" (ibid.: 42). Following Deleuze, such narration should be relational and emergent from at least two perspectives: 1) how the narration produces new relations in the visual moving image and 2) how the narrative would express

the hermeneutic relation between the voice of the ethnographer, the research participants, and the spatiotemporal settings. Indeed, how do these new relations emerge in an ethnographically empathic sense, and what new kinds of relations do they resonantly bring about with and beyond the immediate audience(s)? How do horizons become fused in the videographic expression and do they extend further to fuse yet more?

Finally, complementing the moving image with the auditory is another avenue of experimenting with the relationality of the video medium. Sounds, such as music, add more voices and more interaction in constructing the story. These denote novel emerging relations among producers on the editing table, where the moving image and its soundtrack is supplemented with musical expression, making both the video montage and music enter into new relations. Thus, while credit needs to be shared by all, the 'subject' of production becomes an increasingly multiplied voice that further relates to the multiple voices of the audience (Evens 2002).

While Deleuze offers several considerations on the cinematographic moving image and its relation to thought, he places less emphasis on how the moving image can be seen as embodied in the viewer's experience. These considerations have been further developed by various contemporary scholars of the cinema – to which we shall turn next in order to further our understandings of how the audiovisual moving image can constitute very different epistemological experiences contra the conventional academic form of relating knowledge products (textual expression).

2.8 Moving Image as an Embodied and Co-creative Experience

> "Film is the greatest teacher because it teaches not only through the brain but through the whole body" (Vsevolod Pudovkin)

> "Consumers have always lived in an experience economy. Consumer researchers have just begun to understand the sensuous negotiation that life demands" (Annamma Joy and John Sherry)

2.8.1 Reciprocity of the Cinematographic Experience and its Qualities

Through a Deleuzean reading, we have been gradually approaching the way in which the moving image can be seen to constitute a very different experiential potential as compared to, for example, textual or photographic representation. We have also seen how experiencing the moving image can be seen as ontologically different due to the inherent nature of mostly non-linguistic emergence and the movement itself that is what constitutes the medium. One could say that the moving image has a specific agentic quality of its own, for it does not wait for the audiences' discretion, as it comes to

grasp attention in so much as eyes are kept open and hands from muffling the aural projections ears are so keen to collect (certainly a reciprocal experience is of 'acceptance' as well), or:

> "It is this capacity, this power, and not the simple logical possibility, that cinema claims to give us in communicating the shock. It is as if cinema were telling us: with me, with the movement-image, you can't escape the shock which arouses the thinker in you" (Deleuze 1989: 156)

Now, having briefly considered various ways in which the moving image can be conceptually typologized into relational expressive elements, we need to further construct the experiential qualities of the moving image itself. It is therefore appropriate to continue our investigation into what constitutes such a 'grasping' or 'forceful' experience when the moving image engages the viewer, or as Kozinets and Belk (2006) note, "Videographies can provide audiences with a vicarious sense of experience that deepens understanding and fosters empathy" (p. 340; see also Belk 1998). In further considering the workings of such an experience, we can be informed by scholars from the fields of cinema theory and communications studies who draw diversely from phenomenology, semiotics, linguistics and even brain research, as their underpinnings – and, in doing, often come to adopt forms of Deleuzean thinking. Specifically, the works of Laura Marks (2000), Jennifer Barker (2009) and Torben Grodal (2009), among others, have amounted to extremely interesting and useful accounts of how the moving image relates to the viewer, specifically from the perspective of how the moving image becomes embodied in the act of experiencing it. It must be also noted that such considerations were not *an sich* unfamiliar to Deleuze, for "'Give me a body then' [...] It is through the body (and no longer through the intermediary of the body) that cinema forms its alliance with the spirit, with thought" (Deleuze 1989: 189). However, while starting from the ontology of the subconscious, it was specifically the realm of creative thought, where Deleuze chose to direct most of his attention. And it may be remembered here that he constructed the subconscious intensities of sense as always being neutral (see 2.4.1), as it is conscious thought that assigns qualitative differences in their unfolding as events, for:

> "there is nothing remarkable or exceptional in life, that the oddest adventures are easily explained, and everything is made up of ordinary things. It is just that we have to admit that, because the linkages of the terms is the series are naturally weak, they are constantly upset and do not appear in order [...] It is men who upset the regularity of series, the continuity of the universe" (Deleuze 1989: 15)

But what about these emergent bodies then – the body of the viewer and the 'body' of the moving image itself? This question has, as we will later see, profound implications for the consideration of differences between the moving image and the textual expressions, and also, the uneasy nature of 'representation' with a relational epistemology in the production and

expression of academic vidoegraphies in CCT research. For the aforementioned authors, who have come to emphasize these questions, the point of departure is to move beyond the modernist view of the viewing experience, as limited to the passively receptive or merely cognitive, towards experiential relations that become embodied through all senses. Following these scholars drawing from various disciplines, the moving image becomes a question of 1) a reciprocal experience, 2) the screen as a 'skin', a surface experienced as a haptic, tactile and visceral experience, and 4) the experience as a mimetic and action-inducing exchange.

The experience thus becomes something that does not wait for the viewers attention but grasps it in its own right, as "we meaningfully (and feeling fully) move across and through immediate and mediated attentional spaces [...] Contrary to myth, video is not a passive medium; we do act and move in using the technology and in response to its images and sounds" (Lemke 2007: 40).

For Deleuze, the primary focus was on the infinite relations in the creative processes of the mind, whereas the authors here take the question of the feeling body head on. Yet, this is by no means a work of re-establishing the Cartesian dualism – rather it simply denotes different emphases on the emergence of the body and mind in their spatiotemporal becoming, or as Marks (2000), who uses a Deleuzean foundation to draw from theories of embodied spectatorship, phenomenology and feminist criticism, puts it: "Deleuze's characterization of time-image cinema describes avant-garde works that, in their suspicion of representation, force the viewer to draw upon his or her subjective resources in order to complete the image" (p. 42). Therefore, "If one understands film viewing as an exchange between two bodies – that of the viewer and that of the film – then the characterization of the film viewer as passive, vicarious, or projective must be replaced with a model of a viewer who participates in the production of the cinematic experience" (p. 149-150). And thus, this analysis takes the form of operating between two poles, the mind and the bodies (both the one of the viewer and the one of the moving image), but one where both are also inseparably intertwined in an emergent relationship.

Marks (2000) expands her perspective in her construction of mimetic embodiment of the cinematographic experience. For her, mimesis can be described as an indexical relationship, where a story becomes "sensuously remade in the body of the listener" (p. 138), and, contra text, the very physicality of the moving image has the potential to bring about a heightened and more bodily mimetic experience. Importantly, the underpinning of the concept can be seen to be anti-modernist (or nonpositivistic), as it denotes "a form of yielding to one's environment, rather than dominating it, and thus offers a radical alternative to the controlling distance from the environment so well served by vision" (p. 140). Thus the moving image becomes evermore

a body of agency in its machinic autonomous movement, and the viewer's experiential embodiment becomes a holistic anti-Cartesian undertaking, involving the subconscious, reflex-like bodily alignments as well as memories. In order for such mimesis to make sense, the surface of the moving image also needs conceptualization as something more profound than a two dimensional screen of electronic flashing light. Indeed, the idea of an 'objective' form of distanced speciation must be overcome by allocating the audiovisual moving image a 'body' of its own, where the:

> "cinematographic encounter takes place not only between my body and the film's body, but my sensorium and the film's sensorium. We bring our own personal and cultural organization of the senses to cinema, and cinema brings a particular organization of the senses to us, the filmmaker's own sensorium refracted through the [...] apparatus" (p. 153)

This embodiment becomes 'forced' upon the viewer by the means of "haptic visuality" (p. 162) that can become related by various types of aesthetical dispositions of the moving image (see 2.7.3) via its autonomy, and enters a reciprocal relationship that invokes memories of touch and affect.

In addition, drawing primarily from the phenomenological works of Merleau-Ponty on perception and cinematography, Barker (2009; see also Joy and Sherry 2003) further constructs the film as a profoundly embodied tactile experience, as "Love, desire, loss, nostalgia, and joy are perceived and expressed in fundamentally tactile ways, not only by characters but also, and even more profoundly, by the film and viewer" (p. 1). Thus the experience of perceiving the moving image becomes elevated from classical notions, in to a reciprocal event where the tactile experience between the viewer and the moving image takes precedence as textures, spatial orientations, comportments, rhythms and vitality. These emerge as shared qualities due to the nature of cinema as a multi-sensory medium involving seeing, hearing as well as physical and reflective movement. The tactile embodiment is also, to a degree, precognitive and emergent, shaped and enabled through intimate "engagement with and orientation toward others (things, bodies, objects, subjects) in the world" (p. 22). This emerges as a connection between our own bodies as viewers, and the body of the moving image in a complex relationship that is marked as often by tension as by alignment, by repulsion as often as by attraction.

Adopting views from both Jennifer Deger, who termed the participatory viewing experience as a "transformative space of betweenness" (Deger 2007, cited in Barker 2009: 12), and Anne Rutherford, who conceived the viewing experience as a "movement or displacement of self" where the experience "is not conceived as a physical movement across a physical space: no empirical measurement can discern it" (Rutherford 2002, cited in Barker 2009: 13), the point here is to combine both the spatiotemporal body and the cognitive mind in nonreductive emerging relations. Similar notions can also be found in

Ranciére (2009), whose work on audiences focuses on theatre, where the relationship is equally active and reciprocal, and the distance between the viewer and the performance is the nature of all communicative acts. For him, contemplation about the nature of the distance presents a type of paradox, as "is it not precisely the desire to abolish the distance that creates it" (p. 12). The viewing experience thus becomes a dislocated and emergent state of being, where "We are embedded in a constantly mutual experience with the film, so that the cinematic experience is the experience of being both 'in' our bodies and 'in' the liminal space created by that contact" (p. 19). As we have seen, following these philosophical positions, there is always the 'third' in experiencing the moving image, a subliminal nonreductive space constructed between the viewer and the racing surface of audiovisual imagery, or as Cubitt (1991) notes addressing video directly:

> "The homologue to this in the video apparatus is the constant becoming of the viewer, addressed in the fading as a becoming. In the dialectic of identity, as the on-screen image fades, it enables the viewer to become" (p. 143)

Such positions resonate both with the aforementioned nonempiricality of Rutherford and with a Deleuzean philosophy of infinite relations and constant becoming in nonlinear temporality, and continues the present work of constructing a distinction between the reading of textual accounts and video experiencing. And accordingly, it lays further groundwork for constructing an epistemology of spatiotemporality (through practice theory and non-representational theory [see 2.9.1 and 2.9.2]), and providing a foundation for the level of analysis at which video can be assessed in a holistic context of videographic research in CCT.

2.8.2 Moving Image as Tactile/Haptic Surfaces

> "We never perceive cinematic and televisual worlds as two-dimensional surfaces, but always as three-dimensional spaces that are worlds in their own right and, at the same time spatial extensions of our own local places" (Jay Lemke)

> "Do we know, as the senile know, that we are forgetting?" (Sean Cubitt)

It was Deleuze who called for a 'body', but how have notions of an emergent body or bodies been constructed in the abstract distances between the screen of the moving image and the one of the viewer? Marks (2000) sees the relation between cinema and the viewer as a metaphysically transformative, but most interestingly as something that can be conceptualized as involving an embodiment of 'touch', a haptic sensation:

> "The contingent and contagious circumstances of intercultural cinema events effect a transformation in its audience [...] The very circulation of a film among different viewers is like a series of skin contacts that leave mutual traces [...] the body is a source not just of individual but of cultural memory [...] memory is embodied in the senses" (p. xii-xiv)

This haptic sensation moves forward and backward in time in its fictitious reinventions of history, in present, and in glimpses of potential futures, and thus "performs a multifaceted activity of excavation, falsification, and fabulation, or the making up of myths" (p. 26). And so the focus is thus not one of a truthful representation of a past reality, but of a fictitious yet powerful relation to the tactile experience of the past that goes on to bring about new relations that converge into the future. Therefore:

> "At the moment that the video is shot, the two aspects of time look the same; but the present-that-passes can never be recalled (I feel ill; I am angry at my mother), while the past-that-is-preserved (we gathered around the table, smiling) becomes the institutionalized representation of the moment. Virtual images tend to compete with recollection-images – the memory I have of the gathering is not captured in the video – and, as we know, their power is such that they often come to stand in for our memories" (Marks 2000: 40)

In a very tangible sense, therefore, one can fathom how what-was-recorded is always a spatiotemporal emergence of some *performance*, whether enacted for the camera or for the social relations expressed by the moving image. And such performances are inherently reciprocal, or as Cubitt (1991) notes, "This is the power of the flickering image: though, paradoxically, based on mutual recognition of difference, it is an invitation to become the same; to become Black, a woman, working class, gay…at the moment of the video fading" (p. 143). Similarly, Marks's (2000) notion of intercultural cinema is one that does the work of "inventing histories and memories in order to posit an alternative to the overwhelming erasures, silences, and lies of official histories" (p. 24). The audiovisual moving image in its inherent relational agency seems to call to us – to invite us into the performance and resurrect it in all its truth-resembling-falsity in the present. But how are such performances embodied in the viewer's being? What is such an experience like? Here we return to her treatment of mimesis, a discussion of the visual surfaces of artifacts expressed in the moving image, and how they have the potential to carry powerful resonances in the tactile sensorium of the audience.

By constructing the cinematographic experience as a tactile encounter that is 'felt' rather than merely cognitively recognized, Marks (2000) makes another distinction with respect to the modernist movement of rational thought, as "'Sensual abandon' is a phrase of Enlightenment subjectivity, implying that the senses (except maybe vision, and possibly hearing) dull the powers of the intellect" (p. 118). Following Deleuze, she makes a specific point about the tactile nature of objects expressed by the moving image by basing her analysis on a Bergsonian notion where memory is embodied in the senses. Her interest is in how objects carry memory-based tactile relations to 'fossils' and 'fetishes' (p. 84-85; see also Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe 2002). Therefore, objects presented as cultural artifacts in the

expressions of the moving image have a dual relation with the past, as they simultaneously connect memories in a reinforcing way to times of yore to act as recollection-images, and also (more strikingly) remind us about a past forgotten, as:

> "These images refer to the power of the recollection-images to embody different pasts. When an image is all that remains of a memory, when it cannot be 'assigned a present' by an act of remembering but simply stares up at one where it has been unearthed, then that image is a fossil of what has been forgotten. It is possible, though as Deleuze warned, dangerous, to examine these images and learn the histories they have witnessed" (p. 84-85)

The danger is the recognition of loss, but manifests only when a past is treated as a stationary and fixed state. Thus, the cultural tension we see around us, as expressed by the moving image is one of fossilization, when people experience how familiar and active objects are eroding in their cultural agency and becoming the "abandoned wreckage" (Thrift 2008: 8) of a decaying social practice. Yet, as stated, "The cinematic fossils I examine here do indeed have an unsettling effect, but they are only as destructive as the material they assault is rigid" (Marks 2000: 92). For if there can be no repetition (in a strict sense), all that can remain is infinite difference. Thus, it is not a question of a possibility for 'saving' a cultural practice in a static form, as through every act of social agency every social practice is renegotiated and reinvented, and constituted in performative experiential bodily events (Williams 2008). Every difference is a new opportunity for novel relations, but equally, every opportunity marks a destruction of another. Experience of culture is a flow of relations that can become ephemerally localized in the moving image. Yet, it is the constant fossilization of these cultural images that opens the possibilities for the erosion of the present (active cultural artifacts) and a thrust into a novel future. Thus, to locate the underpinning connections to a Deleuzean ontology seems not to constitute a burdensome undertaking.

Marks (2000) continues that fetishes are relational surfaces that get their power by contact between surfaces, again a very Bergsonian notion of memory embedded in the embodied sensorium, not a representation of an object itself. "Fetish objects can encode knowledges that become buried in the process of temporal or geographic displacement but are [relationally] volatile when reactivated by memory" (p. 85). While fossils can constitute anxious voices from a forgotten history, fetishes are relations between surfaces that undergo potentially swift qualitative changes as social interest in the relations change, or:

> "Fossils retain the shape of the cultural upheaval, perpetually inviting decoding of past conflicts. Their 'radioactive' quality may diminish as connections are made to the historical stratum in which they were created, but they do not go away. Fetishes, although they are similarly dense with meaning, tend to dissolve away after the need for them has dissipated" (Marks 2000: 124)

As we have seen (see 2.2.1), the key ontological concern of documentaries often seems to involve some type of indexical veracity. And it is this aspiration to the external world that carries with it the illusionary trappings of realism in its most fetishistic form (what that reality has to do with the viewer's perceived reality). However, "All documentary images are fetishes, insofar as they are indexes of the event documented. However, they do not transparently reflect it, but opaquely encode it. When documentary is accused, as it often is, of fetishizing the people and events it represents, this is because it maintains the fetish in a state of fixity" (Marks 2000: 125; see also Nichols 1991). And yet, following a Deleuzean ontology, it is this logocentric and synchronic notion of social 'fixity' or stableness that must be overcome first. And as we have seen, the moving image has remarkable "powers of the false" (Deleuze 1989: 126; see 2.7) when it, in its agency, grasps the viewer to accept its illusions as 'truthful' accounts of events and social relations long lost. Thus, we see decaying fossils and fetishes, "as properly the product not of a single culture, but the encounter between two, and how fetishes are produced not only in the course of built-up time, but also in the disjunctive movement through space" (Marks 2000: 89), or as Thrift (2008) states, where forsaken social understandings linger for their time while leaving as resources "abandoned wreckage behind them which can take on new life, generating new hybrids…which still have resonance" (p. 8). Moving images conceptualized as fossils or fetishes are thus by definition of relational becoming, not of synchronic representation.

Videography note (13):



In the PTS videography, we see glimpses of many fossilizing artifacts, most notably the practice of pressing music tracks on 'dubplates' for selective and exclusive circulation among DJs. The practice is a fetish, and these artifacts are fossilizing due to the increasing preference of practitioners to share and listen to music tracks in digital formats. There is a sense of nostalgic wreckage about this practice, as the DJ/producers recollect how the 'dubplate' culture used to constitute one of the foundational cultural practices in the 'dubstep' genre.

On a very personal note, having been the autoethnographic member in the PTS videography, the very tribal practice of paintball constitutes a powerful fetish to me. This past history long lost has a dual resonance in my thought, as it has enabled me in many ways in my academic pursuits, but now remains a remnant of a long experiential journey of past youth, never to be relived again. It is a joyous outcome and simultaneously a study of tremendous loss.

This is, indeed, both the limitation (from the realist perspective) and the profound potential of the moving image as the invoker of gripping and even tactile embodied experiences. As we have seen in Deleuze, we can never represent the unfolding of past events as 'truthful' accounts. What we see, are ghosts of the past surging out to perform in the minds of the present, unaware of their subsequent surging to possible futures through the novel relations they bring about.

What can we take away from this in terms of understanding videography in CCT? Perhaps most obviously and importantly, we may find further reasons to loosen our ties with the indexical and representational nature of video. As such, videographic expression cannot simply be seen to produce 'more', 'better' or 'more truthful' accounts of the recollected past. Rather, it may be seen to provide an expression of very different types of sensory links that haptically engages the viewer, and potentially sensitizes reflexive remembrance of past fictions. In Marks's (2000) terms, these are the threateningly 'radioactive' pasts that portray times lost and, perhaps, to a culturally endowed viewer, memories of what can no longer be uttered, as they are veiled behind the 'accepted' memory of the embodied expression in the present. This, through expression of artifacts and decaying social practices, brings to the viewer a potential haptic experience that merges the memory of the past with the longing of the present, only to lunge forward into future relations. It brings forth haptic and aesthetic epistemological relations. These notions are in line with Deleuze's recollection-images, where the 'realness' of the past event becomes substituted with possible manifestations of memory in the present from various possibilities of a 'truthful' image, or:

> "We are in the situation of an actual image and its own virtual image, to the extent that there is no longer any linkage of the real with the imaginary, but indiscernability of the two, a perpetual exchange" (Deleuze 1989: 273)

Thus, as a reciprocal experience, we find that the viewing of a moving image can be understood in terms of Deleuzean relations that go on to emerge into novel series on, beneath and beyond the surface of the moving image on the one hand, and the illusionary expressions it constructs on the other. Simultaneously, this moving machinery has the potential to tear the viewer into a relation with the past surfaces that depict the fetishes and fossils of social relations long lost as a simulated tactile contact. As with Cubitt's (1993) example of the wedding video (see 2.2.1), it is 'in-your-face' showing the viewer illusions of institutionalized 'false' histories that radiate as a vanguard into the present in ways that can no longer represent any veracity underlying the past performances of social practice, what they were or what they perhaps meant then. Additionally, in line with non-representational theory (see 2.9.2), this involves a type of privileging the material (also bodies) and their embodied and emergent relations through the flux of time. In Marks's (2000)

haptic analysis of the tactility of cinematographic images, we see a kind of a foreword to the body and its processes of embodiment, yet it is Barker (2009) who, building on Marks, develops these notions further.

2.8.3 Types of Embodiment

For Marks (2000), the hapticality of experiencing the moving image has to do with how we connect to its surfaces as a type of 'skin' that involves tactile experiences – not limited to cognitive reasoning but a relational embodiment felt by the whole body. She argues that we form special relations to the moving image that come about when the spatial coordinates of the image are lost (such as extreme close-ups of textures and blurring of the focus) – similarly to Deleuze's (1989) "purely optical or sound situation" (p. 9). Whereas Deleuze conceptualizes the 'sensory-motor' and 'purely optical', Marks (2000), somewhat confusingly, uses "optical" and "haptic" (p. 163), respectively. This seems to come about due to their slightly different emphasis. In Deleuze, the haptic links to an image that requires novel thought. Marks (2000) does not pursue thought similarly, as her point is to argue against the semiological, where the moving image can be 'read'. For Deleuze, it can surely be read – yet what it reads as goes beyond any stable readability, into everything and indefinitely into the 'real'. Thus, when Deleuze focuses on the destabilization of representative notions of thought, Marks places emphasis on the embodiment of the experience, making a link between fetishes and fossils to the senses cinema cannot technically represent: the senses of touch, smell and taste (Marks 2000: 129). In so doing, she eschews the "'Sensual abandon' [that] is a phrase of Enlightenment subjectivity, implying that the senses (except maybe vision and possibly hearing) dull the powers of the intellect" (Marks 2000: 118; see also Sunderland 2006), for "Objects also have a life independent of the human relations they encode, beyond their discursive and narrative significance" (Marks 2000: 120-121). Here she approaches both Deleuze and Thrift (see 2.9.2), who see nonhuman matter and objects as having an agency of their own. This is an agency different from the roles we cognitively assign them, for they now also have great agency towards us at a subconscious level. This subconscious is experienced through our bodies precognitively, and becomes linked to a Bergsonian underpinning where memory is embodied [subconsciously] in the senses. How do these embodied senses come about?

For Marks (2000), the moving image works like a tactile skin that touches our eyes – "It is a brush with involuntary memory, memory that can only be arrived at through a shock" (p. 81) in order "to disrupt the commonsense patterns of sense experience, making room for new cultural organizations of perception" (p. 195). This haptic visuality is most forcefully brought into

being when the viewer is forced out of the ocularcentric mode of cognitive analysis from the distance, which affords the breaking of the subject-object relation, as "Haptic looking tends to move over the surface of its object rather than to plunge into its illusionistic depth, not to distinguish form so much as to distinguish texture [...] that moves on the surface plane of the screen for some time before the viewer realizes what she or he is beholding" (p. 162-163). These seem to be closely linked to the dreamlike and hallucinatory time-images of Deleuze. In Marks's analysis, this deterritorialization can result from the decay of the film or video, but it can also be machinated by blurring the focus or the exposure. The point is to make the moving image enter a haptic and cognitively indistinguishable relation with the viewer's senses.

Videography note (14):

In PTS, in an admittedly tentative fashion, we experiment with visual expressions of the haptic moving image by supplementing a montage of party scenes, starting with a blurred deterritorialized image that subsequently is gradually focused to make its spatiotemporal coordinates more readily recognizable. Through this haptic visuality we wish to bring about more evocative experiences of tactile embodiment by momentarily destabilizing the commonsensical subject-object space.

Party scene (Desto's live set): Moment 1 (unfocused image of haptic visuality [Marks 2000])

Party scene (Desto's live set): Moment 2 (focused optical image [Marks 2000])

Such haptic moments emerge into the potential to bring about relations that are different from cognitive perceptions of what is seen, for it can potentially invoke memories encoded in the embodied senses that are precognitive. The power of the audiovisual moving image, although illusory, becomes from these shifts in form – a sensory-motor/optical image to be analyzed and thought about and the haptic/purely optical or sound images that are embodied, and thus potentially constitute events for the viewer, now emancipated from the straightjacket of the rational that contains the moving image within itself (and only to be gazed at from a distance). These are, to date, underutilized tools in the works of videography in CCT, which have often carried with themselves "the tendency to fix its object in a harsh light, or conversely flatten its objects into a broad projection screen" (Marks 2000: 193), even as foundational work bringing in videography to CCT emphasized the freedoms of expression and its relatively unproblematic relation with art (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; see also Belk 1986, 1998).

These considerations are further developed in Jennifer Barker's (2009) project, where the notion of the embodied experience is considered in far more detail. Embodiment, for her, occurs through experience with the moving image on three levels: 1) haptically, on the surface of the body in relation to the film's own body of shimmering nitrate with its scratches and fibers, 2) kinaesthetically, as movement grips the viewer's muscles, tendons and bones in relation to shifting spatial conditions between living and mechanical bodies depicted entering and escaping spatiotemporal contours, and 3) viscerally, where the rhythms of the cinematographic experience cause responses and re-enactments "in the murky recesses of the body [...] heart, lungs, pulsing fluids and synapses" (p. 3) through the shifting rush of the moving image. For her, affects originate from the dualistic, yet emergently reciprocal nature of the viewing experience of the viewer, contra the displayed moving image of the cinema, thus following Merleau-Ponty's notions of reciprocality within emergent surroundings:

> "Rather, we are in a relationship of intimate, tactile, reversible contact with the films body – a complex relationship that is marked as often by tension as by alignment, by repulsion as often as by attraction. We are embedded in a constantly mutual experience with the film, so that the cinematic experience is the experience of being both 'in' our bodies and 'in' the liminal space created by that contact" (Barker 2009: 19)

As we saw in Deleuze (see 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7), the viewer occupies a kind of liminal existence external, in between, and within the cinematographic experience that is, at one pole of the experiential continuum of both emergent subconscious, and at the other of emergent ideas in thought. Thus: "We are immersed and involved in the space and time of the events of the film, but without a single body with whom to align ourselves unequivocally – be it a character in the scene or neutral camera – we are moved, both emotionally

and physically in two directions at once. We are rendered conceptually and physically ambi-valent, drawn in two opposing directions at once" (Barker 2009: 6). This is the agentic quality of the moving image and the multiple subjectivity involved in the viewing experience, the viewer's, the camera's (moving) point of view, and the relationships between the characters moving and moved as the images race on by. Barker (2009) illustrates the workings of these reciprocal processes through an abundance of examples adopted from cimematographic classics. In the following, I will provide a brief exploration of how similar affects can be adopted into the perspective of videography in CCT.

2.8.4 Skin

Barker (2009) makes an explicit move away from the conventional linguistic analysis of reading the film as a kind of text where the visual, aural and narrative dimensions become reductionistically separated from their intertwined context within an experience of a moving image, and from the reciprocal embodiment by the viewer in this experience (p. 25). For her, the moving image seems to constitute an emergent body, one that resonates between and within the viewer and the surface of the moving image. Films become not texts that can be read or which are imposed to passive observers. Rather, her position of the moving image as skin is of hermeneutic, yet tactile becoming, where "The film's skin is a complex amalgam of perceptive and expressive parts – including technical, stylistic, and thematic elements – coming together to present a specific and tactile mode of being in the world" (p. 29). This is very much like Marks's considerations of fetishes and fossils (see 2.8.2) and, as for Barker, the surface of the film teases us into a tactile relationship that the enabling body of the viewer, thwarted by the liminal distance, can only urge to actualize.

Videography note (15):

In PTS, we radiate between the roughness, darkness and loudness of the contexts of the electronic music scene. In this context, while directly taking away from the quality of the footage, we can potentially offer some relational arguments for exclusively producing footage *in situ*, no matter how adverse the conditions may have been, if one takes pristine clarity of the videographic material as an unquestioned hallmark. Such clarity could have been easily produced by decontextualizing the data production to, for example, interviews in a studio, but then we would have lost much of the relational potential of the context – we were there not producing *an* account of the scene, but rather involved in the relational production of the scene itself. And certainly, while we can never 'get there' in any comprehensive sense, at least we may have expressive glimpses of what we will forever be missing.

But there seems to be more to tactility. A tactile experience has the potential to become truly affective, as "All disgust is originally disgust at touching [...] Both pleasure and horror arise from the skin's function as a boundary – as something that keeps the carnality of the world at bay – but also as something that brings us into contact with the things in us and around us at the same time" (Barker 2009: 55). As ethnographic researchers in the CCT field, we may not often work in situations where such types of images would be abundant, but such affective experiences attest to the potential power of the moving image with appropriate types of (un)aesthetics. They act as relational images that most forcefully bring about the agency in matter. While a cognitive mastery of the context through videographic 'representation' eschewed by Marks (2000) would be of the analytical, where "the act of reasoning requires distance from immediate experience" (p. 58), these kinds of tactile responses open up the world of different types of relations. In these, touch becomes central in both subconscious and thought, making the skin "a container not just for blood and bone but also memory and history" (p. 63). Indeed, our remembrance can be rationally formulated in cognitive terms, but what is it about the elusive tactile memory that language fails to convey, ignited suddenly by the impulse of a tactile experience – that very literally can make our skins crawl?

Following both Marks (2000) and Barker (2009), one could ponder, in Deleuzian terms, that the tactile level of the skin, the experience of the moving image is one of two poles, the skin of the viewer and the skin of the tactile surface of the moving image. An indiscernible olfactory space in between remains, yet it is a space we inhabit in our embodiment, as "The viewer's skin and the film's skin allow a fleeting, incomplete kind of access to the other, which is pleasurable in its impermanence and incompletion" (Barker 2009: 30). We can thus never be certain of the relations between a true or a false image in their simultaneous becoming in montage, for "indiscernability constitutes an objective illusion; it does not suppress the distinction between the two sides, but makes it unattributable, each side taking the other's role in a relation which we must describe as reciprocal presupposition, or reversability" (Deleuze 1989: 69). This could be described as the space of both subconscious emergence and the liberation of thought, as it applies to tactile memories. Memories, again, are thus not about a relation of verisimilitude with an objective past, but a negotiation about possible pasts, and how they intertwine to ephemerally constitute relations in the immediate present.

As we noted when considering the 'haptic visuality' of Marks's (2000) surfaces of texture, this form of visual expression has been to date underrepresented in videographic research in CCT. This may be due to the technical (as it is difficult to get close shots), but also, we have too often

undertaken projects of framing reality in its totalizing spatiotemporal settings. And indeed, such approaches may do away with some of the possibility of assessing the hermeneutic nature of how the viewer changes, through new thoughts, in the process of the experience (let alone the collective relationships of the audiences, as they undergo changes within themselves, between the cinematographic experience and also between each other)?

2.8.5 Musculature

When considering the experience of the moving image from the perspective of musculature, Barker (2009) is referring to more tangible relations, such as the way our bodies become agitated, and even move involuntarily in a reflex-like manner, as they become gripped by the agency of the audiovisual moving image. Indeed, our evolutionary perception does not consist of analytic appreciation of the moving image (Grodal 2009), as it can become fooled by the 'powers of the false' and act accordingly. The moving image can 'take us in' through a reciprocal physical experience, as "we and the film have a muscular empathy for one another, which is derived from similarities in the ways the human body and the film's body express their relation to the world through bodily comportment" (Barker 2009: 73). This empathy of muscular pulsation is formulated similarly in Marks (2000), and constitutes a kinaesthetic memory, a compelling "oscillation between difference and similarity, proximity and distance" (Barker 2009: 73).

For Barker (2009), the musculature performs gestures that are "expressive bodily movements that are 'intentional' [as they reflect the orientations of our bodies sensing and being in the world], in that they are directed toward a world, but not always 'intended', in the sense of being consciously chosen and performed" (p. 78). Thus, there is an embodied mimetic link between the alignments of our body and the alignments of the subjective 'camera-eye', as already described in Deleuze (see 2.6.1). It is of mechanistic mimesis, where the viewer embodies a contextual technological subjectivity and creates relations with it – intended, perhaps, but not necessarily intentional. The 'camera-eye' becomes the viewer's perspective, while not relinquishing to be somebody else's, in simultaneous becoming. But we may also orient to the context without direct contact with the moving image, for "at the beginning of a suspense film, for example, [we] subtly encourage our own feelings of unease, long before the suspense story gives us a reason for feeling uneasy. We turn to express that unease with our own gestures: perhaps we tense our bodies, cross our arms protectively over our chests, or warily sink lower into our seats" (Barker 2009: 80). We become to emergently embody, even with distance, the moving image within and between – when the moving image

grasps us and 'tells' us how to react and become oriented. It seems that the illusions of the moving image are such that spatiotemporal configurations, in their agency, go on to actually 'demand' a body for their experiencing. Thus, any lingering notion of the mind-body dualism from the perspective of this ontology becomes increasingly muddled, for if we accept the tactile and haptic relation between the body of the moving image and the body of the viewer as a reciprocal surface, we must have a body to tell us about us in the world. And to follow Deleuze, we must also have a mind to extend into new lines of thought in infinitely open systems to new series of relations.

Similarly, for Barker (2009), our perception of the 'reality' around us can be seen not as closed system of points to act on in linear fashion; rather, it is a contingent relationship of intensities, where some become actualized (see 2.4.1), for "In a dream/fantasy, we mistakenly believe we can occupy 'that space there'. But in the experience of film, we can and do, because 'that space there' is fully embodied, inhabitable possibility" (p. 104). Yet, she notes that even though cognitively we do know the impossibility, at a subconscious level we often do not feel it. It is rather that "disbelief on our part is a function of reflection [but] If we really felt this way, movies wouldn't move us" (p. 104). Indeed, how much of the experience of the moving image do we lose when it becomes our inclination to force an intellectual analysis upon it? Am I doing such devil's work here?

2.8.6 Viscera

Through her body-perfurating journey, Barker (2009) finally arrives to its most murky conceptual crevices. How is the moving image experienced on the visceral, the virtually completely involuntary level within the tactile surface of the body? For Barker, "We and the film open onto each other completely, 'denuding and dispossessing' ourselves to the other so that we are absorbing/absorbed through our skin and holding/held close in a muscular embrace; once there, the similarities and differences between our visceral rhythms deepen the connection in a way that's both startling, unsettling, and seductive" (p. 123). But while the visceral seldom enters our cognitive field, it may be that our surface senses are in similar ways lost in our cognitive being – we perceive the world through them, not by them. And even if given only scant attention, the act of haptic, tactile and muscular embodiment must also entail the visceral – indeed, if the former can be accepted, how could the latter be denied?

And certainly we do attain visceral responses from textual expressions as well – we can become aroused (e.g. hormonal) or scared (e.g. heartbeat). Yet, there may be something in the agency of the moving image that is of different nature. As stated, its 'powers of the false' are compelling enough for our

senses to induce all the aforementioned forms of mimetic embodiment, or as Marks (2000) notes: "Cinema, by virtue of its richer and muddier semiotic relationship to the world, is all the more an agent of mimesis and synthesis than writing is" (p. 214). But what might this mean? Could it be that it is precisely the potential of the gripping agency of the moving image that forces embodied participation in the 'powers of the false', which can set our beings astray? The subjective camera-eye, the speed of the film, the extra-human capabilities of movement of the apparatus are all vehicles of displacement, and still they are the same ones we feel emergent embodiment with, whether in the 'optical and sound image' of Deleuze or the 'haptic visuality' of Marks. Indeed, "camera movements are not only ontologically ambiguous but also thematically ambivalent: they express, in muscular terms, the simultaneous but contradictory experiences of curiosity and claustrophobia, freedom and restriction, vitality and death" (Barker 2009: 140). There is a powerful Deleuzian connection here, for even as we enter the layers of the body with Barker, it must be noted that this type of embodiment can certainly not be reductionistic. Embodiment, in this sense, is holistic and extensive, for "what is at stake here are not only the stranger's body, the woman's body, or even viewer's body and film's body, but also the larger system of which each of these is only one part, and which brings us all into being" (Barker 2009: 152). In addition, Marks (2000) seems to be equally wary of the potential reductionistic knowledge of the inner movements of our bodies, for "Medical technologies such as X rays, ultrasound, CAT scans, and colonoscopy render our viscera visible. They offer not an embodied visuality, but a visuality that makes our bodies objects to us" (p. 190). Thus, if a Deleuzian underpinning is accepted, it is difficult to fathom how notions of embodiment could be used in other than holistic ways – at least on an ontological level.

What should be fairly clear at this point, is that no amount of videographic research can epistemologically bring us 'more or better representations', even if some researchers in the field are still inclined to propose such (e.g. Lemke 2007). Yet, even for such voices, one can surmise that this 'better' representation is often a qualified one. Indeed, how much is unaccounted for in text, of our experience of actual being? The moving image may be richer in detail and spatiotemporal contexts than text – yet it tells more about the viewer's being than the being of anything 'recorded'. This is of both the falsity of the realist position of the moving image as a 'truth' account, and a further reason for taking the epistemology of relation seriously as a possible perspective.

So far, we have seen how the moving image engages our whole being through a holistically embodied experience. But there (certainly) remains more to explore with regard to how we perceive the moving image both consciously and subconsciously. Therefore, before concluding this chapter, let

us take a minor detour to assess a recent account of the cinematographic experience from a biocultural perspective that draws from more naturalistic account of our biology.

2.8.7 Experience of Mimesis as the Evoker of 'Action Tendencies'

> "By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring commonplace milieus under the indigenous guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action [...] The painting invites the spectator to contemplation; before it the spectator can abandon himself to his associations. Before the movie frame he cannot do so. No sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is already changed [...] This constitutes the shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, should be cushioned by heightened presence of mind" (Walter Benjamin)

As we have seen above, drawing from Deleuzian philosophy of the cinema, Marks (2000) and Barker (2009) develop the argument that the moving image has special (contra text or photograph) powers to invoke a haptic, tactile, and even visceral experience through the connection between surface of the moving image and the senses and the viewer's body. Specifically, Marks (2000) argued that when the visual sensorium becomes of haptic (close to the 'optical and sound situation' in Deleuze, see 2.7.3) expression allowing the moving image to become embodied as a tactile surface – the skin of the film that resonates with a virtual body between the screen and the viewer. This haptic experience is not a realist image that can be objectified and discerned in a directly cognitive fashion. Rather, it often is an opaque image of textures and surfaces that is initially devoid of its spatial coordinates, as I illustrated in my PTS example (see Videography note 14 in 2.8.3). For Marks (2000), these surfaces of the moving image are constituted of fossils and fetishes that call for mimesis in their haptic interaction in the viewer's embodiment. The viewer thus becomes to feel the surface, and in a Deleuzean vein, is then able to project his/her cognitive reflections beyond the screen, into relations beyond any representation of a signifier and signified. Mimesis, as shown above, breaks down the Western modernistic binary of subject-object or perceiver-information to invoke a haptic sensation of culture within the body, a universal visceral immediacy, not something that will deliver meaning (or represent), but rather something that means in itself. Barker (2009) developed these thoughts further by providing a refinement of this relation as a typology of how the moving image has tactile, muscular and visceral levels. In this consideration, the experience of the moving image thus becomes thoroughly embodied.

We must develop the notion of mimesis further here. As we have seen, both Marks and Barker build on this concept to argue for how the human body becomes in a profound reciprocal relation with the screen of the moving

image. It is time now to experiment by adding a more biological character to our exploration.

In his important work, Grodal (2009) considers the question of reciprocal embodiment from a somewhat different perspective. Borrowing from brain science, he shows how Marks's (2000) mimesis and Barker's (2009) visceral embodiment constructs yet another experience particular to the moving image – its powers to invoke 'action tendencies' in the viewer. For Grodal (2009), there is a process in the human brain that becomes activated when the moving image is experienced. Interestingly, while he states to diverge from Deleuze, as he draws his biocultural position from the natural sciences (p. 5), namely neurocognitive theory, a close reading offers an interpretation of somewhat similar argumentative outcomes. It must be remembered that while Deleuzian metaphysical position is underpinned in the subconscious, Deleuze does not eschew the pragmatism in research conducted in artificially closable systems (see 2.4.2). While the underpinnings are no doubt different, Deleuze still comes to argue the following, when considering the difference between a still and a moving image:

> "[A still image has a kind of movement that] no longer depends on a moving body or an object that realizes it, nor a spirit that reconstitutes it [...] But pictoral images are nevertheless immobile in themselves so that it is the mind which has to 'make' movement [...] It is only when movement becomes automatic that the artistic essence of the image is realized: *producing a shock to thought, communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly*" (Deleuze 1989: 156, emphasis in the original)

For Deleuze, this constitutes of a "spiritual automation" (Deleuze 1989: 156) that does not wait for a cognitive mind for its realization, but rather takes on the perceiving mind to actualize it on various levels of both the subconscious and, subsequently, the conscious domain of thought. Similarly, Grodal (2009) focuses on the subconscious and conscious experiences, the difference being that he is looking for naturalistic rather than metaphysical explanations to secure his position (even though he notes that neurocognitive theory is in line with postmodern frameworks as it posits "no fixed mental center" [p. 155]). Therefore, even as Grodal thus emerges as somewhat more orthodox, his work can also be extremely informative here.

Similarly to Marks (2000) and Barker (2009), Grodal (2009) focuses on the perception of the moving image as a thoroughly embodied experience, for "When we watch a film, our heart rhythms change, we sweat and our muscles alternately tense and relax throughout" (p. 4). Yet, his theoretical underpinning comes from brain research, and he thus conceptualizes a PECMA (Perception, Emotion, Cognition and Motor Action) flow to describe how:

> "Audiovisual experiences are therefore intimately related to the types of action they afford, and central aesthetic phenomena are linked to manipulations of the way in

> which what is seen or heard prompts action or – as happens in film – prompts vicarious action in diegetic worlds" (Grodal 2009: 145)

The PECMA flow can be described in evolutionary terms, for information transferred via the optical nerve is first processed in the:

1) visual cortex (analysis of visual forms), then the
2) association cortex (memory matching), then the
3) prefrontal cortex (cognitive appraisal and reality status evaluation), before finally being processed in the
4) motor cortex (only fully activated in real life).

Through stages 1-3 there is also a circuit to the emotional system (limbic system) in the old subcortical parts, primarily located in lower central part of the brain "which may in turn prompt actions that that implement the preferences of agents [...] Emotions are tendencies for action [...] guiding the body what to approach and what to avoid" (Grodal 2009: 146). The stage 2 associations come from memory tags, and thus do not require cognition, rather operating in a reflex-like fashion to allow for quick action orientation, "because memories are always stored with an emotional tag or a marker that indicates how to relate to the object, a tiger match will typically evoke a state of frightened awareness" (ibid.: 149). Importantly, at stage 4, the motor cortex that processes abstract cognition does not have this circuit, rather:

> "If films allow for matches with stored memories but do not support a narrative, we will get lyrical-associative feelings of the kind induced by some music videos, certain art films, and subjective episodes in mainstream films [...] The saturated emotional change of the associative networks therefore fuels the brains hermeneutic machinery and provides feelings of deep meaning [...] because the images and scenes are underdetermined" (Grodal 2009: 149)

Here we find another link to the Deleuzean distinction of 'sensory-motor situation' and 'optical and sound situation'. As we have seen, the 'sensory-motor situation' of the action-image pertains to the illusion of a real world situation with causal agency – a realist image, whereas the 'optical and sound situation' denotes dream-like images without spatiotemporal coordinates to align oneself with. On the realist sensory-motor stage, this is also a link to Barker's muscular embodiment, being the circuit to the emotional system that points to future possible actions embodied in the muscles, as "it is the muscles, whether in the arms or legs or in the speech organs, that implement our preferences, and thus this muscular intentionality colours the experience" (Grodal 2009: 150). Similarly, for Barker (2009), a space needs not be objective in abstract terms, but, rather, of possible points toward which action can be directed. And like Grodal (2009), this action naturally needs not rise from conscious deliberation, but rather "A gesture is an expressive bodily movement that is 'intentional', in that it is directed toward a world, but not

always 'intended' in the sense of being consciously chosen and performed" (Barker 2009: 78). And certainly, while the moving image may sometimes bring about even visual muscular movement on part of the viewer, it must be remembered that a wide array of action tendencies keep constantly firing, "the motor centers are only resonating, not executing" (Grodal 2009: 150). While this can be seen as an undergirding tendency for mimesis in Grodal's approach, there is also a difference. Grodal (2009), who draws from more objective notions of action tendencies due to his underpinnings in brain science, a subjective image (again, 'haptic image' for Marks, 'optical and sound situation' for Deleuze) does not invoke an action tendency. Yet, such images, due to their circuits to the brain's hermeneutic machinery can, due to their lack of a real-world referential object, draw inward and invoke deep meaning sometimes associated with certain types of epileptic seizures of "extreme vividness and also feelings of truth" (Grodal 2009: 149).

For further developing my reasoning regarding the differences in experiencing video (as in moving image) and text (or photography), one key contradiction needs resolving here. While it is certainly not my purpose to argue that textual expression cannot invoke haptic or visceral experiences, or that it can not move the reader's subconscious and conscious experience into relations far beyond the black and while markings on the page, I will argue that the 1) audiovisual expression of spatiotemporal relations, the 2) haptic experience of mimesis and the 3) action tendencies allow for a profoundly different, and in some sense deeper experiences in the moving image. I will return to points 1) and 2) in chapter III, but, for now, the notion of the action tendency needs further development and clarification. I argue that the potential for embodied action tendencies is firmly established when considering what Marks would call the 'optical image' (in contrast to the 'haptic image') and what Deleuze has constructed as the 'sensory-motor situation' (Deleuze 1989: 272). What these describe is the realist image of sensory-motor relations (the action-image [Deleuze 1986: 141]), where spatiotemporal coordinates and flows resemble a potentially actualizable real-world situation.

But what about the moving image that expresses no discernible connection to a real-world situation, where spatial coordinates are broken, such as a hallucination, a dream or an abstract surface? These are the moving images that force us to think while they have the power to constitute a haptic and visceral experience. But what about the action tendency? Do these moving images only move the viewer subconsciously, and push the cognitive thought to explore new relations, without invoking any action tendencies whatsoever (as Grodal [2009] seems to argue)? And if these dreamlike images produce no action tendencies, in what way can their difference be defended against other expressive media, such as, for example, text or photography?

While it seems fair to say that the relationship between an action tendency and an abstract and non-spatial moving image is difficult to fathom, I will also argue for its place here, while such a position is certainly complex to maintain. Certainly, the 'sensory-motor situation' of the action-image has such elements (one reacts when watching a roller-coaster ride, one begins to sweat when confronted with the audiovisual expression of the roar of an approaching mob) unlike text, even as text can invoke feelings as well. I would argue that such a response is differently embodied, however, as text needs the reader's agency for its expression, and it can not compel the musculature to react as a response to its agency). But text can make the reader excited, it can arouse the reader, and it can certainly make the cognitive imagination race without a realist illusion of presence). In abstract moving images devoid of spatiotemporal coordinates, can such subconscious visceral and imaginary processes still be different in nature in terms of how they invoke action in the viewer? For Grodal (2009), the answer would be a qualified no, as there are no spatial coordinates for the viewer to refer to. Yet, the PECMA flow brings about many experiences:

> "its relation to the architecture of the embodied brain provides a series of aesthetic options: to cue an intense focus on perceptual processes; to evoke saturated emotions linked to affect-charged associations; to evoke tense, action-oriented, and goal-oriented emotions; to elicit relaxation through laughter by blocking goal achievement in an active setting; to elicit sorrow and tears by blocking such achievement in a passive setting" (Grodal 2009: 151)

While perhaps not of action tendencies in his words, plenty of room for the participatory agency of the moving image seems to remain. For Marks (2000) and Barker (2009), the question of a quantitative action tendency is not of primary focus, as their epistemic interest is more in the real world action that will come about through new thoughts derived from the experience relationally. Grodal (2009) also constructs an evolutionary perspective, when he argues that, due to the unchanged nature of human biology for the past 50,000-100,000 years, our innate dispositions have much to do with why a moving image provides such compelling realities for us. For him, during film viewing the action tendencies of emotional system in circuitry to the visual 1) and association cortex 2) go on to resonate before the processing in the PECMA flow comes to evaluate the 'realness' of the experience in the prefrontal cortex, which "actually demands a modification of belief or a suspension of belief [rather than disbelief] so that film viewing does not produce full-scale illusions" (Grodal 2009: 154). It would seem that our subconsciously embodied experience thrusts us into the liminal before we cognitively gather our resources to completely fathom the illusion of the moving image. We as humans have evolutionarily learned to ascribe reality to what we gather through subsequent cognitions of our highly selective and actively constructive perceptions (see also Thrift 2008; Raichle 2010). In fact,

what we experience as a truthful account of reality is a "'true world' [that] does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, and if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous" (Deleuze 1989: 137). The moving image with its action tendencies and sense 'filling' expressions comes to resemble our innate evolutionary makeup in such ways that bring us liminal to the 'real' – close enough for a convincing experience, but beyond in ways so as not to completely act out our action tendencies, or to enter into a completely hallucinatory state. It potentially embodies our being holistically, yet maintaining a threshold of being where our thinking can catch up.

I will attempt to unravel this conundrum by drawing on a Deleuzean notion of the relation of embodiment and the moving image:

> "Whether it is visual or of sound, the image already has harmonics which accompany the perceived dominant image, and enter in their own ways into suprasensory relations [...] this is the shock wave or the nervous vibration, which means we can no longer say 'I see, I hear', but I FEEL, 'totally physiological sensation'. And it is the set of harmonics acting on the cortex which gives rise to thought, the cinematographic I THINK: the whole as subject [...] The cinematographic image must have a shock effect on thought, and force thought to think itself as much as thinking the whole. This is the very definition of the sublime" (Deleuze 1989: 158)

The metaphysical question of how we experience the moving image, whether of abstract or realist orientation, does not reduce, if we follow Deleuze's logic, to a matter of how much (quantitative) action tendency it may entail. Rather it seems to be a question of how the embodiment (be it the surfaces, musculatures or visceralities) of the moving image – through its compelling 'powers of the false' and gripping agency – has the potential to provide experiences of irreducible shifts (abstract/realist) of both physiological and thought, a gripping flux of action tendencies and orienting embodiment to an illusion of a world, haptic orientations to textures and dreams that we experience on our embodied bodies, and thought connecting to infinite series of histories and, thereafter, potential futures. Even Grodal (2009) seems to admit to this (and simultaneously seems to build a link to the subconsious metaphysic of Deleuze):

> "Language is not important for those mechanisms that underpin our arousal and hormonal activation in strongly emotion-evoking episodes, in the feelings of intensity that precede meaning and are due to perception alone [...making film viewing...] a biopsychological simulation in a very direct sense, and [to] involve levels far below language and consciousness [...] In film, language is part of an experiential totality that, for instance, includes vision, action, body language, and affective outbursts" (Grodal 2009: 12-13)

Thus, if one chooses to follow my reasoning as adapted from these authors, the key difference between the experiencing of the audiovisual moving image from the perspective of embodiment contra, for example, a textual or a photographic experience, surges from its primary ontology – the gripping mechanistic agency of movement itself, "That goes beyond the psychological

individual just as it makes a whole impossible, “a non-totalizable complexity, ‘non-representable by a single individual’, and which finds its representation only in the automation” (Deleuze 1989: 269). This movement can be conceptualized as different from inherently stationary representations, for it, through the continuum of subconscious haptic and tactile intensities to creative thought, having to now think the possibility of impossible worlds, creates a virtual body that radiates between the poles of the ‘sensory-motor’ and purely ‘optical and sound situations’ to destabilize connections between illusions of commonsensical worlds and relations of novel creative thought. This makes the embodied experience of the moving image that incorporates these cinematographic elements the true shock to thought! This shock entails the breakdown of the objectifying subject-predicate-objective structure of conventional Western linguistic expression into a holistic visual experience of relational becoming (or shifting between action/thought). In addition, it involves all the elements of the mechanistic agency of the medium and its racing connections to the subconscious that goes on to sensitize creative thought, so as to establish novel relations between both the spatiotemporally sensical and the contextually abstract images. These relations are summarized in the following illustration, where textual expression occupies a less destabilized and shifting position, beyond which the embodied experience of the moving image both surges and leaks:



Image 1 – Experiencing embodiment of the video medium (video as extra-textual experience)

By modulating between the purely optical and the sensory-motor, the agency of the medium becomes doubly distanced from expressive media such as text or photography. Thus its embodiment, its very shock to thought is the bodily experience of shifting action and mimesis.

What I propose that we still require, in videographic research in CCT, are ethnographic video directors who can utilize these conceptual tools to embark on projects that could potentially produce such novel shocks to thought. This

is certainly a demanding task, as it will require much consideration of the aesthetic components of the montage, as well as more advanced equipment than what is usually available to researchers, in order to make the production of such footage more readily possible. In any case, this brief overview of visual components and experiencing the moving image is intended here as an encouragement to go beyond description, even to the very limits where artistic images would be readily included to take full advantage of the medium's evocative and convincing potential for storytelling. What perhaps needs no repeating, is that we need to go beyond expressing our research to cognitive minds, and thus to invite more holistic embodied experiences through novel aesthetic storytelling emanating from our research contexts – taking seriously both the potential of postmodern frameworks and the videographic medium itself.

2.9 On Social Practices and Space

> "Spaces are constituted by series and events – rather than containing them" (James Williams)

Let us now further explore the epistemic question of 'why video?', more directly from the perspective of CCT in particular. What is it that video media would be especially suitable for in expressing consumption phenomena – and in so doing, what would its potential advantages be compared to textual and other forms of expression? We have already touched upon the topics of the distancing effect of the purely abstract and thus even sanitized nature of text, the potential of 'uncomfortable' illusions of reality provided by the video medium (see 2.2.1), visited notions of how the visual can break down the deeply embedded objectifying linguistic structure of western language (see also 3.2), and how different shifting modes of the experiential embodiment of the audiovisual moving image has the potential to invoke powerful shocks to thought (see 2.7 and 2.7.3). Yet, departing somewhat from the aesthetics and experience, what theoretical stances of expression might such a medium most readily welcome? As it stands, contemporary videographies seem to still struggle with what it is that the medium could show that would be especially convincing (I recently sent in a critical review of one work submitted to the ACR 2011 conference, where the footage consisted exclusively of decontextualized 'talking heads' and perspectives *of* action [see also Heisley and Levy 1991; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006]). What I will now propose is that video has tremendous potential for expressing convincing academic fictions from perspectives that highlight emerging social practices, without neglecting the material contexts where such phenomena occur.

I will approach social practices through practice theory, which through the work of Theodore Schatzki (1996, 2001, 2002, 2010), has recently received growing interest, especially in the field of organization theory (e.g. Whittington 2006), and has also become increasingly cited in CCT (e.g. Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005; Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010; Halkier and Jensen 2011). In fact, practice theoretical work championed by Eric Arnould won a best paper award at the recent ACR 2011 conference. While the literature in practice theory places conceptual emphasis on the material surroundings of social practices, I will add further conceptual resources from non-representational theory, heralded by Nigel Thrift (2008) in the field of human geography. These theories, although boasting much in common, should not be confused with the widely known actor-network theory (ANT) crafted by Bruno Latour, for it levels the agency of humans and matter in its dehumanistic 'radical symmetry', rendering all constituents of a system into neutral effects (e.g. Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe 2002; Kirsch and Mitchell 2004). This ontology would flatten and neutralize a Deleuzian perspective of liberating the creative potential of thought, and while both practice theoretical and non-representational accounts take similar positions regarding the emergence of human and material relations, they remain considerably more humanistic, as practice theory places emphasis on the contextual social rituals, performances and meaning-makings, and non-representational theory has a political underpinning of human emancipation from oppressive spaces and technologies. Let us briefly explore these approaches in order to further construct what it is that CCT videographies could express about consumption.

2.9.1 Practice Theory

> "Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be" (Walter Benjamin)

When constructing videographic expressions of the social contexts of consumption, what types of relations would the video material theoretically be particularly adept in expressing? Could the unfolding social phenomena be best suited for the production of evocative and efficacious experiences? Here we can visit the theorizations of 'social practices' that have long constituted a focal concept in social sciences and are also beginning to be increasingly explored in the field of consumer research (e.g. Bourdieu 1990; Giddens 1984; Holt 1995; Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009). However, what has been described as the 'practice turn' (Schatzki 2001; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and Von Savigny 2001; see also Reckwitz 2002a) is still relatively new in CCT. The problem with practice-oriented analyses has long been their confusing variety and differences in their vocabularies, assumptions, scope, levels of

abstraction, and nature (e.g. the unconscious or conscious). Also, lack of synthetic approaches has further fragmented practice-theoretical accounts (Schatzki 1996, 2002; Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005; Halkier and Jensen 2011). In addition, as I will further speculate, there may be something intrinsically related to the practice theoretical ontology that resists textual accounts about it.

Practices have been conceptualized as routinely expressed activities that entail an intertwining (and thus an anti-Cartesian) of the mental and the bodily in an agent's shared beliefs, habits, knowledge, competence and desires (e.g. Reckwitz 2002a; Schatzki 2002; Warde 2005), organized in "a routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge and understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge" (Reckwitz 2002a: 256). Importantly, Warde (2005) defines practices as collective achievements. Here, practices are important for consumption: "therefore the practices rather than individual desires [...] create wants" (Warde 2005: 137). Additionally, Schau, Muñiz and Arnould (2009) argue that the social practices themselves underlie the social negotiation of value in consumption experiences, not the orthodox notion of possessions and associated consumer needs and wants.

In contrast with research stemming from social construtivism on the cognitive symbolism and identity-formation in consumption prevalent before the turn of the millennium, the radical idea in the practice approach is that it treats 'practices', or the actual 'doings', as the site of the social instead of placing the social into the minds, texts, or social interactions (Reckwitz 2002a; Shove and Pantzar 2005; Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011). It offers potential epistemological insights for CCT in the sense that it focuses analysis on the social/cultural via practice. The social world consists of diverse social practices, which are 'carried' and negotiated through explorative social performances between agents (individuals). These actors perform practices via performative events in 'sites of the social' (Schatzki, 2002). According to Schatzki (2002), sites in general are where things exist and events spatiotemporally emerge – where entities are intrinsically intertwined as parts of their own context. Therefore, as an analytical framework, social practices can be seen as consisting of the simultaneous intertwining of contextual human action (situated understandings, routines, skills and knowhow), and the material arrangements this action occurs in (e.g. Schatzki 2002; Reckwitz 2002a, 2002b; Warde 2005). As learned routines, they thus often consist of 'learned doings' that are socially and contextually conducted and negotiated, both cognitively and subconsciously – thus again ontologically breaking down the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy.

According to Schatzki (2010), material arrangements and spaces are contemporarily seen to constitute room for movement, set bounds on movement and importantly, "set stages" (p. 19) for mutually negotiated social practices, and, therefore, as Halkier and Jensen (2011) note, practices should be seen as "performances" (p. 118) where data is "produced" (p. 118). The key distinction between practice theory and a Deleuzean ontology seems to be the level of analysis. Whereas both have to do with emergence and non-objective situatedness in the world, many practice theoretical perspectives tend to assume methodological individualism (Halkier and Jensen 2011), and to focus solely on doings and meaning-makings, thus eschewing the role of emotion, as the action is assumed to take precedence, for "actions that emotions determine are usually done for an end" (Schatzki 2010: 121). In contrast, a Deleuzean ontological perspective could be seen to be of the shifting subconscious intensities of sense that emerge via affects into thought – and perhaps could be described as being postrationalized into emotions. Additionally, practice theoretical accounts place epistemic emphasis on social practices embedded in cultural structure (e.g. Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011), thus constituting, in a sense, a more stable structuralist backdrop.

The constant negotiation of context-dependent social practices makes them evolutionary (Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010), temporal time/space situated in human life itself – not as an objective linear externality (Schatzki 2010: 9, 27). Indeed, our spatiotemporal surroundings are constantly rebuilt as our cultural negotiations and doings as social performances are experimented in social agency. Yet, to date, research on communities of consumption has offered only few insights into how the social practices of cultures of consumption evolve. In our BIP videography, we argue that a practice theoretical approach would open up valuable insights in this regard by examining the hybridization, bifurcation, fragmentation and appropriation, coherence, conflict, insemination, media of communication, and politics of practices (Schatzki 2002: 252). And while BIP lays down the groundwork for the analysis of social practice on videography, we have attempted to continue the work in our PTS videography, which illustrates how the negotiation of changing technologies (material arrangements) and the understandings of appropriate doings (social practices) undergo simultaneous negotiation that drives cultural evolution.

Videography note (16):



Our practice theoretical framework (adapted from Schatzki 2002) in BIP that aims to provide a tentative exemplification of how social practices could be typologized from the perspective of videographic research in CCT.

As we highlight in BIP, with its potential to express convincing illusions of social doings within spatiotemporal relations and embodied materiality, videography could provide further approaches for practice theoretical research. As such, the video medium could be a novel vehicle capable of providing epistemological perspectives for interpretation and understandings of marketplace cultures. But, most importantly, it could facilitate the breaking down of the objectifying linguistic form of conventional academic expression (see 3.2), and thus provide a very different and potentially convincing experience contra textual expression of knowledge products. Videographic research could become a toolkit for expressing these unfolding relations in a Deleuzean sense – seeing various types of moving images constructing an evocative and contextually situated story. If such depictions of human relations are found convincing, ethnographic data collection must be extensively planned to consist of footage showing these ongoing and unfolding relations *in situ*. In this view, cognitivist perspectives of past action as postrationalizations in interview settings are perhaps no longer similarly convincing and sufficient in and of themselves – especially as it can then always be questioned why video was chosen as the medium in the first place. Rather, we need in-depth and contextual expressions of social practices as they happen in their respective embodied material surroundings. Certainly

not an easy task, but perhaps one well worth pursuing (and as we have tentatively attempted in our PTS videography).

Contemporary research utilizing practice theoretical frameworks has mostly concentrated on its conceptual and epistemological underpinnings – empirical work has been less common (Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011; see also Reckwitz 2002a; Schatzki 2002; Warde 2005). Additionally, perhaps due to its difficulty to be vibrantly described via text, it seems that the material arrangements and spaces where social practices occur have received less attention than human agency (Shove and Pantzar 2005; Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011; see also Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009; see Reckwitz 2002b; Magaudda 2011 for notable exceptions). As we have seen from a Deleuzian perspective, we lack such concepts (see 2.4). Videography may constitute a novel possibility for experiencing the unfolding contextual relations where the agencies of social practitioners intertwine with the agency of the material surroundings. In line with Deleuze, I will thus briefly emphasize this elevated role of material arrangements and the relations that emerge from the agency of things through non-representational theory.

2.9.2 Non-Representational Theory

> "Whatever they do with their objects must also happen to them, since subject and object come into existence as the torn halves of a single relationship. Even though they have been artificially separated in the society of the spectacle, subject and object are still the matching parts of a primary unit, and their unity still controls the way in which whatever happens to one of them will happen to the other" (Sean Cubitt)

> "To balance our accounts of society, we simply have to turn our exclusive attention away from humans and also look at nonhumans. Here they are, the hidden and despised social masses that make up our morality" (Bruno Latour)

I have proposed that by expressing the unfolding social and material relations, video can offer novel potential for epistemic interpretation of consumption phenomena from the perspective of practice theory. Yet, there is more to the potential of both the aesthetics of the medium and the embodied experience that video can offer, and thus it is useful to mine for more conceptual resources that are particularly related to do how we understand the material arrangements that intertwine with meaning makings, skills, routines and knowhow. As stated above, CCT research utilizing a practice theoretical ontology has generally placed emphasis on human action (often starting from meaning-making), and not as much on the embodied material arrangements that intertwine with social practices (e.g. Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009), and has tended to emphasize the conceptual rather than the empirical (e.g. Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005). In a recent account, Schatzki (2010) has also turned to pursue these questions, as he argues through the concept of 'timespace' that no human activity (or practice) occurs in a space

and time, but rather constitutes it emergently and indeterministically. Also, as Deleuzean ontology makes little distinction between the human and material agency (if the creative potential of thought is excluded), the relations and agency and the role spatiotemporal arrangements have in our social constructions of social practices need further scrutiny for the purposes of this exploration. Following his emphasis on the emergent intensities of sense, there are no *a priori* qualities that people assign to things, and as we have seen, there is no linearity in relation (as there is no before-present-after but rather extending relations through senses):

> "Each trajectory itself constitutes a machine, in which man is a cog between the different elements: [...] the trajectory-gag and the machine-gag – are two aspects of a same reality, a machine which produces man 'without a mother', or the man of the future" (Deleuze 1986: 177)

This relational movement of agency (human, nonhuman) is always intertwined with the shifting intensities of sense in the subconscious (see 2.4.1). I have thus proposed (as one potential perspective) that the videographic methodology set forth in this work could be of great potential, as it has the power to produce convincing illusions of how actions, spaces and things intertwine and constitute the emergence of relations in and beyond communities of consumption.

I will further adopt elements from non-representational theory introduced by Nigel Thrift (2008) in his seminal work, which constructs something of a practice-based "non-epistemic ontology-activity" (p. 113) by drawing on pluralistic sources, such as theories of practice, biology of inspiration and illustration, feminism and anthropological discourses. Here the non-epistemic seems to denote emergence itself, as Thrift ventures to describe an ontological position that foregrounds considerations of emergent relations (between humans but also non-human objects) that reduces the importance of representation as a category of thought. In addition, much of the non-representational thinking follows Deleuzean notions of the emergent subconscious and how relations are constituted through the endless differentiation through events (see 2.4.1 and 2.4.4). Thus, unlike many perspectives of practice theory, the conscious agency and the individual are decentred. Additionally, in line with Deleuze, non-representational theory continues the logic of practice theory to decidedly concentrate on the precognitive emergence of the social where the embodiment within material arrangements is primary, cognition always secondary, and can only be seen as a postrationalist illusion of past events and agency.

Following Thrift (2008), in non-representational theory consciousness becomes nothing more than an illusionary fallacy, a window of very short time spans where only a few things can be addressed, and is easily "distracted" (p. 6) and "fragmented and volatile" (p. 36). Additionally, it is

argued that human action takes place from 0,8 to 1,5 seconds before the agent is cognitively aware of it, but academically there has been very little emphasis in this pre-personal dimension of existence (Thrift 2008: 58; see also Anderson and Harrison 2010: 9). Put radically, humans construct their consciousness of imagined histories, fluently blending fact and fiction. From this recognition, it follows that research utilizing only interview-based descriptions of past action (for Thrift [2008], "probably 95 percent of academic thought has concentrated on the cognitive dimension of the conscious 'I" [p. 58]) becomes highly suspect, especially if knowledge claims for accurate 'representation' or 'reproduction' of events are assumed (see also Hudson and Ozanne 1988). But even as that may be the case, it does not diminish the importance of taking the nature of cognition as a form of storytelling and meaning-making negotiation, when the level of analysis is placed in the stories themselves. Such accounts of the conscious mind must be, and indeed are in many interpretive perspectives, understood to contain stories about stories of what is remembered about past performances reconstituted as further performances in the immanent present. As perspectives *of* action, they are important for the interpretation of the meaning-makings of the participant, but to be able to interpret the event itself, the actuality of the act (or social practice), consumer researchers may want to place more emphasis on the perspectives *in* action – the very essence of participatory ethnography (e.g. Wallendorf and Belk 1989; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006), even as these observations remain performative accounts of yet more performances themselves (Halkier and Jensen 2011; see also Cho and Trent 2009). Yet, when conducting research *in situ* there is more to interpret than only the perspectives – there is the whole emerging material surrounding, both relationally enabling the social practice and becoming transformed by it.

Thus, non-representation goes further than the social constructivist position, as it concentrates on the subconscious and emergent being in the world. The construction is always second, always a story or a performance to validate a sense of purposeful intention and causality of human action (see also Kavanagh 1994). Through these lines of thought, we can further consider what videography in CCT can learn from both moving on from (but not discarding!) 1) cognitive meaning-makings to 2) the (material) preconscious, and raising further doubt on any conceptual stability of 'representation' (see 2.4.4).

In problematizing the representational accounts (or the originary truth that could lie behind it), social constructivism has been seen by some non-representational scholars as a convenient shortcut, as it focuses on the representation of symbols and structures behind it (Anderson and Harrison 2010). Similarly to Schatzki's (2010) recent notions, in non-representational

theory, constructivism becomes 'radicalized' to break down the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy upheld in much modernist thought, to consider the human as a part of the on-going becoming of worlds (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 11). It is 'radical', because it goes beyond the 'social' in terms of what it is that is constructed (ibid.: 18), or:

> "If thinking was not quite what we thought it was, if much of everyday life is unreflexive and not necessarily amenable to introspection, if, as shall be claimed below, the meaning of things comes less from their place is a structuring symbolic order and more from the enactment in contingent practical contexts, then quite what we mean by terms such as 'place', 'the subject', 'the social' and 'the cultural', and quite how 'space', 'power' and 'resistance' actually operate and take-place, are all in question. For now, however, our question becomes how are we to think of this 'background', how are we to characterize it beyond the somewhat limited and limiting definition 'non-representational mental capacities', and so gain some purchase therein?" (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 7)

For my purposes, much of this 'background' becomes of importance, as I (adapting Deleuzean thought) focus on the non-representational implications on social practices and spatiotemporal embodiment. In doing so, I will tentatively attempt to further several conventional interpretative approaches to videographic work in CCT. As I and others have argued, video, as a (epistemologically) non-representative media can bring about new relations by offering rich contextual accounts of such practice-oriented phenomena as the material context of settings, proxemics, kinesics, and social activities (practices) of human agents in interaction with these material contexts, including tools and spatial structures (see Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006). While not eschewing the meaning-making dimension of practice theory entirely, considering the ontology of non-representational theory highlights agency as continuous rhizomatic movement, contextually manifesting social performances within limiting and liberating material spaces, which have the potential of making events "eventful" (Thrift 2008: 114; see also Cho and Trent 2009) – when having become assigned qualities by retrospective thought. Performance focuses on the emergent, subconscious and even accidental, "which make each moment a new starting point" (ibid.: 21) or where the social actor is to be understood as a "body as being expressive without being a signifier" (ibid.: 14), such as in performing a dance, or:

> "Epistemologically, this means that the 'action' is not in our bodies, habits practices and behaviours (and surroundings). Indeed the decisive analytic gesture of social constructivism is to make the latter an expression of the former" (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 5)

Agency of Things

As discussed above, Schatzki (2002) constructs social practices into emergent meaning-makings, skills and routines and the 'site' which consists of the material arrangements that can restrict and liberate the human agency. Thrift

(2008), in turn, emphasizes his notion of 'machinic humanism' by giving primary emergent potential to the material surroundings themselves. For him, the body is not a separate entity in a world, but, rather, in itself, 'The human body is a tool-being" (Thrift 2008: 10; see also Gherardi 2000). Thus, all the things around us ascribe their purpose on us, and we our doings on them simultaneously – but matter takes some precedence as it 'tells' us our potential for action before we can cognitively sense our actions and ascribe the reasons for our purposeful agency back to them. While Schatzki (e.g. 2002) primarily concentrates on the social nature of the meaning-makings and understandings in practices, these notions bring the interaction of the body with the surrounding material things (and other humans as physical things) to the forefront. Such interaction remains considerably precognitive and emergent for Thrift (2008), however, as he can imagine little focus on human agency, as 'The unchosen and unforeseen exceed the ability of the body to contain and absorb" (p. 10). The conscious is therefore not before or after a practice, but always emergently intertwined, even as subordinate to the emergence itself. The place does not contain the culture, as put forth by Latour, "social is not a place, a thing, a domain or kind of stuff but a provincial movement of new associations" (Latour 2005: 238; see also Thrift 2008: 21). Additionally, Thrift (2008), "following Deleuzean interpretation" (p. 61), reverses the relation by arguing for the body not as something passive where society and culture is inscribed on, but something in diverse relationships with things surrounding us.

In line with a Deleuzean ontology, Thrift's (2008) non-representational theory is more closely affiliated with the immediacy of human life and thus contains strands of the phenomenological – "the lived immediacy of actual experience, before any reflection on it" (p. 6) and becomes "resolutely anti-biographical" (p. 7). This emergent social interaction with other human agents encapsulated in material surroundings Thrift calls "*material schematism*" (p. 8, emphasis in the original), as for him objects make the very possibility of thought "do-able" (p. 60). Yet, Thrift does not jettison the subject entirely, and thus maintains a "sense of *personal authorship*" (p. 13, emphasis in the original), where "conscious awareness is repositioned as a means of scrutinizing and focusing these actions" (p. 58), even as no logocentric static states of a subject or object remain to be analyzed and quantified.

The reason for maintaining the importance of 'personal authorship' – the truth of a constructed past for Thrift (2008) seems to be of pragmatic and political nature, "Because how things seem is often more important than what they are" (p. 13). Here Thrift seems to resist the dehumanizing potential in allowing for a completely machinized world, which for him seemed to lead into idealized bourgeoisie communities and the automatization of the

industrial society or the neutralizing and dehumanizing effect of "one of the most damaging ideas that has swept the social sciences and humanities has been the idea of a disenchanting modernity" (p. 65; see also Horkheimer and Adorno 2002/1987; Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe 2002; Kirch and Mitchell 2004). In non-representational theory, humanism that needs a human agent capable of questioning boundaries, rather then becoming completely abstracted within them, thus remains. Thus, in a Deleuzean vein, also the unquantifiable 'magic' of ritualistic practices, such as art, dance and music become of importance as they are "virtual actualizations" (p. 67) of time which allow consciousness to become acute without necessarily being directed by drawing on the non-cognitive, or:

> "Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats all the repetitions, by virtue of an internal power (an imitation is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses the copies into a simulacra). Even the most mechanical, the most banal, the most habitual and the most stereotyped repetition finds a place in works of art, it is always displaced in relation to other repetitions, and it is subject to the condition that a difference may be extracted from it for those other repetitions" (Deleuze 1994: 293)

Similarly to Deleuze, they consist of moments of no intended representation (no signifier-signified) and thus become more 'real' (as they connect beyond any structure through affect) than the folly of the notion of the 'truth' behind a representation.

On Representation

> "The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation. But modern thought is born of the failure of representation, of the loss of identities, and all the forces that act under the representation of the identical. The modern world is one of simulacra" (Gilles Deleuze)

In line with a Deleuzean ontology, the scholars of non-representational theory have needed to consider what the emergent 'event' consists of – as their social world is a materially embodied flux of performance with every new performance constituting a novel event that connects to everything through the new relations it brings about. If everything can be seen as a kind of a performance, what is it that is possible to express with them? We have already seen that, in line with Deleuze and other scholars we have followed, representation as a conveyer of a truth or a repetition of the same is highly problematic – even philosophically indefensible. When we attempt to represent something, it is never the same materials or language that constitutes this representation assumed to repeat, rendering all acts performative and even playful expressions that reconstitute social orders and material spaces. Additionally, all relations in the world among people (and matter) have hermeneutically 'moved on' so the outcome is a new set of resonating relations, not a return to any originary innocuous state. Indeed, if one attempts repetition as representation in this framework, what does it

mean to keep the "copies in order: to ensure that they do nothing more than return originals, identities and givens" (Doel 2010: 118)?

In line with Deleuzian ontology, the notion of a representation that repeats is eschewed (see 2.4.4). There is a caveat, however, as this is (again) not to mean that 'anything goes', or that non-representational theory is a refusal of representation *per se* – rather the refusal of the naïve realist notion that anything can be represented in absolute terms or as the same (Doel 2010). Again, in line with Deleuze, Doel (2010) notes that we certainly think in representation, and we have a tendency to think about the fidelity of any performance to its origin. But as we have seen, none of the same origin to return to exists. Rather, it invokes the Baudrillardian notion of the 'simulacra' (Baudrillard 2006), which is the 'hyperreal'. As stated above, the 'hyperreal' is a copy that assumes the reality of the original, even as it bears no direct resemblance to it – or indeed has never really existed in the first place. "The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbours positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction" (Deleuze 1990: 262). What remains is the potential for new relations, as the representation does not call back to an original, but rather creates new 'realities' of its own.

As we have seen in Deleuze (see 2.5 and 2.5.1), video indeed has no access to any type of originary truth. It is an interpretation we construct as simulacra in the form of storytelling. The epistemic focus should thus reside in the types of relations it generates. Again, this is not to say we do not attempt to represent, but rather it shifts the level of analysis to the poststructural emergence from the illusion of the assessment of the 'veracity' of any particular representation (Doel 2010).

> "And so even representations become understood as presentations; as things and events they enact worlds, rather than understood as presentations; as things and events they enact worlds, rather then being simple go-betweens tasked with re-presenting some pre-existing order or force" (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 14)

Any stab at representation thus becomes an ephemeral relational performance, emergence of social practices generating (rather than reducing to) some *a priori* order that can be reconstructed as a perfect copy (Anderson and Harrison 2010). As we have seen in Deleuze, copies of such type cannot be conceptually maintained, as they have to assume a stagnant world, where those who experience a representation would be exactly the same as those who experienced the original. Worlds would need to be synchronically frozen and all potential human agency a constant *tabula rasa*. Even when we try to achieve a representation, it must be understood that with all the new relations that it arouses, it thus becomes generative rather reductive to some past logos. Through its inherent difference to a past, every representation becomes an eventful performance, and due to its inherent difference, every performance is an event that establishes new relations between people and

even material arrangements. “An event is thus not something one inserts into an emplotted dramatic sequence with its start and finish, for it initiates a new sequence that retrospectively determines its beginnings, and which leaves its ends unknown or undetermined” (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 22, citing Rajchman 1991: ix). What we are left with is the emergence of difference as “The same and the similar, the Analoguous and the Opposed, do not return. Only affirmation returns – in other words, the Different, the Dissimilar” (Deleuze 1994a: 299).

Importantly, concentrating on this difference is not a new false logos. Difference resists conceptualization due to its very nature, as to know difference, there must already be some state that it can be compared to. Difference alone cannot be described without an ‘external’ identity, or as Doel (2010) concludes, “One of the great lessons of poststructuralism is that difference, knowing nothing of identity, is ‘inexplicable’” (p. 121).

As, for the most part, a nonlinguistic medium, could video have novel potential for the production of evocative accounts of the emergence of these social and material contexts? And if it is to do so, what types of audiovisual moving images would be of the most convincing nature? In our more recent videographic works (especially PTS), we have attempted to express the potential relationality of the medium. Video does not objectify like text due to its linguistic structure, and video is always contextual, if the contexts are allowed adequate relational aesthetic possibilities in producing them videoegraphically (e.g. by adopting Deleuzian notions on moving image aesthetics). But, when constructing such aesthetics, we need to first unbind some of our ties with several types of moving images we have tended to utilize in CCT videographies. From my perspective, the primary one is fairly obvious and connected, that is, the overuse of ‘talking head’ interviews in decontextualized settings (often set up for filming). Such aesthetics diminishes the contextual relations with social agents in the spatiotemporal contexts where the relations being inquired upon (produced) occur in action. In addition, the common individualizing practice in a ‘talking head’ interview may need to be questioned further – for such perspectives *of* action necessarily entail the objectification of social consumption practices. Thus we attempted to produce the more interview-type situations so that they become exchanges of meaning-makings among social agents, constitutive of cultural phenomena rather than analytic of it. Thus, these events were produced so as to not resemble group-interviews (let alone focus groups), where the visual becomes a type of reformulation of the Cartesian dualism – a social agent syncronized out of the emergent context and assigned a kind of objectifying and elevated position in relation to it. Rather, we were attempting to relationally express not the analysis of cultural phenomena, but on the contrary, the active contextual and emergent production of it. As such, our

work is not of constructing audiovisual illusions of peep holes into syncronized cultural states, but of hermeneutical and material participations into their emergence. Here our involvement of autoethnographic members (see 4.1.3) in the research team became of great relational importance – making us perhaps less of the Western man looking to investigate far away cultures and their 'primitive' ways, but rather more immersed participants in the unfolding of the cultural phenomena in general (e.g. the 'PTS' Vimeo video has been viewed over 4,000 times at the beginning of 2012, and has been widely debated in many Internet discussion forums among the cultural practitioners, see Appendix 2).

It is now time to move to a more comprehensive conclusion for the Essence(s) section of this study. In doing so, I will attempt to make some connections from all the traversed, admittedly abstract, thinking. Perhaps there is also room for some novel beginnings.

III Videography in CCT: Elements of Essence(s) and Relation

3.1 (Post)Overview of a Heretical Journey so Far(ther)

> "For theory too is something which is made, no less than its object. For many people, philosophy is something which is not 'made', but is pre-existent, ready-made in a prefabricated sky. However, philosophical theory is itself a practice, just as much as its object. It is no more abstract than its object" (Gilles Deleuze)

In the previous sections, we have constructed the moving image (video) into convincing digital illusions not in any way indexical to any 'reality out there'. Yet the moving image has vast expressive potential, and can be evocative and convincing through its relentless agency and its ability to show us the impossible in montage by freely blending time into possible 'truths' and 'falsities'. It thus becomes not a medium of representation but of potential relations that, in a Deleuzian sense, constitute the world and beyond. Let us briefly summarize:

1. Video (as a digital medium) is not a 'representation' or a 'reproduction' of reality but a completely abstracted medium capable of expressing convincing 'illusions of reality' through its 'powers of the false' that invoke the viewer's creative mind to consider its impossibility in various novel ways

2. Video thus simulates reality, but, through its illusions of space and time, has no correspondence to it, apart from the viewer's experience (precognitive and cognitive) of the events and performances it relates

3. Contra text, video is particularly potent in relating tactile embodied experiences – in a sense its unreality is often (through expression of myth, performance and fantasy) more convincing than the 'reality' underlying it

4. The epistemology of relation brings together the transcendent emergence of people and objects – connecting it to practice theory through social practices and the material arrangements and to non-

representational theory through the spatiotemporal emergence of people-objects

5. The ontology of the moving image is *movement* itself as an emergent change without synchronic equilibrium. Different moving images can be used to express different kinds of relations – the most basic ones being perception, affection and action

6. The epistemic quality of the moving image, however, is *time* and relation, as the nonlinearity of time expressed through the simulation of reality breaks the whole fabric of 'reality' down into illusion – which, as stated, can be more compelling than the 'reality' it expresses

7. The moving image is constructed in frames that are illusions of closed systems, but via relations forcefully push out to make new relations beyond and until infinity

8. Through the ontology of relation – metaphor, paradox, performance and dream are more 'real' than a 'realistic' representation of spatiotemporal settings as they have the potential to invoke new thoughts (and thus new relations) that stretch into infinity – both as past and future intensities simultaneously

9. Thus, through relation we eschew the logocentric notion of a 'representation' and focus on the emergence of new relations, and, from the perspective of CCT videographic research this can open novel epistemic interest into considering the nature of relations between the participants of the research context, between the connected shots in the montage of the moving image, and finally between the videography and its audience and beyond

3.2 Video Medium Contra Textual and Photographic Expression

> "If one of the most important cognitive leaps of the last few hundred years was the growth of writing in its many forms, now, or so I argue, a similar change in the structure of cognition is occurring but as a general process of the purposeful production of semiosis, in which space is both template and font [...] We do not consider the fact that there is more information in an experience than an account of it. It is the account that we consider information. But the whole basis of such an account is information that is discarded" (Nigel Thrift)

Let us now summarize and briefly build on how experiencing the audiovisual moving image on videography can be seen as profoundly different from the

reading of textual expressions or the viewing of photographs. Again, I must admit the superficiality and shallowness of my account, for a truly in-depth consideration of text and photography are beyond the scope of this study. Additionally, I have recognized that I am thus forced to conduct analysis on text and photography by depending on 'mainstream' ideas – while still comparing them to a 'radical' Deleuzean one. I intend the following as something as a starting point that can potentially bring about new ideas and relations, not as a conclusive project by any means. And therefore, I will make do with what I have.

We can now briefly revisit the early sections of this study to consider the initial problems of distinction among video and other expressive media. Scholars of videography in CCT have come to note that video is by some means 'richer' (Smith, Fisher and Cole 2007) than more conventional textual expressions. Photography could thus reside between these expressive entities (see also Peñaloza and Cayla 2006). Such distinctions sufficed as initial positions for entering into a conversation about these matters, but I hope that the turned pages of this study have brought about various problems of situating these expressive media on such a continuum. In fact, I feel that in my analysis the whole notion of 'richness' has lost much of its grounding, for considering the amount of information (however conceptualized) does not suffice. And while something like 'the amount of relation' could initially seem more closely aligned with my analysis, there surely could never be any stable criteria for making such assessments either quantitatively or qualitatively. These media can thus become seen as expressive styles with many overlapping qualities, but, equally, many differences. None of them can be posited as 'better', but they can surely co-exist and complement each other. Let us briefly make some comparisons.

Text has long been the taken-for-granted form of expression in the construction of academic knowledge products. The scientific project of the logical positivists turned text into full modernist swing by advocating the rational reconstruction of language through logic (e.g. Schwandt 2000). In their (now) utopian thought, this project would have finalized the work of science and philosophy alike by producing a 'true' correspondence between the world, experience and its expression in formal language. This was, however, not to come to pass, as the work of many philosophers (see 2.3.1) amounted to the 'death' of logical positivism. Yet, as we have seen, the reverberations of this movement carry on to these days, and very much so in marketing and consumer research. In an ongoing manner, the mainstream of these discourses emphasizes methodological procedures adopted from positivistically oriented natural science, assumes the possibility for objectivity, reductionism, logocentric truth and a (at least approximate)

correspondence between language and events in the world. I have argued that much of this may have to do with the structure of Western forms of language.

Adopting the notions of Metz (1980) and Marks (2000) above, the inherent ways in which Western culture is structured through its use of language has grave implications for how we tend to construct its workings. This linguistic system seems to place overt emphasis on the objectification and the mastery of the world through its very structure, which privileges the subject and renders the object under its causal agency (subject-predicate-object) (see also Hermans 1996). This individualization and the foregrounding of the mastery of the all-powerful subject is in line with the modernist project, as we see in Cubitt's (2001) reading of Virilio as well: "But Virilio's point is more fundamental than that: he argues here that this commanding gaze is the beginning of the geometricisation of vision as perspective in the Renaissance, an abstraction of vision from which commences the tendency towards seeing all space from a single point" (p. 63). Likewise, such a position seems to accentuate the vision as the primary sense under which all other cultural knowledge is subdued (if it has room to exist at all) (e.g. Marks 2000; Barker 2009). In addition, through the 'crisis of representation' and postmodern and poststructural frameworks we have now come to understand language as simply an emergent and ephemeral code in and of itself – a contextual act of a social game with no more profound correspondence or verisimilitude to any 'reality' that would be 'out there' (e.g. Firat, Dholakia and Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Dholakia 2006; see also Deleuze 1994a; Wittgenstein 2009/1953).

Similarly, in Deleuze's philosophy ('superior empiricism') that seems at times both poststructural and radically humanist, focuses on the emergence of relations (physical and thought, both human and nonhuman), as "text is merely a small cog in the extra-textual picture" (Smith 1997: xvi), for "By themselves, resemblances and codifications are poor methods; not a great deal can be done with codes [alone]" (Deleuze 1989/1985: 28). Thus, Deleuze's style of writing became free indirect discourse and his emphasis was on the construction of concepts for their own sake – not from the perspective of uncovering novel ways to establish links to more rigorously defined external signifieds that would have 'real' existence in the world. Rather, his style of writing seems to be his way of proving this point, which is to show how language can in essence have no retreat to a more stable logos, but rather to open up new avenues of thinking (on part of the reader) through paradox, humor and general inaccessibility (e.g. Williams 2008; Hughes 2009). Thus, ontology becomes of emergent relations that emanate through events that bring about qualitative changes in things as they resonate shifting intensities of sense, and these senses assume their qualities through human cognition, which remains an afterthought to the event itself (see 2.9.2).

Scholars who have adopted Deleuzian or similar 'poststructuralist' underpinnings, have extended these notions to events conceptualized as emergent performances (e.g. Berbary 2011; Cho and Trent 2009). When representation through media as an accurate means, or even as something that carries with itself a verisimilitude to 'reality', has become eschewed in a philosophical sense, they have turned their attention to the emergent and ephemeral nature of social performances themselves. Language (text or otherwise) has been noted to fail to their expression: "As a description of a dream in words never quite captures [...] its feeling/picture/space" (Jones 2006: 69), and in terms of emergence: "Although some scholars have written as though performance could be treated as a form of text...its unique strategic properties are destroyed when it is considered as, or reduced to, text...Unlike text, performances are ephemeral" (Thrift 2008: 135, quoting Schieffelin 1998: 198). Thus, to be able to read text so as to connect to some past 'reality' becomes a fantastic act of reification in and of itself.

Yet, all this that can seem at this point an audacious bashing of textual expression is not meant as such. Text, like any other mode of expression, can (when the modernist machinistic project can be overcome) become another vehicle of nonreductionistic liberation of expression, and indeed we are seeing such inroads being made in consumer research in terms of poetic expression (e.g. Schuten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; see also Van Maanen 1995). While not limited to poetry with the waving of some typologisizing magic wand, such textual approaches share much with a Deleuzian ontology I have been attempting to bring forth, for text could indeed shed some of its modernist baggage of being the reducer of thought (and relations) instead of a 'crystal' (see 2.7 and 2.7.3) that could further their undetermined possibilities in thought. And again, this does by no means entail that the orthodox academic textual form has no place; evocative reasons to "go beyond the fetish of the narrative as the ultimate measure of consumer behavior" (Peñaloza and Cayla 2006: 287) might exist, or:

> "In part this reflects a growing dissatisfaction with purely symbolic approaches to understanding material like rituals, which seem curiously robbed of life and power when distanced in discussions concerned largely with meaning. 'Performance' deals with actions more than text: with habits of the body more than structures of symbols, with illocutionary rather than propositional force, with the social construction of reality rather than its representation" (Thrift 2008: 125, quoting Schieffelin 1998: 195)

The moving image, through the production of illusions of social practices in spatiotemporal contexts, can make the emergent settings of consumption more than a textually objectified and reduced narrative. It can also give us a vista not only of human agency, but also of the relational agency of materials and spaces as they intertwine in the performative routines of consumption practices. The exploration of this potential is what this study tentatively calls for; nothing more.

Indeed, text has also many qualities that make it more accessible than videographic expressions. Most importantly, virtually all literate people are very accustomed in using it. This is one of the greatest handicaps of video (especially in academia), as no 'stable' conventions in experiencing it have yet emerged. To make use of, for example, Deleuzian aesthetics of the moving image would probably require a great deal of teaching viewers how to initially orient to the image to further intensify some parts of the experience (without becoming deleteriously over-analytic). Thus, video still becomes easily seen as 'entertainment' alone, even in academic venues (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; Sunderland 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009; see also Cubitt 1993). Text, in its most relational form is still capable to let the mind roam free.

Photography has long enjoyed a relationship alongside the conventional textual academic publishing format. Yet, it has often been made into somewhat of an unwanted sibling – progressive, but not equivalently accepted (e.g. Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). Unlike text, which claims the realm of pure abstraction, many scholars have come to consider the essence of photography as consisting of an indexical relationship to what was photographed or 'captured'. The essence of a photograph thus becomes its very immobility – the way a photo "immobilizes a rapid scene into its decisive instant" (Barthes 1981/1980: 33; see also Leighton 2008; Sutton 2010). Indeed, in comparison to text:

> "Since the Photograph is pure contingency and can be nothing else (it is always something that is represented) – contrary to the text which, by the sudden action of a singular word, can shift the sentence from description to reflection – it immediately yields up those 'details' which constitute the very raw material of ethnological knowledge" (Barthes 1981: 28)

We have already seen how the ontology of the moving image can be constructed as movement itself, a perpetual displacement of time and its conceptualization as a linear flow in a montage that fuses true and false into an impossible but convincing illusion. The ontology of video becomes additive and relational, while photography privileges the instant, its stillness, or as Sutton (2010) notes, "the photograph as creating an 'immobile section', one so different to the modulation created by the cinematic shot as a 'variable, continuous, temporal mould'" (p. 310). As a medium that proliferated coinciding the modernist era, photography became to have a very straightforward correspondence to the real, for "Photography captured once and for all the instant of time. It came as a guarantee of the positivist notion of facts. Photography captured facts" (Cubitt 1993: 45). Equally, Barthes (1981) maintains a realist indexical link to the past that has already happened in photography – a sort of melancholy making photography into "a kind of primitive theater, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a figuration of the motionless and made-up face beneath which we see the dead" (p. 32), and "Whether or not

the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe" (p. 32; see also Benjamin 2007/1968). Photography thus becomes abstracted from life, for "In understanding space, time, identity – life itself – photography is an unnatural apprehension or means of comprehension because it cannot capture or represent the change that life involves" (Sutton 2010: 311). From my perspective, the digital moving image, in all its impossible authenticity and all its potential postmodern banality, is, in a positive contradiction, very much alive – not dead potential, but full of possibility thorough endless opportunities of remediation and 'mashups', remixing and reconfiguration. It does not (only) mourn the dead, but breathes life into them – as fictive media they are all fables.

Scholars of photography note another important distinction between photography and the moving image. As the photograph expresses a decisive instant, it is "no longer 'anything whatever'" (Barthes 1981: 49). As we have seen, this encloses the frame into a state of completeness, a "self-suffiency and superimposed 'competence' – it allows few ways, or only one way in" (Sutton 2010: 311). Unlike a Deleuzian conceptualization of emergent relational moving images; like a painting, the frame becomes the limit of the expression, or:

> "Yet the cinema has a power which at first glance the Photograph does not have: the screen [...] is not a frame but a hideout; the man or woman who emerges from it continues living: a 'blind field' constantly doubles our partial vision [...] confronting millions of photographs [...] I sense no blind field: everything which happens within the frame dies absolutely once this frame is passed beyond. When we define the Photograph as a motionless image, this does not mean only that the figures it represents do not move; it means that they do not emerge, do not leave: they are anesthetized and fastened down, like butterflies" (Barthes 1981: 57)

Yet, if Barthes (1981) would not have come to anchor himself so incessantly to the (quasi) realist position, his analysis might have taken a very different tone. For him, the photograph is as "emanation of past reality: a magic, not an art" (p. 88) that cannot make "us dream" (p. 49). Indeed, at times, he seems to come very close to a different interpretation, as "The Photograph then becomes a bizarre medium, a new form of hallucination: false on the level of perception, true on the level of time: a temporal hallucination, so to speak, a modest, shared hallucination (on the one hand 'it is not there', on the other 'but it had indeed been'): a mad image, chafed by reality" (p. 115). It could be that the affective power of the photograph relies in its melancholy evoking immobility. And as it can powerfully invite the viewer into a contemplation of a potential past that may in some sense constitute a limit of its affective relation. And what matters to me in a digital world is exactly the opposite, for the moving image in its agency is doubly different in its relation. As we have seen, it does not merely invite, it forces itself upon the viewer through embodying experiences, and it can potentially bring about novel relations of thought outside and beyond itself. Not a trip to the past but a

relational movement to possible futures through impossible pasts. It is in no stable way indexical, and indeed, where would I reach for in the sheets of the possible futures and past in vivid montages of the moving image to uncover a correspondence or a verisimilitude of a fixed and linear past reality?

Barthes (1981), again from his more realistic position (maintaining the authentic indexicality of the photograph), portrays the relation between photography and text as the following:

> "It is the misfortune (but also perhaps the voluptuous pleasure) of language not to be able to authenticate itself [...] language is, by nature, fictional; the attempt to render language unfictional requires an enormous apparatus of measurements: we convoke logic, or, lacking that, sworn oath; but the Photograph is indifferent to all intermediaries: it does not invent; it is authentication itself; the (rare) artifices it permits are not probative; they are, on the contrary, trick pictures: the photograph is laborious only when it fakes" (p. 87)

How would Barthes have needed to reconsider his position in the digitalized simulacra of today? By following more contemporary thinkers, we have seen the inherent fictivity of every performance abstracted from its emergent spatiotemporality, to be carried over in a flux of timeshifted media (e.g. Cubitt 1991, 2001). Sutton (2010) constructs a less stationary account, as, for him, "The photograph that appears in our newspapers or subway advertisements is similarly mobile, an image everywhere that more directly becomes an anywhere in the sense that anywhere we look, we see photographs that refuse to stay put" (p. 313). Likewise, with the proliferation of digital photography, it seems they are equally gaining a new epistemic stance. The photographs, lavishly shared on the Internet, may no longer similarly consist of privileged instants long lost, but, rather, occupy a "place in contemporary culture as a 'lifeline'" (Sutton 2010: 316; see also Schwarz 2009).

Text is fictional, but equally so are photographs and the moving image. Yet, the moving image occupies a different ontological plane altogether, its inherent agency ('instancy' [Bolter and Grusin 2000; see also Belk 1998]) and capability to shift from the spatiotemporally defined (realist image) to textures and dreams (nonrealist image). As we have seen, video, as "A technology that had begun by trying to reveal a world too small or too fast for human perception ends up as a medium for inventing things with no ties to reality at all" (Cubitt 2001: 56). Indeed, from the perspective of the philosophical underpinnings utilized in this work, how laborious indeed would the construction of the 'non-fake' moving image be? From which stance could such a notion even find stable footing? While Barthes (1981) called for the indexicality of photography, these notions seem not entirely absent in his work, for "in the cinema, no doubt, there is always a photographic referent, but this referent shifts, it does not make a claim in favour of its reality, it does not protest its former existence" (p. 89).

As we have seen, the moving image is not about reality from an ontological perspective. Videographic expressions related to a 'reality' in any sense become of pure illusion, and as an expressive attempt this illusion constitutes a performative act of storytelling. Thus, academic videography is a constructed 'truth' intertwining the contextual performances of social practices and contextual agency of material arrangements. Every performance, in a sense, is an act of 'representation', but, as we have seen, representation never generates copies, as the same can never return in any 'real' sense – nor can it be unproblematically seen as the agents' purposive goal. Rather, every social practice is a performative (even playful) event generatively constructing new opportunities for new relations through the experience of viewing and acting upon its stories. In consumer research, these stories have been epistemologically focused on frameworks of cognition and meaning-making – the social constructivist position of symbols and some construction of structures they resonate with. In my account of videography, there is nothing *per se* that argues against the potential of constructing a convincing story through the assessment these cognitions. However, limiting research to such postrationalistic and non-material perspectives runs the risk of overlooking the experiential and relational potential of the medium. At worst, it can mean going after one 'truthful representation' of a decontextualized 'talking head' (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006) after another, severing the relational performances from both their social and material context.

Thus, in my account much of this potential can be found in situated perspectives *in* action that focus on social doings within material surroundings (practice theory), without forgetting material agency and how it goes on to emergently influence on a preconscious level (non-representational theory). This notion operates between two Deleuzian poles, as we can both situate the scenes of our videographic storytelling so that they present a convincing story of the emergence of social relations among research participants, and at the same time we can give more opportunities to the material itself to become a participant with its own agency, no more secondary or merely objectified as an outcome of our modernist thought and symbol systems (language), or:

> "As with non-representational theory, all attempt to move away from the distinction between 'individual' and 'society' and all share an emphasis on the ongoing composition of the social from within the 'rough ground' of practices and the concrete richness of life" (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 17)

When we express this emergence on video, we can find further epistemic grounding for what Kozinets and Belk (2006) call the "bright and noisy" (p. 335) of consumption phenomena. While an illusion of a 'reality', CCT videographies can express the emergence of social practices in a potentially

convincing and evocative experience differently from textual or photographic expression, or:

> "But at the very point that the image is replaced by an utterance, the image is given a false appearance, and its most authentically visible characteristic, movement, is taken away from it" (Deleuze 1989: 27)

As a final note, these and similar notions may also share a link to one of the initial questions, or, rather, critical comments, I referred to in one of the early sections of this study (see 1.1). The comment often directed to me when discussing videography with an academic audience, was: 'You can surely manipulate your audience as much as you want in video representation!' The comment assumes more than it reveals, at the very least it posits 1) an objectifiable reality where one and one's doings can be extracted and synchronized from the emergent relations of the world, 2) a reality that can be represented so as to erect an unproblematic verisimilitude to reality, and 3) a 'representation' that can be similarly understood by all viewers/readers. As we have seen, due to my adoption of a postmodern and poststructuralist and even a radical humanist ontology and epistemology, such a comment does not pose serious concerns regarding this work. In line with published work on CCT videography, our research reports (whether video or writing) are thus to be seen more as rhetorical devices where the distinction between science and art cannot be philosophically defended (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; see also Belk 1986, 1998). When we come to accept the impossibility of originary knowledge or a logos, we have instead turned our attention away from fetishizing about better and rigorous methods to more pressing (even though subliminal) matters, such as whether our work convinces and is it evocative? And most importantly, whether it has efficacy – does it, even in tentative ways, bring about new relations or what Bogue (2003) called a "revolutionary consciousness" (p. 169). Likewise, as we have seen, video no longer makes claims about capturing reality, rather, through its "powers of the false" (Deleuze 1989: 126) it is indeed of the opposite – making impossible claims in such convincing ways so as to make the body feel and the mind to surge beyond what was possible. It is a bold illusion – an illusion not to be represented or understood as real/fake or true/false, but as their perpetual and emergent indescernability (Deleuze 1989) when invoking thought to go beyond itself to discover novel relations.

It could be that the aforementioned critical comment also tells a more mundane story. As we saw in the brief historical overview of the CCT approach(es), the modernist ('positivist') inclination to reduce and rationalize reality into a concrete and uniform whole, commonly with great reliance on quantitiative methods, was (and still remains) reluctant to share ground with interpretive frameworks. The underpinnings to such resistance stem from the ideals of logical language (through mathematics) as the enabler of a more

direct correspondence with the physical world, time as linear and objective, thus synchronizable and the mind/body as forever separate and objectifiable (enabler of objective, experience in cognition) (e.g. Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Shankar and Patterson 2001), but such positions have emerged as philosophically indefensible, and thus, the challenge of the interpretative paradigm to these axiomatic notions was perhaps seen as too great a threat. Now, with the interpretive paradigm gaining traction, could we, as videographers, be experiencing something similar – while many have loosened some of their ties to the modernist ideals of science, is the threat of visual expression too great for some who are stubbornly embracing their fixation on words themselves as the bearers of knowledge products as well as the traditional publishing formats? 'So, you think video will go away any time soon?'

To summarize:

- Text is of abstraction and structure; it abstracts any spatiotemporal event into objectifiable (subject-predicate-object) and thus sanitized states. This structure of (Western) language gives us a world controlled and overpowered by man. New (to academia) expressive styles such as poetry test this structure, but text is not mobile, it is without agency of its own – it can only invite

- Photography is of immobility and decisive instants frozen 'out of time' in time. The decisive instant is one of completion; the frame is of completeness and permanence. Photography is about actual pasts bringing about their melancholic ephemerality in the present – it cannot make us dream (or think the unthinkable)

- The moving image is of movement itself, in movement it has agency, in montage it displaces time into a potentially convincing illusion of a real. In its frames it does not reduce a world but expresses a part of the Open (infinity) beyond it. In its agency it engulfs the viewer twice, by kidnapping both the body in the experience of embodiment and the mind by lunging it beyond the frame into the Open of new relations and associations. I argue that it can be particularly advantageous and convincing in an epistemic alliance with a practice theoretical or non-representational ontology

3.3 Videography and the Epistemology of Relation – Implications for Videographic Work in CCT

> "The cinematographic image must have a shock effect on thought, and force thought to think itself as much as thinking the whole. This is the very definition of the sublime" (Gilles Deleuze)

This chapter has focused on constructing a perspective for a potentially useful ontology and epistemology for videographic research in CCT. It has consisted of an account of possible Essence(s) for videographic research. In so doing, I have attempted to bring together conceptual resources for further exploring what videographic expression in CCT could entail. Academic research has conventionally been textual and has often ignored the visual and remained silent, yet the social practices of consumer culture are "bright and noisy [in] a mass-mediated world where rich, colourful, multilayered, sound effects-laden, quick-moving, quick-cutting, audio-visual information is increasingly the norm" (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 335; see also Belk and Kozinets 2005a; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). Kozinets and Belk (2006) also brushed upon the potential differences between different types fo expressive media, when they considered the need to gain credibility for a videography by accompanying it with a textual supplement. As we have seen (see 3.2), text, photography and the moving image can be conceptualized to consist of very different kinds of expressive means. While all can be produced as separate accounts, there is thus no need to resist combining them *ex ante*, especially if a more convincing and evocative story can be produced with these media working in unison.

We have also briefly considered the tumultuous development of the CCT paradigm. Ever since the proliferation of interpretive approaches in consumer research since the late 1970's, scholars of what became known as the CCT field have drawn on pluralistic and nonfoundationalist underpinnings. Thus, their research activities became operationalized not in laboratory settings undergirded in ontological reductionism and objectivity, but rather in the fieldsites themselves. While there are many shades to its nature of knowledge production (e.g. Schwandt 2000) in CCT, this anthropologically guided research stream has generally followed a constructionist ontology and interpretive epistemology (Arnould and Thompson 2005; see also Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Spiggle 1994; Shankar and Patterson 2001; Denzin and Lincoln 2005). As CCT scholars have gradually moved on from the discourse's positivistic underpinnings (e.g. Holt 1991; Denzin 2001a; Shankar and Patterson 2001), and gained prominence in the turbulent postmodern debates of the 'crisis of representation' (e.g. Ruby 2000: 30; see also Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Van Maanen 1995; Brown 1998b; Goulding 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2005), the field has been blessed with many expressive approaches over the years. Now,

a decade after the inception of the videography track (the 'Film Festival') in the ACR Conference (Belk and Kozinets 2010), what could the role of videography be in CCT?

We have discussed that while videographies can stage something like convincing "truth effects" (Shankar and Patterson 2001: 492; see also Deleuze 1989) in their audiovisual illusions of some true presence, as an abstract digital medium there is no philosophically defendable indexical correspondence to any logocentric 'reality' out 'there'. In producing videographies we thus construct yet more perpetual simulations in realities of simulacra, which in postmodern frameworks may have become more real than their inherent 'hyperreal' falsity indeed (e.g. Baudrillard 2006/1981; Cubitt 2001). As we have seen, the camera-eye always assumes expressive perspectives and every unfolding event in its relentless gaze is of perpetual performance, the authenticity of which can not be evaluated in any stable and foundational manner (e.g. Deleuze 1994a; Thrift 2008). Apart from its truth-mimicry, nothing of objective nature can be conceived about this human-machine gaze, and thus videographies become rhetorical devices in no less equal way than other means of academic storytelling (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 2005a; see also Thompson 1990; Holt 1991; Shankar and Pattreson 2001). As we have seen, this is not unlike text or photography, yet the ontological differences between these expressive media can be constructed simultaneously as more subtle and more profound.

Previous research has also considered the 'richness' of the video medium (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; Smith, Fisher and Cole 2007; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). This richness seems to be constitutive of the potential in the medium's agentic qualities that bring about a gripping sense of embodiment in the viewer (see 2.8). Initially, we noted the peculiar personal, even uncomftrable nature of experiencing the moving image (see 2.2.1). From there, if my position as set out in this study is accepted, these experiences (precognitive and cognitive alike) of embodiment surface in emergent relations that the agency of moving image imposes upon the viewer in a reciprocal becoming. Thus, as we have seen, through a Deleuzean reading of the moving image, the ontology of the moving image is of movement itself, its very instancy (e.g. Bolter and Grusin 2000), a moving flux of 'any-space-whatevers' (Deleuze 1986). In considering the moving image, we can therefore no longer speak primarily about any 'decisive instants' (cf. Barthes 1981; see also Sutton 2010), but rather a succession of emerging relations in which the viewer occupies a liminal space – between their own bodies and the 'body' of the moving image (Marks 2000; Barker 2009; Grodal 2009; see also Deleuze 1989).

But these potentially powerful experiences of embodiment require a moving image that is convincing from the perspective of the audience(s). The

emergence of these intensities, affects, mimesis and embodiment require a great deal of consideration into the aesthetic qualities of the moving image, a question not thoroughly addressed in CCT discourse to date. Here Deleuze (1986, 1989) provides many conceptual categories for producing aesthetics that could empathically move both the body and thought of the viewer. This, as we have seen, becomes constructed in the 'powers of the false' (see 2.7), where symbolic expressions of the past fluidly coalesce with possible presents and futures. Thus, the ontology of videographic expression is movement, but what might be called its epistemology is of destabilized time. This flux of nonlinear spatiotemporal orientations in the montage of the moving image, in turn, forces us (the audience[s]) through its agency to go beyond 'representation' (the recognition of an expression) to creatively think of the impossible – to go beyond our possible thoughts (see 2.7.3). But let us not neglect the epistemic possibilities of spatiotemporal 'data' from the perspective of the CCT discourse.

In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation of practice theoretical thought in CCT (e.g. Reckwitz 2002a; Shove and Pantzar 2005; Warde 2005; Halkier and Jensen 2011; Halkier, Katz-Gerro, and Martens 2011), in which the radical idea is to go beyond the ontology of constructivism by breaking down the Cartesian dualism of mind/body and fusing being into an emergent flux of meaning-makings, routines and material arrangements. But how to produce a report of such emergence? I have argued that language (and thus any purely textual account) offers us limited tools for this, as the structure (and thus thought) of Western language gives us an objectified and anthropomorphically overpowered world. The very linguistic logic of the subject-predicate-object makes the world a passive external entity in which we are in totalizing control (see also 2.7.4 and 3.2). But as we have seen in Deleuze and in non-representational theory (e.g. Thrift 2008), materials and spaces have equal (if not more) agency in and of themselves. Perhaps this is suggestive of why we have relatively few empirical publications on practice theory – for as we saw in Deleuze (see 2.4), language has no concepts in its toolkit to express these emergent mental and material relations where the subject is decisively decentered. Following this perspective, we have considered how video as an expressive medium is more of the semiological, than of linguistic expression, for it "has constantly achieved a language of objects" (Deleuze 1989: 28). When sufficient consideration (and technical expertise) is put into aesthetics (e.g. Deleuzian), accompanied with relational expression, we may become able to produce convincing illusions (if only glimpses) of the kind of emergence we are considering here. If such academic stories, mediated in the form of digital simulations of the audiovisual moving image, are to become seen as reflexive and empathic (e.g. see also Ellingson 1998; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; see also Richardson 2000; Brownlie 2006),

relationally convincing (e.g. Holt 1991), surprising (e.g. Thompson 1990), evocative (e.g. Goodall 2000; Sherry and Schouten 2002), and efficacious (e.g. Thrift 2008; see also Murray and Ozanne 1991; Denzin 2001a), we may begin to have some purchase to relatively novel forms of expression in CCT videographic research.

While the postmodern frameworks in CCT research have enabled scholars to utilize more abstract and artistic approaches in their work (e.g. Belk 1986, 1998; Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; see also Bochner and Ellis 2003), it would seem that videographic work is most readily "bound to the realm of 'art'" (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 343). While some may perceive this to deprivilege and delegitimize its scientific credentials (back to 'physics envy' all over again [Tapp 2007]), this consciousness can also be very liberating (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006). In fact, if the ontological and epistemological position advocated in this study is convincing in CCT research, we emerge into something related to what has been labeled 'performative social science', which foregrounds the relational by making "way for a more enlightened conception of science as opportunities for invention, discovery and creative endeavour, using methods which are counterintuitive, unexpected and polyvocal" (Jones 2006: 68; see also Denzin 2001b; Bochner and Ellis 2003; Berbary 2011; Guttenplan 2011). If polyvocality and creativity have been seen as the drivers of CCT research, it would be a misfortune to see CCT turn back on itself to advocate less open-minded and evocative research in exchange for more rigor (that we cannot philosophically defend) via some "cults of criteriology" (Sherry and Schouten 2002: 220), or as Law and Urry (2004) note, "to the extent that social science conceals its performativity from itself it is pretending an innocence it cannot have" (p. 404).

Yet in some sense, the videographies one sees at ACR, seem to still commonly occupy the realm of description – a kind of lingering idea of intertwining settings and events 'captured' and 'reproduced'. What I argue is that there may be expressive reasons for us as video producers to move beyond what the moving image describes to how it comes together to describe us. Indeed, to go for a "revolutionary consciousness" (Bogue 2003: 169), or at the very least for some convincing 'efficacy' (Thrift 2008; see also Thompson 1990; Holt 1991; Denzin 2001a).

3.3.1 Adding to Existing 'Criteria'

As we have already seen, Kozinets and Belk (2006) have devised an accessible '4T' criteria for evaluating videographies in consumer research "to be the starting point of discussions about quality videographic work" (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 342). '4T' consisted of the criteria of 1) topicality (is the topic

interesting and relevant *vis-à-vis* the empirical approach and the 'field site'), 2) theoreticality (how is theory brought to bare and is it presented in a convincing manner), 3) theatricality (is the 'story' interesting and convincing, does it satisfy questions posed) and the 4) technicality (is the production masterful in terms of picture quality, sounds and music to create a convincing mood) (Kozinets and Belk 2006). These criteria provide for an inspiring starting point and due to their unspecific nature leave much room for interpretation and experimentation *in media res*.

In this study I wish to further these criteria by adding considerations from a Deleuzean ontology that focus on emergence and relations. Similarly to Belk and Kozinets (2005a) and Kozinets and Belk (2006) (and in line with poststructural ontology), these suggestions are certainly not intended to cause rigidities for interpretation or pathways to any 'right', 'correct' or 'truthful' 'representations', but rather to inspire and open new avenues of thought for different interpretations, and to thus actualize relations of new series and events expressed via the moving image. My suggestions are the following, coined flippantly as the '3R'. What I suggest is to consider how convincing, insightful, surprising and evocative are the:

R1.	Expression of relations between all the participants (human and nonhuman, people and spatiotemporal settings) of the research as expressed by the videography
R2.	Expression of relations between the aesthetics, visuals and sounds expressed by the montage sequence
R3.	Emergent relations that come about between the videography, its viewers, and how the viewers thus come to become inspired to actualize further relations

The first relation has to do with my explication of a Deleuzean ontology of relations, practice theory and non-representational theory (see 2.9.1 and 2.9.2), as a transcendent flux of ephemeral relations that resonate nonlinearly throughout infinite series (see 2.4.1). Is the internal emergence of relations by people-objects convincing as an expression of becoming realities that reach, in thought, beyond themselves? The second relation has to do with my explication of the philosophy of moving image and time as they are expressed through simulation. Is the videographic expression an aesthetically convincing and artistically evocative simulation of 'reality' that brings about

new creative relations within and beyond the videography? The third relation has to do with my explication of the precognitive and cognitive embodiment when experiencing a video. What is the video's efficacy in creating events and new series between itself, its viewers and beyond?

While there will surely be no 'right' way to construct expressions of such relations, videographic researchers can draw on Deleuze's (1986, 1989) typologies of the movement-image and time-image. This means a further recognition of the fictive nature of all expression, and perhaps thus allows CCT video makers to become bolder in their efforts of constructing informative and inspiring social performances on video, as well as the wider acceptance of more abstract and artistic aesthetics such as metaphoric moving image and moving image that has been removed from its spatiotemporal coordinates, or as Cubitt (1993) has noted:

> "The material aesthetics of electronic media lead us away from the prison of representation – the enounced, and the subject of the enounced – and into the realm of relations between enounciations, and the subjects of enounciations: what cultural studies isolates at the moment of reception" (p. 203)

As we have discussed, this could mean an increased openness to utilize evocative cinematographic aesthetics in the work of CCT video makers to finally move beyond merely displaying one 'talking head' after another. This can be done by taking the fictive potential seriously and attempting to construct aesthetically convincing and evocative stories while eschewing some lingering routines that may still draw us to produce some sort of 'representation' that would 'faithfully correspond' to an external 'reality'. An interview needs not be an 'interrogation', but could be a much more relational setting where a phenomena is constituted and produced *in situ*, not merely an 'external' and 'objectified' account of it. This becomes possible especially in projects that have an autoethnographic member taking an active part in all data collection settings. S/he is not the one who 'records', but one who participates and thus constitutes (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.3).

In addition, relational expression can be attempted by, for example, producing scenes of 'purely optical and sound situations', and 'haptic visuality' (see 2.7.3 and 2.8.2), to accompany the more commonplace action-image (see 2.6.3) that has a sole mode of expression in more realist orientations of videography work. Thus, there is an eternally extending relation between the shots of the video through montage, and an equally infinite set of relations between the medium, its producers and its viewers (montage has occurred far before and thus beyond the video medium – it is not locked in 'representation', just as like there is no quantitative scale of affect and intensities of relation). Thus:

> "We may, then, consider the story as the development of two kinds of images, objective and subjective, their close relation which can go as far as antagonism, but which ought to find resolution in an identity of the type Ego=Ego; identity if the character seen and who sees, but equally well identity of the camera/film-maker who sees the character and what the character sees." (Deleuze 1989: 148)

This relation can be extended so as to take into account the potential of novel relations between and beyond the audience(s) of the videography. From a Deleuzian 'poststructural' perspective, the goal becomes one of potential forces, new relations, new possibilities for creative thought in life.

Such videographies can thus become constructed as 'crystals' rather than as 'mirrors' that can be considered as a closed system of internal relations in the perpetual process of breaking beyond the screen (frame) to potentially bring about new relations through endless resonances (Deleuze 1989). This emergence could be crudely illustrated as follows:



Image 2 – Emergence of relations in producing videographic research

The entire research process can thus become more sensitized to take into account the hermeneutic spiraling between all participants without excluding the agency of spatiotemporal (nonhuman) arrangements, the creative work of expression on video media and its efficacy to produce a 'revolutionary consciousness' through embodiment and thought.

Videography note (17):

In our PTS videography, while relying (perhaps too extensively) on interviews, we put in great efforts to express the relationality of such situations by foregrounding the notion of conversation with our autoethnographic team member Desto (left in both images). Thus we attempted to express the production of emerging relations in the interviews – not as accounts of the cultural phenomenon, but exactly the opposite – as culture 'being produced' and constituting the *in situ* spaces and times in an emergent flux.

3.4 Final (In)Complete Contemplations

> "Video is a medium only in the sense that it mediates between: people, fundamentally. But to begin with what we actually have before us: video mediates between senses, between media and, at even a more profound level, between technologies [...] This is not a quest in the classical sense: there is no definite end in sight. It is not teleological, guided by a historical goal, but eschatological, governed by the principle of hope" (Sean Cubitt)

Before we enter the chapter on Production, a more practically-oriented workbench reading of the actual practices of the work of producing videographies in CCT, I would like to offer some further concluding thoughts regarding our epistemic journey so far. In particular, some personal perspectives on the current state of videographic research and some speculations about its possible futures warrant further speculation here. As a new and even controversial medium in consumer research, videographic production and expression is certainly still in the very marginal – and thus a potentially very risky undertaking for an aspiring young scholar. Indeed, only the in recent years, the ACR 'Film Festival' has witnessed a considerable increase in submissions by Ph.D. students, perhaps still often instructed to play a 'safer game' in terms of publishing to attempt for a more obvious and straightforward career path towards attaining the security of tenure positions. And indeed, why would anyone even consider videographic expression, which can be seen as "such a perilous career path" (MacDougall 2001: 15) in academia?

As noted by scholars in the few extant methodological CCT videography publications, videography is still a relatively technically demanding methodology (at least contra writing text), has no established, citable, respectable or stable academic publication outlet, and it is often seen to be overtly concentrated in the realm of entertainment and art only (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006) – even seen "as a welcome break from attending the 'more serious' paper presentations" (De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009: 80; see also Sunderland 2006) at the ACR Conference. And, as we have seen, even as more unconventional (even artistic) expressions of research activities have become increasingly recognized in CCT (e.g. Denzin 2001b; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Ellis and Bochner 2003; see also Belk 1986, 1998), videography has yet to make its mark of significance in becoming properly recognized outside the relatively small group of academic video enthusiasts. What I wish to briefly consider here is the potential for videographic research to overcome these challenges by turning them into their opposites by bravely using its internal (and inherent) potential to novel types of research practices and expressive strategies. If creative work and artistic expression continue to gain further clout in academic auspices, it can become an advantage of the video medium to have several of such considerations inbuilt in its practices in CCT research.

Video is still, especially in academic contexts, an up-and-coming alternative for conducting and expressing research. Due to this novelty, the champions of videographic research are in an interesting position, which makes the potential methodological rigidity of video expression rise, not from path-dependencies of the current practice, but, rather from a common tendency to mimic the formats and expressive styles of textual publications. If the open potential for experimentation is not curtailed into such tempting rigidities, we can construct an opposite stance for the creative outlooks in video research. Indeed, as long as theoretical and practical relevance of the productions brings about efficacious relations (all accolades and criticism included) in our sociohistorically contingent academic discourses, the possibility for this creativity may exactly amount to the *tours de force* that could further the epistemic debate about the dichotomy between 'science' and 'art'. The 'present company' of some headstrong acolytes of orthodox expression notwithstanding, video work as a novel medium seems to invoke much contemporary interest. Even when conversing with many conventionally inclined scholars, the reaction is often one of curiosity, and thus brings about new relations through debate. In addition, the proliferation of video for expressing research findings does seem to resonate with many as an unavoidable (if not anticipated) future direction of consumer research. Finally, in line with Kozinets and Belk (2006), videographic research, with its inherent openness to artistic aesthetics comes with a promise of being extremely liberating, and this type of challenge was exactly what I, as a nascent ethnographer, was waiting for (see also Belk 1998).

From a more pessimistic perspective, Bell (2009) provided some novel considerations for creative research activities. She argued that while academic work has often been considered as a bastion for creativity, innovativeness and criticality, many such efforts become actually a:

> "derivative due to their preoccupation with competitive [academic] practice; compromised due to unbounded demands of teaching and conventional research (now add community engagements and consultancy); technically underdeveloped due to the lack of time and space to refine the realization of creative concepts; highly theorized and therefore less accessible to an audience; and conservative due to high levels of accountability and uniformity demanded by the contemporary university" (p. 252-253)

Recalling personal conversations with Robert Kozinets and Marylouise Caldwell in the context of my position as an assistant at Aalto University, which is at present undergoing an all-encompassing transformation into a primarily Anglo-Saxon type 'tenure track' system, I can but agree with Bell's position. Yet, perhaps this pessimism can have a flipside as well, one that can be seen illustrated in my completed videographic projects, for even with all the substantial changes in the logic of academic work and career options ongoing around me in Aalto University, I have mostly received only encouragement for my pursuits. This together with generous resources to

travel extensively for both conferences and in order to conduct empirical work, as well as to purchase video production and editing equipment which, to my knowledge, constitute one of the technically most advanced 'laboratory facilities' in interpretive consumer research. Why has this been the case for my work?

Videographic research at the Department of Marketing at Aalto University, even as it started as somewhat of a whim, seems to have become increasingly seen as a fruitful approach on three accounts. First, with the rise of spatiotemporal considerations in CCT (e.g. practice theory; see also Joy and Sherry 2003), it has come to be seen as a novel medium that can be potentially very useful with its largely nonlinguistic mode of expression. As I have discussed, video can elicit spatiotemporal relations differently from text, which due to its very structure objectifies contexts and foregrounds the cognitive 'I'. Second, it seems to have become widely accepted that video and other novel visual research methods (as I have already argued) are 'not going away', but are rather seen as media of the future, the potential of which we are only beginning to envisage. To have videography in one's methodological toolkit now, when it is in its academic infancy in CCT, gives one something of a head start in terms of the potential oncoming pluralization of our methodological approaches towards including the visual and the auditory. Third, there seems to be something very compelling about the possibilities the medium holds in popularizing academic research and the way it can potentially challenge the rigid and incumbent journal structures that are increasingly seen not as providers but the gatekeepers of information (see also Guttenplan 2011). Video as a fluid and perennially changing medium can resist these tendencies for its:

> "strength is its ability to cut across the interstices, to play upon the contradictions, of the regimes of looking and hearing that structure the dominant audio-visual world. Its very weakness, its indefiniteness, becomes its field of possibility: the necessity of pluriform tactics, since no structure of power presents it with a strategy. Video is strong because it evades, is larger than, exceeds, avoids, slips by and away from, cannot be accounted for in the discourses (including this one) about it" (Cubitt 1991: 185)

And to 'cut across' some conventional interstices, our resolute position has been to put, without restriction, all our work online via video service providers. While this has been something of work of tempered anarchy, we immediately discovered that the videographic medium seems particularly potent in popularizing academic research. As stated earlier, our statistics bear witness to this: a total of almost 2,000 views for our first BIP project and a whopping 4,000+ views for our PTS project in only three months. These statistics have been complemented by lively discussions on various online forums (see Appendix 1) – and these views have amassed for quite theoretical (even tedious or outright 'boring') videographies, and certainly not from an academic audience alone – seemingly the opposite. Indeed: "How perfect

would it be if research reports made it to the top of the viral list? Wouldn't it be perfect if they were sent around" (Sunderland 2006: 378).

It seems that videography, in its illusions of spatiotemporal proximity and its potential to fracture the palisade of technical academic textual expression, seems particularly suited for this work of popularization (see also Belk 1998). However, as I have attempted to cover in this study, it surely must be done in a fashion that can raise the interest of both academicians and the general public alike. We need to continue to evaluate our craft, and to never be content in just 'pointing and shooting'.

Apart from extra-academia potential, equal, if not elevated, possibilities to publish research in more conventional textually-based A-tier journals by utilizing the videographic 'data' as the primary empirical material underpinning the research might exist. Indeed, why should this *in situ* data not be considered even more 'reliable' (contra fieldnotes) and accessible (if a need arises to require parts of the empirical material for the review process) for a more conventionally oriented editor or reviewer? While not more 'realistic' in any philosophical sense, videographic illusions of presence hold the possibility for better after-the-fact assessment of how convincing the methodological work has been. For example: was the researcher present? How closely was s/he in proximity to the practices of consumption? Was the researcher's access considerable? Could empathic understanding and in-depth knowledge of the cultural context be assessed from the interview settings and interactions? Such accounts seem very difficult to assess from fieldnotes scribbled *in situ* or even from copious amounts of photographs accompanying them. Similarly, the need for a heterogeneous research team (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.3) to enable access to consumption phenomena facilitates multiple points of view and contributes to amounts of discussion regarding what occurred during the course of fieldwork. Thus, for us, video has potentially a greater empirical and epistemic range as compared to a more conventional scientific article. It helps to intensify academic debates and attain broader audiences. It thus becomes a means of entering academic debates – not only a means to 'represent' them.

In addition, I have been granted the liberty to extend the ethos and practice of videography beyond researchers already pursuing academic careers: at Aalto University's Department of Marketing we now boast a Master's Thesis group for students to conduct CCT research on video, and then to produce a textual companion to their audiovisual production. The first graduates of this pioneering Master's Thesis group have received considerable attention from both within the academia and the broader media alike. Here the potential entertainment and artistic factors can work for us in the most direct sense. Compared to academic textual articles that are often conceptually inaccessible to broader audiences, video seems to be more readily accepted.

What is quite probable, however, is that traditional journal channels will not actualize this potential due to their path-dependency in text publication formats, and a contemporary over-emphasis in controlling information. Video, by its very nature, will wholeheartedly resist this (e.g. Cubitt 1991, 1993). The whole nature of academia-publics relationship may need to be reconsidered, if videographic work is to make good of its potential to reach and create new efficacious relations with broader audiences.

In addition, people in managerial roles are opening their eyes to nontraditional ways of expressing consumer experience and consumer culture (Catterall, Maclaran and Stevens 2002; Arnould and Thompson 2005). Video can be, and seems to have increasingly become, utilized for managerial purposes (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Martin, Schouten and McAlexander 2006; Sunderland 2006; see also Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007a; Borghini, Carú and Cova 2010), and the same applies regarding my own experiences of conducting a number of corporate videography projects and videographic Master's Thesis seminars at which three videographic research projects following CCT frameworks were conducted in a close relationship with company managers. In fact, a relatively large dairy company, Valio (www.valio.com) hired one of my Master's Thesis group students as the company's official videographer. His work on consumer research and interorganizational communications has since been used for both to spark and to disseminate new ideas on many managerial levels.

Another potential problematic regarding the video medium becoming a more established mode of expression in respectable academic auspices remains, and has to do with the very nature (ontology) of the medium explored in this study. What I mean by this is that the conventional academic game seems rigged against video medium if one is to take its creative potential seriously. This is the grounding of a methodological form in its conventional sense. Indeed, what could potentially skewer this creative potential is the threat emanating from attempts to establish new criteria for 'rigor' of evaluation – often the very bedrock, the stone of ages, of academic respectability itself. Thus, how can videographic expression gain respectability without falling into another vicious centripetal vortex where "cults of criteriology" (Sherry and Schouten 2002: 220) emerge to call the shots?

But while we now have some preliminary ideas regarding videographic research that support evocative, empathic and potentially artistic approaches, many political hegemonies that distribute video seem not similarly inclined. What we seem to see is in fact the opposite, endless sameness. As Cubitt (1991), in considering televised media, puts it, "Broadcasting homogenizes, and through its imaginary community proposes an absolution by producing a series of perpetual Others in order to produce a register of the Same [...] The

refusal to be the Same, and the insistence on (decentred) individuality from the second necessary condition of democratic media" (p. 171). As I have argued, the medium's potential can be seen as exactly the opposite, the freedom of creativity, artistic and aesthetic potential, the expression of new relations, expression of emergence, and the expression of culture in its evolving production. It is not about form, but about evocative, empathic and thus efficacious and surprising substance that could make us think previously unthinkable relations. Videographies thus emerge as:

> "A selective, interpretative gaze back at historical texts, reviewing them on video, is not only a process of revision but also a dialectical method of montage. I want to place different films and videos against one another, not as instances of historical teleology, but as historical interruptions" (Russell 1999: xii)

Thus, an overt focus on criteria for 'good' videographies can counterproductively tame, sanitize and thrust toward a banal average. Similar worries could be argued for if future CCT videographies do not acquire the ability to break through their too often merely descriptive attempts at expression. Here I see parallels with how many authors, pointing out, via unconcealed rhetoric, how the forces of commoditization go for "the standardization of diversity" (Cubitt 2001: 130), "in the service of corporate capital: to remodel the future as the clone of the present" (ibid.: 135). In my darkest hours, I see academia as a potentially similar homogenizing and institutionalizing force. This can surely be seen as something of the opposite position, as compared to the playful creativity advocated by Deleuze (1989). In his view, cinema that does not force the viewer to think the unthinkable, "limits itself to a dream state induced in the viewer [...] to an imaginary participation" (p. 168), where the dream is of static passivity not extending to taking full advantage of its potential. This goes "from the image to thought there is shock or vibration, which must give rise to thought in thought; from thought to the image, there is a figure which must be realized in a kind of inner monologue (rather than in a dream), capable of giving us the shock again" (p. 166). While comprehensively metaphysical, it may be this very magical spark of artistic creativity that may allow academic videography its evocative and efficacious potential – the potential to bring about new thinking and relations, or:

> "Their most powerful agent is the film. Its social significance, particularly in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage" (Benjamin 2007/1968: 221)

As for the future of video in CCT, I seem to have implicitly positioned my doctoral work between the 6th and 7th movements of CCT research (e.g. Denzin 2001a). The movements that came before these questioned the 'positivist' logic of consumer research and emphasized a pluralistic philosophical underpinning for research. The 6th movement was about

representational pluralism (e.g. Sherry and Schouten 2002), and the 7th was about critical theory that emphasizes consumer emancipation (e.g. Denzin 2001a; Murray and Ozanne 1991; see also Denzin and Lincoln 2005). In line with postmodern underpinnings (no logos), the critical theory approaches are gradually becoming incorporated in CCT (and have come more developed in organization theory [e.g. Gherardi 2000; Fenwick 2004]). The realization that there can never be objectivity or neutrality of research activities has made it clear that all research is an exercise in the interest of (some) political power. While the days of naïve realism in CCT may be slowly drawing to a close (proposed by Denzin already in 2001a), we must also consider the possibilities and potential pitfalls of critical theory. In contrast to orthodox research approaches, critical theory highlights conflict rather than establishes order, and asks not whether one is apolitical (for this cannot be), but what is the political stance one assumes, as 'facts' cannot be separated from values (Murray and Ozanne 1991, Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Denzin 2001a).

Critical theory, the descendant of the Frankfurt School, is axiologically emancipatory at its core (Murray and Ozanne 1991; Denzin 2001a; see also Hammond 2001; Horkheimer and Adorno 2002/1987). Thus, critical researchers focus on reconsidering and changing the structures in which human activity occurs, from the perspective of liberating the oppressed (Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Brownlie 2006). While critical theory will surely have much to contribute to videographic research in CCT (see our PMW videography for evaluative purposes) – and I am, in fact, involved in three such nascent videographic projects – its broad explication here is beyond the scope of this study, as critical theory can be seen to partially resist a Deleuzean ontology. The axiological focus on emancipation of critical theory can run the risk of building something like a new logos, which a Deleuzean ontology resists. In my reading of Deleuze, emancipation has less to do with a political perspective, and Deleuze seems often content simply exploring the liberation of the creative potential of the human mind. However, Thrift's (2008) non-representational theory brings in more of the political, in terms of how human action is subjugated/liberated via technologies and spaces. The question, for now, must thus remain open. What kind of emancipation can offer novel 'truths', 'righteousness' or 'justice', as we know that truth is equally contextual, paradigmatic and politically usable to whichever ends deemed necessary? Thus, no radical thinking is pure, as it, in a very Deleuzean vein, operates as emerging relations towards the poles of both conservativism and revolution (Williams 2008: 61). When a radical movement draws away from its opposite conservativism, it simultaneously

draws closer to the establishment of its own set of structured and stabilized thinking, or:

> "Deleuze's moral philosophy is therefore not of resistance, of mediation or conservation – however pragmatically we allow these to bend and vary. It is a moral philosophy of creativity in relation to events" (Williams 2008: 136)

For the purposes of this study, my Deleuzean interpretation leaves the question of political orientation for the future, as it cannot rest on the destabilization of being and language to merely initiate another center – however diachronic and emergent it may be. Thus, while videographic projects in CCT can certainly adopt perspectives from critical theory, this study opens doors for reflexive research from any political position. The point to be emphasized, is simply that one should not do research naively, but with an acute awareness of the underpinnings of the political system it touches base with, and with a reflexive orientation and transparency in reporting that enables the creative mind to run free as it encounters impossible worlds in the moving image (whether the approach is critical[emancipatory], managerial[capitalist] or something that wishes to break down this dualism). Such work of criticality, which is keenly aware of its own act of constituting the system it is part of, is an ongoing project of non-representational theorists (e.g. Thrift 2008; see also Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe 2002; Kirsch and Mitchell 2004). For our present purposes, let me conclude by raising the following question: While we can make managerially oriented consumer research, should we not also ask what its purpose is, and especially, why such orientation is often assumed to be our given axiological position as consumer researchers? Indeed:

> "In fact a range of 'ethnographic' approaches, linked by little more than labels, has prompted me to think in terms of the good, the bad, and the ugly in qualitative research. We have traditional ethnography, the long term labor intensive field immersion favored by academic researchers. We have 'adnography' a kind of rip-and-run hot-button solution to the need of managers for intimate yet efficient contact with contextually embedded consumers. Finally, we have 'blitzkrieg ethnography,' which combines some of the best and worst features of the other variants. Blitzkrieg ethnography provides just enough field exposure to tantalize and to aid hypothesizing, but not enough for comprehensive understanding" (Sherry 1987: 371)

In order to make videographic expression more recognized we must be wary of the institutions and organizations that act both as (both academic and private) gatekeepers and funders of these expressive efforts. But, as we have seen in this study, the promise of academic work on video may occupy a greatly broader sphere of evocative and efficacious potential for philosophical and aesthetic expression. This expression may firmly need to resist the seirenic calls for quick-and-dirty approaches, going after the 'fast buck', and to resolutely continue the historical legacy of in-depth ethnography (e.g. Sunderland 2006), in order to become evermore convincing as both an academic and a managerial medium alike. Yet, it must be noticed that:

"Capitalism homogenizes", and "while we run the [capitalist] machine, it also runs us [...] we simulate choice, while the system simulates its absence" (Cubitt 2001: 140-141). Could we come up with something that is beyond such pessimistic perspectives?

Thus, here is where we come to refer to a somewhat of a pragmatist approach regarding our position as ethnographic videographers in the academic world – do as you will, but do reflexively appreciate the political nature of every video expression. The true success to be potentially found in our ability, in line with Denzin (2001a; see also Richardson 2000), is to invoke what Bogue (2003) referred to as the "revolutionary consciousness" (p. 169), or what Deleuze termed "action-thought" (Deleuze 1989: 163). These new relations that Deleuze discussed call for action, for "This is no longer organic and pathetic but dramatic, pragmatic, praxis, or action-thought. This action-thought indicates the relation between man and the world" (ibid.: 161). Video offers a readily hermeneutic technological relation between people and the world, but as a digital medium, also offers a relationship between technologies – a relationship between relationships (Cubitt 1993).

As we have seen, we are no longer purely constructivist or poststructuralist, but rather have become a bricolage of these philosophical resources, set in emergent videographic motion by a Deleuzian 'superior empiricism' and the 'radical humanism' of non-representational theory. In our research activities, we construct academic stories, but via the largely nonlinguistic and embodied experience encountered in videographic form, we can express relational becoming in cultural contexts where the 'richness' of expression is the constitutive and intertwined emergence of the meaning-makings and ritualistic performances of the cultural agents (human), the agency of material surroundings, the researchers, and the relations the machinic videography brings about from *in situ* contexts via the editing table, and its subsequent encounter with audience(s) in profuse and simultaneously ephemeral digital universality. Regarding this work, the ontology of the moving image in CCT has become a movement itself, its epistemology has become its false time, perpetual difference. But, importantly, its additional epistemic purpose in CCT research can now be seen to consist of relation and reflexive efficacy. We have entered a new tentative space; one of open possibility. Let us thus further explore these relations, while damning the deadening tentacles of cynicism beneath an emerging island, where one further relation becomes firmly erected – a nascent relation to hope. May your videos be resonant, evocative and glorious!

"What remains? There remain bodies, which are forces, nothing but forces. But force no longer refers to a centre, any more than it confronts a setting or obstacles. It only confronts other forces, it refers to other forces, that it affects or that affect it. Power (what Nietzsche calls 'will to power' and Welles, 'character') is this power to affect and be affected, this relation between one force and others" (Deleuze 1989: 139)

IV An Account of Production

4.1 Linkages to Essence(s)

> "If one had to define the whole, it would be defined by Relation. Relation is not a property of objects, it is always external to its terms [...] Relations do not belong to objects, but to the whole, on condition that this is not confused with a closed set of objects" (Gilles Deleuze)

In the preceding chapter, I have attempted to construct a tentative Deleuzian ontology and epistemology for videographic research in CCT. I would like to offer a warm welcome to alternative takes on these matters. Let us now move to a more practical account of our experiences in the praxis of doing videographic research. Here, drawing on our activities in the field and by the editing table, I will provide a list of observations and notes that briefly describe how we approached the production of our published videographic expressions. It has certainly been an exercise in 'learning-by-doing' an in no means in any way 'complete', indeed quite the opposite.

Thus, after exploring the possibilities for a more philosophically detailed underpinning for videographic research, I will offer some ruminations on the actual practice of conducting and expressing videographic research in the CCT tradition. To do so, we can revisit the relational framework of the various levels of videographic production presented in 3.3.1. These levels are the relations between the social phenomena under inquiry (social practices and spatiotemporal settings), the research group and the technologies that mediate it and the audience(s) that thus come to encounter it.



Image 3 – Emergence of relations in producing videographic research

4.1.1 Focusing on the Relational Contexts (*in situ*)

> "We challenge the claim that the author(s) should/could only have minimal impact during the filming. And we wish to extend this view beyond filming, so as to take into account the editing process. Throughout the editing process, we refused to give the impression that we stood above the debates, as omniscient narrators." (Jean-Sébastien Marcoux and Renaud Legoux)

When shooting footage, we produce frames. In many discourses on the visual, frames have been construed as closed systems of analysis (in cinema theory, photography or visual anthropology). Yet, following a Deleuzian view, the frame always relationally extends to the indefinite via its encounter with a mind – the potential for creative thought. In the first place, the frame extends into the out-of-field, which "refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present" (Deleuze 1986: 16). These can include sounds or external activity that, while beyond the immediate visual, have an affect to the frame. Cultural phenomena emerge in spatiotemporal contexts that constitute the emergence – the out-of-field is constitutive space (see 2.5.1). Thus, to the best of our ability, and while it has sometimes been demanding, we have come to conduct all our videographic data production *in situ*, as, for us, it is not the false closed system of the frame that depicts a social event of consumption, but the infinitely extending spatiotemporal relations between the agents of consumption, the presence of our videographic team and the temporal (hermeneutic) relations that thus emerge.

Furthermore, following Deleuze, it is through the conceptualization of relation that the moving image extends to and beyond the audiences experiencing it – all relational events extend to all future events through indefinite series (see 2.4.1). Thus, the relation is an open system of cultural change at a comprehensive scale, not a mere closed system of images to be explained and interpreted (e.g. as texts). Indeed, there are larger questions to

address. “The whole is therefore like thread which traverses sets and gives each one the possibility, which is necessarily realized, of communication with another, to infinity” (Deleuze 1986: 17). This we can exemplify through our PTS project, in which we make attempts to express the translocal emergence of social practices through which authenticity is perennially negotiated. Thus any frame we construct *in situ* presupposes an out-of-field, with its multiple ‘threads’ each in the process of constituting qualitative change in the open system of the particular cultural phenomena in question. The translocality of parallel social practices is necessarily open, and the (quasi-spurious choices of) frames are intended to thus reveal the impossibility of realist accounts (which would need to entail *a* system). We can only produce short snippet-like illusory expressions of the whole that we are always a constitutive force of (see also Denzin 1995). There are no external vantage points to any system, only the whole system’s becoming.

We wished to highlight this illusion by additionally utilizing a multitude of shots that explicitly show the presence of the camera in all its obtrusiveness – in all its performance-inducing capacity (see 2.4.4 and 2.9.2). What we shoot is not the Real, but a spatiotemporal event in becoming, another performance in the making.

Thus, for us, the spatiotemporal contexts become the sites of relation. These relations are those that we wish to construct ethnographic stories about. These become the very acts of production of cultural phenomena, rather than its abstraction, externalization and objectification (which happens expressively when participants are interviewed in non-relevant locales, thus producing only postrationalized perspectives *of* action, not relationally constituting the very cultural phenomenon itself). Therefore, in PTS, we produced *in situ* scenes, where our research team’s autoethnographic member took an active part to turn the interviews more like conversations, for “conversation is undoubtedly inseparable from structures, places and functions, from interests and motives, from actions and reactions which are external to it” (Deleuze 1989: 230). Such active partaking mediated the emergent negotiation of cultural phenomena, rather than constructing them into mere extractions produced by ‘interrogations’ with ‘talking heads’ reduced to ‘subjects’. The scenes thus become illusions of emerging relations in (at least tentatively) a practice theoretical (see 2.9.1) and non-representational (see 2.9.2) sense. The contexts are the sites of material arrangements and fetishes (see 2.6.1 and 2.8.2) – of unfolding performative events of thought and creative negotiation.

4.1.2 What about the Camera's Presence and 'Truth-manipulation'

> "We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are part" (Gilles Deleuze)

It is important to note that doing videographic research is, in its obtrusiveness, very different than traditional field note writing (e.g. when shoving a camera into someone's face it would be advisable that s/he thinks it is a 'good idea'). Thus, many scholars have commented on these inherent problematics of camera presence in naturalistic settings, with the early visual anthropologists even attempting more systematic and representative "non-interventionalist approach, leaving the camera to film continuously to produce 'objective materials'" (De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009: 91; Belk and Kozinets 2005a). This invokes a positivist notion of an untarnished and 'purely' objective possibility of capturing reality.

Yet, as we have seen, the threat of the camera significantly changing the setting is not a key concern from a contemporary poststructural and radical humanist viewpoint. As we have already seen via Deleuze (1989/1985) and Thrift (2008), there can be no 'accurate' way for anyone to act in a philosophical sense, as everything that we do is 'performative'. All relations, including the research participants and the equipment alike, are in any event constitutive forces of its emergence, and thus we can do no work of externalization (which would indeed move us toward a more 'positivist' underpinning), or making the recorded event 'more natural'. It is our role, as videographic storytellers, to edit the videography in a manner that ethically corresponds to our best idea of an interpretation – as there can be no 'truthful' one. Marcoux and Legoux (2005) further emphasized the importance of the *in situ* recording, as they found it constructs a 'context effect' that invokes a sense of *vox populi* communication. From the perspective of a Deleuzean ontology, this 'context effect' could be interpreted as the spatiotemporally unfolding relations between people-objects – an intertwined emergence of thought and material arrangements. Indeed, for Deleuze, the 'camera eye' should be, though the perspectives it 'chooses', seen as an active participant, the machinic and agentic "third eye, replacing the eye of nature" (Deleuze 1989: 265), as through the work of close-ups and the nonlinearity of time produced by the montage-cut, it can potentially produce impossible thought (see 2.7.3), affect (see 2.6.2) and embodiment (see 2.8.2). The perspective is never neutral, never a "non-intrusive fly on the wall" (Belk and Kozinets 2005a: 134), and thus, we as videographers, need to use it to our advantage – to fill it with expressions.

For Deleuze (1986), even the early visual anthropologists were, at least implicitly, aware of the impossibility to 'capture reality'. Yet, this inherent

fictitiousness became undermined by the illusion of the 'camera eye' as an objective observer; overthrown with the false conception of the real as the polar opposite of fiction (Deleuze 1986). Likewise, "everybody has always known that the camera has an active effect on situations, and that characters react to the presence of the camera, and it hardly troubled Flaherty or Leacock, who already saw only false problems in it" (Deleuze 1989: 151). This, especially in our most recent PTS videography, is why we attempted to produce illusions of how cultural phenomena become constituted in a flux of emergent performances, so as to create honest accounts of hermeneutical becoming in togetherness, not "illusions of absence" (Marcoux and Legoux 2005: 254). Thus, we made an effort to express the emergent artificiality of every camera perspective and the performative nature of every cultural context, by making the presence of the 'camera eye' explicit (see also Videography Note 5 in 2.6.1). As an ethnographic participant, the camera is not an externality to be hidden, as it is necessarily a part of, or participant in, the videographic research team. Indeed, "Not only do bodies bang into each other, but the camera bangs against the bodies" (Deleuze 1989: 193-194) (see Videography Note 5 in 2.6.1). Additionally, in line with Marcoux and Legoux (2005), all these elements are composites of an ethnographic togetherness: the research team, the 'camera-eye', the *in situ* material contexts and the conversational interviews. These become active and constituent participants in the cultural phenomenon we are researching – no less than how the participants embedded in the cultural phenomenon become to constitute us.

From a more practical perspective, Belk and Kozinets (2005a) and Kozinets and Belk (2006), note that the presence of the camera in the research setting can become daunting, as it "can definitely interfere with the conduct of interviews" (2006: 342). Certainly, the problem of participants 'freezing' in front of the camera can be a problem. As stated above, we have attempted to remedy this issue by carefully planning the composition of our research teams. All our projects have included an autoethnographic member, who has been very influential in the particular cultural context, and thus able to set up interviews, and provide access to contexts that would have forever remained beyond the reach of 'outsiders'. Importantly, they were not included to the team as a 'key informants', but as active authors, who just happened to be mostly involved in the production of background understandings for the other members of the research team and in securing field access.

The possibility of spurious manipulation of the videographic data, at the outset, seems like a very serious problem (also seen in the 'critical comments' described in the introductory chapter, see 1.1). However, this concern becomes less threatening from a poststructuralist and radical humanist perspective, and even from a more practical viewpoint, when one recognizes the nature of video media contra textual expression. When taking a

poststructuralist position, the veracity of the material does not assume paramount importance – convincing and evocative storytelling does (see e.g. 2.3.3, 2.5.1, 2.6.5 and 2.7.2). Thus the possibility of intentional manipulation, or of the "sweetening, titling, scoring, and other enhancing that goes on in the editing process is capable of telling many 'truths'. Even the cuts, dissolves, and bits of music that are usually added to a video can do much to determine its emotional impact on the viewer" (Belk and Kozinets 2005: 133), is no longer an alarming concern, for every camera angle and cut necessarily tells its own story – as does the use of every metaphor and metonymy in textual expression. Further, to 'completely fake it', so as to produce videographic data from nothing is surely a very difficult (if not impossible with contemporary technology) undertaking. However, when crafting academic reports utilizing textual expression, could one not write whatever one chooses? Even if audiotapes of the interviews can be requested by journal reviewers, what makes, for example, fieldnote scribblings convincing when written during situational participant observation? Certainly, it is possible to reconstruct video data to emphasize a particular perspective (and necessarily so), but why is this a concern for video in particular? At least, regarding the video data, a reviewer can request the original footage files. From such 'raw' recordings any work of deliberate mischief in terms of 'cutting and combining' should be fairly easy to detect.

Finally, a brief word on ethics and the intrusiveness of the 'camera eye'. Due to its inherent audiovisual nature, it is not so straightforward to conceal the identity of a participant in the video media (although this can certainly be done as well – in PTS, the last participatory conversation with 'Seckle' does not reveal his appearance in accordance with his request). In our projects, we have incorporated the use of Internet-based video services when conducting videographic research in international settings. Before the interviews, we have told all key participants that before any finalized version will be made available to public, they will be able to view and comment it online – where it would be set up behind a password on the Vimeo service. To date, apart from the aforementioned 'Seckle', no comments requesting changes or the exclusion of any material have been received.

4.1.3 On Autoethnography and Research Team Interaction

> "[Rouch] took cameras into Paris streets for impromptu encounters in which the filmmaking process was often a part of the film, with filmmakers and equipment in the frame. Those filmed became collaborators, even to the extent of participating in discussions of the footage, which were, in turn, incorporated in the final version of the film" (Jay Ruby)

Video is a high-risk ethnographic medium. When constructing a textual expression of research findings, the author can rely on the abstractions in

his/her fieldnotes and memories of the relevant events. Video footage needs to be shot at the right moment, the focus must be right, the zoom must be right, the batteries must be charged, the memory cards need to have storage space, and the lens and the microphone must be at least adequate with respect to the particular context, if one is to produce a potentially affective (see 2.6.3) or embodying experience (see 2.8) on video. Even from a purely technical perspective, it is truly a methodological quagmire in and of its own – you either have it [the footage] or you don't (Artis 2008). And as we have seen, we have come to insist on producing videographic data only *in situ* to express the relational becoming of the spatiotemporal context and the hermeneutical spiraling between the research team and the cultural phenomena. But how to go about this? In our experience, the best way to mediate these concerns is to have a high degree of access.

To do so, we have always included an autoethnographic member in our every videographic research project to negotiate access to interesting contexts and participants, and to be able to become more holistically immersed in any particular consumption phenomenon we are attempting to become an empathically relational part of. To work in such teams, as opposed to the conventional 'mentor-graduate student relationship', seemed to be particularly suited for facilitating "the rhizomatic, synergistic impulse of truly collaborative research" (Sherry 2006: 275). We can thus bring about diverse interpretations of the research phenomena, and also show some glimpses of the emergence of qualitative relational changes between the authors and the autoethnographic member – something that video has a capacity to express as an emerging story, but which is typically only highlighted in methodology sections of textual accounts. It must be pointed out that this form of autoethnography (perhaps another concept would work better) is not similarly emphatically personal, as the fully-fledged introspectively-orientated autoethnography written from an 'I' perspective (cf. Ellis and Bochner 2000; see also Van Maanen 1995). Yet, at the same time, it does require a willingness on the part of the autoethnographic member to distance him/herself from the very context s/he feels very passionately about – in effect to "be willing to be vulnerable" (Ellis and Bochner 2000: 752). In addition, as we follow a Deleuzian relational ontology, it is only natural that the autoethnographic 'I' in a research team will rhizomatically blend to become a performative part of the entire videographic collaboration, which will carry its offspring into the emergence of hermeneutic relations in the production of the videography, and in thought, beyond to future projects and lives.

Yet, this 'willing vulnerability', in our experience, is no light matter, as it invokes completely novel and personal thoughts about the social phenomena one was a passionately engaged part of. To do active autoethnography means

the reflexive questioning of these, once taken-for-granted relations. Thus, as the autoethnographic member takes part in his/her particular social phenomenon, there is an opportunity for a constant interplay of meanings among the research team (what could be also referred to as member checking from a more conventional perspective), as s/he enters into an emerging interplay of distanciation (e.g. Berry 2011; see also Videography Note 13 in 2.8.2). This requires an active contemplation on the developing hermeneutic by the autoethnographer, as the autoethnographic researcher is estranging himself from the immanent and emerging practices of the social phenomenon – hovering to become an 'outsider', while, in terms of academic research, s/he is entering into more intimate, more analytically profound and theoretically abstract understandings of the social phenomena under inquiry. Here the vulnerability gains prominence, as this interplay of distance/closeness is certainly not void of emotional anxiety – a potential outcome about which the autoethnographic member should be consulted before the start of the project. In any case, the essence of the autoethnographic member, one not only a 'key informant', but a fully-fledged participant, is one of greatly improved access to the social phenomenon, and the sharing of voluminous personal insights that emerge to form novel relations among and beyond the research team in the course of the research activities.

Let us also briefly consider how some of the conventional, now somewhat discredited (see 2.3.3), criteria for qualitative fieldwork can still inform us during our contemporary experiences in the field. Even though we have come to epistemologically eschew any stable criteria for 'good' or 'more accurate' fieldwork predispositions, we can yet find considerable merit in pragmatically utilizing some of the tenets of the more 'positivistically' underpinned notions that dominated the CCT field some two decades ago. But to be sure, for us, these guidelines do not produce 'accuracy' (in any sense), but rather a reflexive orientation for producing more relations among the immediate research team members and beyond – perhaps then allowing for more convincing ethnographic tales as a bonus. Indeed, using these notions as helpful guidelines for more relational and pluralistic fieldwork interactions, not as principles of validation and veracity production, can further facilitate reflexivity. We can build on them, not become subjugated by them! The aim is not to construct 'truer' accounts as 'objective' researchers – rather to foster techniques that can enable honest, holistic, evocative, and empathic storytelling (e.g. Marcus and Fischer 1986; Goodall 2000, Richardson 2000; Ellis and Bochner 2000; Denzin 2001a).

For example, Wallendorf and Belk (1989) advocate for the importance of regular on-site (research) team interaction, to facilitate a collective and constant construction of the emergent design. Our research team compositions have made these interactions emergent, as there have always

been two to three team members present during all phases of fieldwork. Additionally, due to our focus on multi-sited or translocal ethnographic research, we got to travel together and share hotel rooms and other accommodations in various contextual settings. Also, in our case, the risk of groupthink becomes beneficially diminished, due to the highly different levels of initial researcher involvement with the social phenomenon under investigation. Also, as Wallendorf and Belk (1989) state, negative case analysis (trying to uncover evidence that does not confirm the emerging interpretations) became an important technique, serving to keep the natural enthusiasm of the researchers in check. Here we find the interplay of emerging interpretations between the autoethnographic and the not-initially-immersed participant ethnographers in our research teams invaluable. As the autoethnographers emergently become to view what is often their passion from more analytic perspectives, they seem to be more than ready to criticize the (to them often seemingly naive) enthusiasms of the other ethnographers. While the 'sufficient' amount of diversity remains equally ambiguous as the question of 'sufficient' time spent doing fieldwork, it is our experience that the varying backgrounds, and especially the differing amounts of contextual experience among the researchers, has spurred amounts of lively discussion and critique of our varying interpretative reasonings – making the work, in and of itself, a delightful yet sometimes taxing activity of "ethnography [...] conducted as an extreme team sport" (Sherry 2006: 268).

In addition, coming up with diverse videographic teams can be seen as an inversely-oriented 'triangulation' across researchers, where multiple interpretive perspectives can arise due to the differences in researcher backgrounds. As an example, in conducting the BIP videographic inquiry, our team consisted of myself, a Finnish autoethnographic member (with 15 years of experience in international tournament paintball) in his early thirties, a Finnish member, who tried paintball for the first time during the study, also in his early thirties, and a French Assistant Professor in her late thirties who was initially relatively uninformed about the research topic. In PTS, our team consisted of three Finnish members in their early thirties, out of which two were trained ethnographers, with varying expertise in electronic music, and an autoethnographic member who was a prominent international notoriety in the cultural phenomenon, and hailed from a different university than the first two. Thus, we all came to learn together, or to produce something of "a synthesis, perhaps the dialectical product, of [...] personal views and backgrounds" (Marcoux and Legoux 2005: 255).

While Wallendorf and Belk (1989), at the time of their criteria-building, found debriefings by peers (circulating emergent research constructions with researchers not directly involved in the research) only marginally useful, they place great emphasis on the importance of member checks (auditing the

interpretations with the informants). For them, somewhat unlike Hirschman (1986), informant comments can be thus used for revision, if the descriptive emic voice of the informants has become misinterpreted. In line with more contemporary thinking in CCT, Holt (1991) does mischief for this perspective by pointing out that the researchers' rapport of an emic account is just another etic interpretation, and is thus no more credible or even sacred – everything becomes, in a sense, etic interpretation, and thus we cannot get any closer to anything more 'real' on the logocentric pole of a 'positivist' undertone. Yet, while always etic, by utilizing the ease of access to many influential participants via the autoethnographic members, we were able to encounter and consider a variety of viewpoints. Indeed, in PTS and PMW, we collected a vivid array of viewpoints from our participants by uploading a version of the videography to a password-protected account on the Vimeo online video service. This constituted another relational possibility, not to ensure the veracity of our interpretations, but rather to maintain an active global interaction between all participants.

As we have seen in the Essence(s) chapter and also here, my epistemic position in terms of videographic research in CCT has moved beyond questions of 'representation' to, rather, a focus on the problematics of relation (see 3.3). This can be seen to be in line with the '7th movement' in consumer research (e.g. Denzin 2001a), but also can make some early attempts to go beyond social constructivism, as it incorporates elements from the practice theoretical and radical humanist toolkit (see 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, respectively). Following Deleuzian (e.g. 1994a/1968) thinking, *an* account of a 'system' becomes impossible, for all accounts are also constituents of the emerging system itself. Thus, specific methodological techniques cannot act as any type of guarantors of privileged status of academic research. Technical expertise (both in terms of equipment and ethnographic method) in the field is surely of considerable pragmatic importance, but the ethnographic value resides in the diversities of interpretation and the efficacy of novel relations. Any notion of a stable trustworthiness, dependability, transferability, integrity and dependability, and the like, regarding the data or the interpretation(s) can probably be put to rest – the poststructural position remains in line with what Thompson (1990) and Holt (1991) posited already two decades ago – the criteria for 'good' research can only come in destabilized form – does it evocatively surprise and convince the reader (see also e.g. Goodall 2000; Richardson 2000; Denzin 2001a). While evocativeness and the surprise seem to be firmly rooted in the metaphysics of good dialectical storytelling, convincingness seems to constitute of making a holistic, comprehensive and theoretically relevant ethnographic expression – partly is can be the 'convincingness of sweat'.

Let us now briefly visit the three videographic projects that accompany this study. I will attempt to provide something of a workbench account how these projects came about, and how we emergently negotiated the most pressing problematics. A brief account of the theoretical outcomes is also provided, regarding how video, as an expressive medium, was utilized to found the theoretical approaches.

4.2 Notes on 'Brothers in Paint': A Practice Theoretical Inquiry into a Tribal Marketplace Culture (BIP)

- See the videography at: '*http://vimeo.com/36543163*' (Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010)

4.2.1 Foreword

What became BIP was truly a coincidental, yet a fortuitous project in retrospect. It was early 2008, and, at the time, I was still focused on B2B project marketing literature, when a fellow doctoral student Joonas Rokka stormed into my office, and spectacularly disclosed his newlyfound aspiration to conduct a videography. It was only recently that he had heard of the method's existence, having been introduced to it in a CCT workshop conducted by Robert Kozinets. At the time (and considerably after, I must confess) I remained very suspicious. Rokka's epiphany had been coming up with the idea to make me an autoethnographic research team member, in order to conduct research on the extreme team sport of paintball – a practice I had been closely involved with on an international level for circa ten years at the time. The European Championships (www.millennium-series.com) season was to begin in some months, and with my team Helsinki Cyclone (www.cyclone.fi) participating on a divisional level, it seemed like only a matter of purchasing a cheap video camera, and we would be all set. I was to assist in providing extensive access to our teams social activities, and between the games we were to prowl around the staging areas at the tournaments, (research was actively conducted in six international tournaments in all) looking for interesting characters to interview. What could have been more simple?

4.2.2 Notes on Some Notable Problematics

When this project got underway, we were certainly 'born yesterday'. Neither of the active fieldwork participants (Hietanen and Rokka) had any substantial experience in video work, or for that matter, even photography. Thus, we

knew virtually nothing about shooting video or aesthetic composition (do we know today?), operated with a single cheap video camera, and had no previous experience on any video editing software. While the quality of the finished work was certainly mediocre at best, I feel surprised it turned out as anything at all, or even became finished in the first place.

In addition, our idea of ethnographic fieldwork was idealistic, or naïve when put in more frank terms. Certainly, one of the hallmarks of videographic research calls for an in-depth understanding of the cultural phenomena under inquiry (long *in situ* presence), which could bring about an empathic relation between the researchers and other research participants. However, when shooting videographic footage, there are some pressing questions of research economics that also come into question. The pragmatics of video footage production in ethnographic research operates between two poles, it is a 1) high risk medium and 2) it is a laborious process, to analyze and to construct into a finalized product. Let us elaborate.

Unlike manual fieldnote recording (and taking photographs [only] to elaborate findings, not to constitute them), video footage that can compiled into a finished work of videography comes in the form of 'you either have it or you don't'. While a textual account can be constructed by relying on memories of events, the construction of a convincing videography relies on recorded footage that, to be useful, needs to be sufficient in terms of quality, and audiovisually excellent to be potentially evocative. The recognition of this becomes largely a question of technicality, aesthetics and field site access. In retrospect, we can only note our considerable lack of a clear understanding of the role of technical (cheap amateurish equipment) and aesthetic (no theoretical training) considerations. What we had through myself, the autoethnographic participant, was access alone. And thus, while the quality can be now deemed as substandard when compared to any contemporary efforts, the relational quality allowed by great opportunities for close access to the consumption phenomenon, may still have some merit to it. This idea became carried with us to our following projects, as we came to include an autoethnographic participant in all our subsequent work. Additionally, we noticed, how our cheap equipment recorded sound in mediocre quality at best, but the soundtrack could be resurrected *post facto* by hiring the services of a professional sound engineer. In terms of 'getting it or not', this practice allowed for fieldwork flexibility, as we were not forced into planting lavalier microphones on the shirts of the participants' we had the opportunity to interact with. In our experience, an *ad hoc* orientation of this kind seems to come with plentiful contextual advantages.

In terms of the laborious nature of analyzing extensive amounts of raw footage, there are definite research economics questions we had to also negotiate. During the BIP fieldwork, we were quite uninformed about how to

shoot and, indeed, what to shoot. The unfortunate outcome of this 'wetness behind our ears', was that we had voluminous amounts of raw footage – over 40 hours – yet of poor quality, and which mostly consisted of 'overall' distance shots that did not concentrate on any particular (or interesting) viewpoint into the consumption phenomena. Thus, while it may contradict some holistic notions of ethnographic field presence, we would now recommend that an aspiring CCT videographer will probably do well to have some initial ideas about what particular contextual events to shoot. Naturally, these ideas can, and will, change during the course of the fieldwork.

Do to our nonspecific and uncoordinated approach to shooting footage, we were initially at a loss, when the time came to begin our work at the editing table (not to mention that we had no experience on the software beforehand). Yet, through what seemed like endless hours of going through the raw material, themes began to gradually emerge, and the very visuality of the medium began to direct us to practice theoretical considerations. It was, at the time, a year into our project, and we began to fetishize about producing a videographic submission for the up-and-coming ACR2009 'Film Festival'. Yet, our editing inexperience was considerable, manifesting into, at best, mediocre montage, going completely beyond the original schedule, and a deeply felt reluctance to discard any (unnecessary) shots. This amounted into submitting an incomplete production into ACR2009, almost missing the conference deadline entirely, and shipping a videography that was almost an hour in length (the final edition that accompanies this study is now less than 40 minutes – adequate, but still certainly still on the lengthy side).

Thus, our acceptance into the conference (albeit with considerable review) came in as a pleasant surprise, and through great pains we completely overhauled the entire production. While one cannot conjure up excellent aesthetics from poor quality footage, we felt the review round did much to improve the video in terms of the criteria set up by Belk and Kozinets (2006). Gradually, we seemed to improve our skills in critically evaluating the material (and thus became more readily inclined to drop unnecessary footage). In addition, albeit to a humble extent, we were able to improve our theoretization, so as to bring about some theoretical closure in the conclusion of the videography.

The outcome, even if acceptable in its time (fortuitously winning the 'Juror's Award' in the ACR 2009 Film Festival), certainly looks amateurish, at best, in contemporary light. And while some of the aesthetic limitations can be attributed to our shoddy equipment, the lack of theatrical evocativeness in the montage cannot. The limitations in our vision, are best exemplified by our incapability to go beyond the traditional journal format of academic expression, even as we were working with an unconventional medium. Partly, this may have come about due to the mediocre aesthetics of the raw footage –

it did not invite an aesthetic consideration! Yet, mostly, it was due to our own incapability to challenge convention. Thus, the outcome seems like a journal article in an audiovisual format, focuses largely on 'talking head' interviews and is filled with 'voice-of-god' narration, which consists of an excessive mumbling that closely follows a journal publication structure. While having its moments (especially the more autoethnographically oriented sections where emotion becomes more evocatively expressed), as an account of practice theoretical emergence, it now seems an odd naively realist attempt for some implicit objectivity. At the time, however, it was the limit of our nascent ability, and as such expresses an interesting initial endeavor to the methodology.

While they seem excessively commonsensical from a contemporary perspective, the following points summarize the most important lessons we learned in the course of producing BIP:

What to take into consideration in advance:

- Acquire adequate video recording equipment and practice extensively with them beforehand – no, I mean, really *do* experiment with them

- Plan ahead for some immediate theoretical and aesthetic guidelines, then let these initial ideas evolve reflexively during fieldwork

- Even when utilizing an autoethnographic research team member, set up contacts in advance – do not only rely in fortuitous contacts in the field

What to take into consideration in the editing phase:

- Always ask yourself: Why video? Is any particular use of the medium in the montage interesting and evocative as an aesthetic expression? Consider letting go of the conventional journal format and assuming a brazenly explorative stance

- Be ruthless with your raw footage: Do we really need this particular shot? Establish an illusion of presence and communion, but be wary of any overt repetition of any particular perspective

- Foreground visual storytelling, as it is the video footage of emergent social settings that does the work of convincing (perspectives *in* action), not externalized accounts of the social phenomena ('interrogated' talking heads) or overt 'voice-of-god' justifications

4.2.3 A Note on Theoretical Implications

The BIP project constituted of our initial foray into the videographic methodology. Due to our inexperience, both in aesthetics and in constructing an initial theoretical orientation, the outcome can be seen to be humble at best. As practice theoretical thought was gaining some initial recognition at the time (see 2.9.1), our outcome became descriptive – how to operationalize a practice theoretical framework in videographic expression. We thus conceptualized the social practice of paintball as a multi-site activity (incorporating into consideration virtual online interactions as well) of a 'tribal' marketplace culture (e.g. Cova and Cova 2001, 2002), where resource constellations and relevant socially understood meaning-makings come together in a 'nexus of practice elements'. Through this conceptualization, we attempted to shift the notion of the 'social as the site' to a more translocal perspective, in which the nexus itself can be understood as the site, no matter where this 'site' emergently manifests in interrelated meaning-makings, routines and material surroundings. By further highlighting the performative nature of social practices – how practices become continuously renegotiated in dispersed translocal contexts – we were also tentatively able to investigate their evolutionary trajectories empirically. Thus, the nexus became a flux of emergent meaning-makings of practitioners, technologies, and commercial aspirations of marketers, all of which collectively constituted the emergent tribal practice.

Although implicitly, the videographic method exemplified the emergence of relations of collective meaning-makings in social settings – and emergence difficult to describe due to the limitations of textual expression (see 3.2). This relation between videographic expression and the non-Cartesian ontology and epistemology of practice theory and non-representational theory (see 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, respectively), will be more thoroughly foregrounded and explored in a future project (to be submitted to ACR 2012).

4.3 Notes on 'Pushing the Scene': Tensions and Emergence in an Accelerated Marketplace Culture (PTS)

- See the videography online: '*http://vimeo.com/32192229*' (Hietanen, Rokka and Roman 2012)

4.3.1 Foreword

PTS was to become our second large-scale videographic project. Now, armed with a new confidence bolstered by our accumulated experiences and many

studied and recited volumes on cinematography (e.g. Deleuze 1986, 1989; Marks 2000; Barker 2009) and video theory (e.g. Cubitt 1991, 1993), we set out to conduct our first 'real' production. Therefore, again, little did we anticipate that our novel brazen hubris would bring along with it a new spectrum of challenges as well.

PTS started out with substantially more forethought than the more haphazard BIP affair. Keeping up with the spirit of incorporating an autoethnographic member into our research team, we contacted my old friend and former university flat mate Risto Roman to discuss the conducting of a large-scale videographic inquiry into the social phenomena of the 'dubstep' genre electronic music subculture. Refining our theoretical approach from the BIP videography, now primarily following Giesler's (2008) notions, we had agreed to initially focus on how the 'dubstep' practitioners negotiated 'authenticity' in their cultural practices, thus potentially expressing their social relations through colliding and evolutionary 'drama-filled' practices. Roman was very interested in taking part in the project as an autoethnographic member, and, as he (under the pseudonym 'Desto') had achieved notable international fame, he was in a prime position to set up contacts to allow for an unprecedented access to DJ's, producers and other important agents in this marketplace of marginal 'underground' music production and consumption. A further initial focus was to highlight the non-Cartesian underpinnings of the practice theoretical approach by empirically constructing a criticism of the producer/consumer dichotomy prevalent in consumer research. Through Desto's extensive ability to set up contacts, we decided to primarily focus on what we conceptualized to be 'powerful cultural agents'; famed DJ's, producers and other cultural aficionados such as bloggers, record label owners and online forum administrators.

4.3.2 Notes on Some Notable Problematics

We acquired a whole new repertoire of video equipment for the PTS project. We purchased a semi-professional video camera, but on top of that, we, after some consultation, switched most of our video equipment into DSLR's; digital photography cameras with video recording capability. While this allowed to record footage of considerably higher quality (by enabling exchangeable lenses and much more light sensitivity), it brought about a novel quagmire of the need to learn the pitfalls of these somewhat experimental set-ups not exclusively designed for video recording. This study does not boast a technical orientation (as one would date quickly), so it may suffice to say we encountered, usually in the midst of fieldwork, how to manage novel memory card issues (HD video needs the fastest cards [preferably 'Level 10']), the batteries swiftly draining (have spares), the cameras overheating, the

handling of excessively large files, the fitting and monitoring of external aftermarket microphones to the camera systems, and the installing and operating open source software hacks in our cameras to alter their functionality, so as to make them more video enabled (e.g. http://magiclantern.wikia.com). In hindsight, we would have perhaps been better off by investing more resources in order to purchase conventional dedicated video cameras. Alas, the context of filming in nightclubs and other low-light events required the light sensitivity only a DSLR system could provide with anything that resembled a reasonable price. In addition, these contexts were considerably loud, an obstacle we mediated by careful monitoring of the microphones (after some initial calamities) and incorporating the professional sound engineering capabilities of Desto during the editing phase.

As this project moved to the editing table, sound nevertheless emerged as a considerable problem. And as we have seen (see 2.7.4), sound seems to become often overlooked in academic discourses on the moving image. For example, from firsthand experience, there seems to be considerable talk in the ACR corridors about video cameras, but far less seems to come said about adequate microphones and other sound recording devices. We discovered this in truly destructive fashion in the early stages of the PTS project, as we first introduced our recording equipment to very challenging settings – the darkness of music clubs and the associated booming noise levels. In a personal conversation, Robert Kozinets advised us to use 'lavalier microphones' (the small microphones attached to the participants' shirts), but we decided against this practice, as we wanted to be able to freely move in crowded *in situ* contexts, without the obstructing effect of a wad of cables, and the potentially decontextualizing effect of attaching devices to participants as they were partaking in emergent and unplanned social practices. Thus it soon became apparent that the sound quality was substandard in many shots. As stated above, our rescue came in the form of our third author, who is a professional sound engineer, and was thus able to 'rescue' many parts of the audio track.

The following illustrates some of the contents of our gear bag at the time of the writing of this study:

Videography note (18):

(From left to right, somewhat) Handytools Base-X, Rode SM3, Audio-Technica AT875R, Canon 60D, Sigma 18-50mm F2.8 EX DC Macro, Rode Stereo Mic, Sigma 15mm F2.8 EX DG Diagonal Fisheye, Canon 550D/T2i, Zoom H4, Redrock/Ops Running Man.

(From left to right, somewhat) Sigma 70-200mm F2.8 EX DG APO Macro HSM II, Canon 60D, Joby Gorillapod SLR, Silk Monopod 350, JVC GY-HM100U, Glidecam 2000.

Our Canon 550D running the experimental Magic Lantern third party open source software (with automatic gain control [AGC] disabled, audio meters, focus peak and zebras), which modifies the camera into a more video enabled device.

All the novel problems notwithstanding, this was our first videographic production where we had the privilege to utilize technical equipment, which boasted a degree of sophistication to allow the recording of many Deleuzian aesthetic notions. In terms of these aesthetics, by far the most difficult one seems to be the affection-image; the extreme close-up that deterritorializes the spatiotemporal coordinates of the moving image. The difficulty in producing such aesthetics has naturally much to do with the *in situ* settings of shooting ethnographic video, as it is certainly not a simple task to be able to record extreme close-ups of facial expressions in the emergent and unscripted flux of performative events. We went about this by considerably preplanning the camera angles, as well as utilizing advanced telescopic zoom lenses to record emotive images (see 2.6.2).

As stated, we also acquired a decent video camera (JVC GY-HM100U), but quickly noticed its inadequacy in low light conditions (amounting into very granular footage). But even such shots, when used in moderation, could become aesthetic tools following Marks (2000; see 2.8.2) aesthetics of haptic visuality. As the 'dubstep' scene stems from an 'underground' and uncommodified ethos, a 'rough' visuality was also usable, in order to express haptic qualities. In addition, we were now able to record footage with moving focuses, that brought about a territorialization of the image from a texture blur – an expressive attempt to 'blend' the viewer haptically into a relational embodiment with the moving image. Both of these aesthetic shifts expressed humble attempts to bring about viewer embodiment in the agentic quality of

the moving image, as it races between different spatiotemporal orientations (see 2.8.7)

Another important consideration was our goal to bring about some notion of Deleuzian relationality to the emergent events expressed in the montage. This called for videographic aesthetics firmly embedded *in situ*, in events of cultural production, but with a relational twist. We wished to make interview settings not into the aforementioned 'interrogations' that externalize the cultural phenomena, but rather into conversations where Desto took an active role. This made them into *loci* where the cultural marketplace of 'dubstep' itself is emergently and relationally negotiated and expressed – not mere objectified accounts of them.

Our aspirations for relational expression also amounted to another critique of a realist conception of moving image data. As stated earlier (see 2.6.1), here we made an effort to express the emergent artificiality of every 'camera eye's' perspective and, thus, to emphasize the performative nature of every cultural context by making the presence of the 'camera eye' explicit (see also Videography Note 5 in 2.6.1). Following Marks (2000), it was our intention to, as ethnographers, not to only fetishize the cultural context, but to also reveal the fetishistic relation of the camera (see also Žižek 2006) and the research team, within the hermeneutic spiraling of our ongoing interpretations. We hoped to potentially bring about an expression of the emergent relationality of every cultural performance – with us as researchers, and the culturally embedded participants in emergent interaction with the spatiotemporal settings and meaning-makings.

Another focus we wished to improve upon from BIP, consisted of our take on the narrative storyline we were expressing. We wished to make some breaks from the 'journalesque' structure, which we generally followed in BIP, so as to incorporate elements of potentially evocative storytelling to the montage. As we have seen from a Deleuzian perspective, the power of the moving image consists of making us 'think the unthinkable' by presenting us with convincing worlds of false temporal connections (see 2.5.1). In a humble way, this notion gave us permission to rearrange our ethnographic narrative, to not follow a temporal scheme, but rather, a scheme of our ethnographic understandings. To exemplify this, the PTS videography follows a fictive 'ethnographic road-trip' form, even as the events did not follow such temporal sequences (e.g. we visited the New York scene before London, and the events recorded in Helsinki took place throughout the research, not before as the videography expresses). We, albeit in a humble way, liberated time to strengthen our 'truth effects' (Shankar and Patterson 2001) and the arc-of-drama. Likewise, the interview-events recorded in New York express an ongoing conversation with the DJ/producers in the 'Dub War' 5th anniversary party, even though some of the interview events occurred after

the party had already seceded. We thus attempted, with these aesthetic considerations, to expressively increase the relationality and the immanence of cultural phenomena underlying our theoretical argument of 'cultural acceleration'. In addition, we hoped to further express the relational break-down of a linear temporal scheme, by blending the transitions in the latter part of the montage, so as to highlight how the different locales of the accelerated marketplace all blend together in a flux of events, affects and performative emergence.

Thus, in comparison to BIP the lessons to be learned from PTS had now become considerably refined:

What to take into consideration in advance:

- With more sophisticated equipment, the technological expertise required to maintain and run them increases considerably: practice (this time I *really* mean it) with your new equipment in advance

- Scene management – when operating in difficult shooting conditions, both the use of specialized equipment, and some work of preplanning camera angles, can enable the recording of evocative aesthetics (so as to produce some forms of Deleuzian cinema aesthetics)

- Think ahead of different types of aesthetics that you need to record to come up with footage that can be utilized in a Deleuzian schemata

What to take into consideration in the editing phase:

- Constructing a montage from unconventional interview settings and focusing on their aesthetic expression to bring out the most relational use of the medium

- Constructing creative and nonlinear time to bring about a potentially evocative narrative – Thus going beyond the medium and reflexively considering the efficacy the videography could have in terms of its relation with the audience(s)

4.3.3 A Note on Theoretical Implications

In PTS, we construct a notion of an 'accelerated marketplace' to define the rapid flux of events negotiated in the practices of the 'dubstep' electronic music culture, which is mediated by the instancy of the global reach of the Internet. Musical scenes had been commonly researched by exploring their

marketplace structures, for example, the relations between producers, intermediaries and consumers. In our emergent, fast-paced and translocal context such boundaries had become ambiguous.

We thus interpret cultural practices that 'powerful cultural agents' employ, in order to negotiate and maintain their cultural positions, in the flux of events they no longer seem to be able to control – while at the same time expressing an infatuation for the liberating potential of the global reach of Internet-mediated technologies. Thus, we construct categories of social practices, such as 1) practices of maintaining a connection with audiences in an accelerated marketplace, 2) practices of controlling accelerated cultural knowledge and 3) practices of balancing off the profit motive and foundational nomadism.

These tensions become emergently negotiated, but seem to entail a disenchanment in the emergent breakdown of stable cultural scripts. Could this be the flipside of the liberating promise of postmodernism (e.g. Firat and Venkatesh 1995)? As the powerful cultural agents had lost much of their cultural authority in the accelerated flux of globally dispersed cultural emergence, they seemed to have lost much of their passion regarding the cultural practice itself. They seemed to have become 'cultural nomads', now only temporarily attached to its social practices. The lack of control in the 'accelerated marketplace' now had become to allow them only to desperately cling onto cultural resources and scripts – a seemingly disenchanted maintaining of the prevailing order, thus the reconstructing and allowing the cycle of acceleration to remain intact.

4.4. Notes on 'Post-Materialist Work': Dreams as Fetishes (PMW)

- See the videography at: '*http://vimeo.com/30893212*' (Hietanen and Uotila 2012)

4.4.1 Foreword

PMW consisted of a project that was quite dissimilar to both BIP and PTS. It was the first outcome of a Master's Thesis seminar I had been assigned to conduct – the first of its kind, where the students produced their Master's Thesis work as videographies. PMW was not originally produced as CCT research; not in the least. It was the pioneering handiwork of Hannu Uotila, a master's student from the Aalto University Department of Entrepreneurship, who took up the video challenge due to his expertise with the video medium,

as he was the CEO of a music video production company that he had personally founded.

Thus, while Uotila had shot the footage and constructed a videography for the Department of Entrepreneurship, we decided to use the same material and bring it into the CCT discourse. After much deliberation, we moved on to reconstruct the material with a focus on the consumption of one's vocation, and after the first review round in ACR 2011, we moved further to bring about views from critical theory and a dialectical interpretation of the tensions our participants had to negotiate in their professional life.

The interesting challenge in this project thus had, for my part, very little to do with shooting footage (even though I did participate in the settings of music video productions to shoot some background footage). Indeed, this was primarily Uotila's project, but it was up to me to reconstruct it theoretically into a CCT videography. This work brought about novel interesting perspectives to storytelling, as the same footage thus emerged to tell an academic story through both entrepreneurship as well as a CCT framework.

4.4.2 Notes on Some Notable Problematics

Changing the story of this video footage, originally shot to be utilized in the field of entrepreneurship, entailed the usual work of thoroughly going over the material and in-depth discussions with Uotila, the autoethnographic research team member. I had recently become interested in critical theory and what had become conceptualized as the '7th movement' in consumer research (e.g. Denzin 2001a), and thus we decided to foreground the dialectic of one's vocation, from the perspective of aspiration that is negotiated between a longing for a creative freedom, but simultaneously subjugated by the need to scuffle in 'mainstream' projects, so as to maintain one's business and monetary pursuits in the capitalist marketplace.

Administering a Master's Thesis seminar, where the students conducted their research as videographies, was not without its administrative problems. Indeed, the fact that the project got underway at all in the first place is a testimony to the forward thinking of our department head Henrikki Tikkanen. Similarly to the *Consumption, Markets and Culture* special DVD issues (see Appendix 2), it was agreed that a written piece was required to serve as a theoretical companion to the videography. Thus, in effect, the brave souls doing their pioneering Master's Thesis research in video medium came to effectively do twice (if not exceedingly more) the work, when compared to a traditional thesis report. The students' persistent aspiration to submit all the finalized videographies to ACR also reveals their unfaltering dedication. There were some preconditions, however. All the students in the group had extensive experience in video work, and thus they were all relatively

comfortable with the medium. My position thus became one of a provider of theoretical orientations for their work. There were no stringent rules, so we had to negotiate problems on-the-go.

Following the orientation of all our videographic projects, I directed the students to work on something autoethnographic with a keen reflexive eye. In terms of Uotila's work, this seemingly worked especially well, as he wholeheartedly agreed with the dialectical outcome of the study, as it became converted into a CCT framework. As an instructor, this brought about its own problematics – I had to become empathically invested in the students' work, in effect, to become a participant in their research myself. This entailed considerably more than the lending of some video equipment, but taking part in their research contexts and even spending time in their homes to participate in the evaluation and editing of their video footage. I must add that this participation was by no means unidirectional, as I was lucky to learn voluminous amounts about video production by observing their professional expertise with the video media.

In comparison to BIP and PTS the lessons to be learned from PMW have more to do with the admitration of the novel Master's Thesis seminar itself:

- Administering a group of video professionals conducting videography research is not the running a Master's Thesis seminar in any traditional sense, its about participating as an empathic and invested member in each project to the best of one's ability.

- Always tell the (autoethnographic) students to be reflexive and introspective about their context, but also about the use of video medium itself. Indeed, why video? What would be the most relational use of the medium?

4.4.3 A Note on Theoretical Implications

Reworking the story, so as to follow our emerging interest in critical theory in CCT (e.g.; Murray and Ozanne 1991, 1993; see also Denzin 1995, 2001a; Horkheimer and Adorno 2002/1987), made us focus exclusively on a dialectical interpretation. Thus, we produced one the first (to our knowledge) videography in CCT that specifically followed the '7th movement' espoused by Denzin (2001a; see also Clifford and Marcus 1986). Our footage seemed to continuously tell us a story of video professionals with creative aspirations for expressive freedom, only to be subjugated by the necessities of the capitalist marketplace, which encouraged practices of 'selling out', and producing video work that would appeal to the commoditized mainstream tastes.

While these creative aspirations can be conceptually constructed as 'post-materialist' (e.g. McLarney and Chung 1999), it seemed that the capitalist marketplace hindered such aspirations by monetarily rewarding commoditized and non-artistic 'mainstream' video productions, which our participants were forced to produce to eke out a living. When speaking about this tension, our participants often reverted into what we conceptualized as a 'heroic narrative of one's striving', which maintained a fetishistic narrative of a future, in which they would eventually get the chance to fulfill their creative and artistic (and often not commercially-oriented) aspirations.

Thus, it seemed that these creative and artistic aspirations functioned as an impossible fetishistic pursuit, one that maintains one's striving, but can never be achieved (see also Žižek 1999). While one can exercise creativity in one's work, in the video industry it seems to assume a sanitized nature, which one must bear and maintain by negotiating the fetish of a future where one could be emancipated from this burden. The videography ends in an attempt for a relational message, as we ask the viewer to ponder: 'in the contemporary capitalist society, what keeps you aspiring – what is the fetish you make do with?'

> "Our projects must show how human beings endure and prevail in the face of those technological structures which threaten to erase forever the fragile, sacred self and the few remaining spaces it occupies in this horrible and terrifying world we call the postmodern. And it is with downcast eyes we must now look" (Denzin 1995: 218)

References

Anderson, P. F. (1983), Marketing, Scientific Progress, and Scientific Method. *Journal of Marketing*, 47 (4), 18-31.

Anderson, P. F. (1986), On Method in Consumer Research: A Critical Relativist Perspective. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 13 (2), 155-173.

Anderson, B., Harrison, P., (2010), The Promise of Non-Representational Theories. In *Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography*, (Eds.) Anderson, B., Harrison, P., 1-34, Ashgate Publishing Limited: Farnham, U.K.

Appignanesi, R., Garratt, C. (2007), *Introducing Postmodernism: A Graphic Guide*. Gutemberg Press: Malta.

Arndt, J. (1976), Reflections on Research in Consumer Behavior. In *Advances in Consumer Research (3)*, (Eds.) Anderson, B. B., 213-221, Association for Consumer Research: Cincinnati, Ohio, USA.

Arndt, J. (1985), On Making Marketing Science More Scientific: Role of Orientations, Paradigms, Metaphors, and Puzzle Solving. *Journal of Marketing*, 49 (3), 11-23.

Arnold, S. J., Fischer, E. (1994), Hermeneutics and Consumer Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (1), 55-70.

Arnold, S. J., Kozinets, R. V., Handelman, J. M. (2001), Hometown ideology and retailer legitimation: The institutional semiotics of Wal-Mart flyers. *Journal of Retailing*, 77 (2), 243-271.

Arnould, E. J. (2006), Service-dominant logic and consumer culture theory: Natural allies in an emerging paradigm. *Marketing Theory*, 6 (3), 293-298.

Arnould, E. J., Price, L. L. (2006), Market-Oriented Ethnography Revisited. *Journal of Advertising Research*, 20 (1), 24-45.

Arnould, E. J., Thompson, C. J. (2005), Consumer Culture Theory (CCT): Twenty Years of Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 31 (4), 868-882.

Arnould, E. J., Thompson, C. J. (2007), Consumer Culture Theory (and We Really Mean Theoretics): Dilemmas and Opportunities Posed by an Academic Branding Strategy. In *Research in Consumer Behavior (11): Consumer Culture Theory*, (Eds.) Belk, R. W. and Sherry, J. F., 3-22, Elsevier: Oxford, U.K.

Arnould, E. J., Wallendorf, M. (1994), Market-Oriented Ethnography: Interpretation and Marketing Strategy Formulation. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 31 (4), 484-504.

Artis, A. Q. (2008), *The Shut up and Shoot Documentary Guide*. Focal Press: Oxford, U.K.

Barker, J. M. (2009), *The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience*. University of California Press: Berkeley, USA.

Barthes, R. (1981/1980), *Camera Lucida*. Trans. Richard Howard, Hill and Wang: New York, USA.

Baudrillard, J. (2006/1981), *Simulation and Simulacra*. Trans. Glaser, S. F., University of Michigan Press: USA.

Belk, R. W. (1987), The Role of the Odyssey in Consumer Behavior and in Consumer Research. *In Advances in Consumer Research (14)*, (Eds.) Wallendorf, M., Anderson, P, 357-361, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, UT, USA.

Belk, R. W. (1998), Multimedia approaches to qualitative data and representations. In *Representing Consumers: Voices, views and visions*. (Ed.) Stern, B. B., 308-338, Routledge: London, U.K.

Belk, R. W. (2001), Special Session Summary Videography Versus Written Ethnography in Consumer Research. In *Advances in Consumer Research (28)*, (Eds.) Gilly, M. C., Meyers-Levy, J, 44, Association for Consumer Research: Valdosta, GA, USA.

Belk, R. W. (2009), The Modeling-Empiricism Gap: Lessons from the Qualitative-Quantitative Gap in Consumer Research. *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 45 (1), 35-37.

Belk, R. W. (2011), Examining Markets, Marketing, Consumers, and Society through Documentary Films. *Journal of Macromarketing*, 31 (4), 403-409

Belk, R. W., Devinney, T., Eckhardt, G. (2005), Consumer Ethics Across Cultures. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 8 (3), 275-289.

Belk, R. W., Kozinets, R. V. (2004), The Second Annual ACR Film Festival. In *Advances in Consumer Research (31)*, (Eds.) Kahn, B. E., Luce, M. F., 6-17, Association for Consumer Research: Valdosta, GA, USA.

Belk, R. W., Kozinets, R. V. (2005a), Videography in Marketing and Consumer Research. *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, 8 (2), 128-141.

Belk, R. W., Kozinets, R. V. (2005b), "The Third Annual Film Festival", in *Advances in Consumer Research (32)*, (Eds.) Menon, G., Rao, A. R., 6-8, Association for Consumer Research: Duluth, MN, USA.

Belk, R. W., Kozinets, R. V. (2010), ACR Film Festival: The Last Picture Show. In *Advances in Consumer Research (38)*, (Eds.) Dahl, D. W., Johar, G. V., Van Osselaer, S. M. J., Association for Consumer Research: Duluth, MN, USA.

Belk, R. W., Sherry, J. F., Wallendorf, M. (1988), A Naturalistic Inquiry into Buyer and Seller Behavior at a Swap Meet. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 14 (4), 449-470.

Belk, R. W., Tubat, G. (2005), The Cult of Macintosh. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 8 (3), 205-217.

Belk, R. W., Wallendorf, M., Sherry, J. F. (1989), The Sacred and the Profane in Consumer Behavior: Theodicy on the Odyssey. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 16 (1), 1-38.

Belk, R. W., Seo, J. Y., Li, E. (2007). Dirty Little Secret: Home Chaos and Professional Organizers. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 10 (2), 133-140.

Bell, S., (2009), The Academic Mode of Production. In *Practice-led Research, Research-led Practice in the Creative Arts*. (Eds.) Smith, H., Dean, R. T. Edinburgh University Press (2009). CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne: U.K.

Bengtsson, A., Ostberg, J., Kjeldgaard, D. (2005), Prisoners in Paradise: Subcultural Resistance to the Marketization of Tattooing. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 8 (3), 261-274.

Benjamin (2007/1968), Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Schocken Books: New York, USA.

Berbary, L. A. (2011), Poststructural Writerly Representation: Screenplay as Creative Analytic Practice. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 17 (2), 186-196.

Bernard, S. C. (2007), *Documentary Storytelling: Making Stronger and More Dramatic Nonfiction Films*. Elsevier: Burlington, USA.

Berry, K. (2011), The Ethnographic Choice: Why Ethnographers Do Ethnography. *Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies*, 11 (2), 165-177.

Bhaskar, R. (2008/1975), A Realist Theory of Science. Verso: London, U.K.

Bochner, A. P., Ellis, C. (2003), An Introduction to the Arts and Narrative Research: Art as Inquiry. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 9 (4), 506-514.

Bogue, R. (2003), *Deleuze on Cinema*. Routledge: New York, USA.

Bolter, J. D., Grusin, R. (2000), *Remediation: Understanding New Media*. The MIT Press: Cambridge, USA.

Borghini, S., Diamond, N., Kozinets, R. V., McGrath, M. A., Muniz, A. M., Sherry, J. F. (2009), Why Are Themed Brandstores So Powerful? Retail Brand Ideology at American Girl Place. *Journal of Retailing*, 85 (3), 363-375.

Borghini, S., Carù, A., Cova, B. (2010), Representing BtoB reality in case study research: Challenges and new opportunities. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 39 (1), 16-24.

Bourdieu, P. (1990), *The Logic of Practice*. Trans. Nice, R., Stanford University Press: Stanford, USA..

Bradshaw, A., McDonagh, P., Marshall, D., Bradshaw, H. (2005), "Exiled Music Herself, Pushed to the Edge of Existence": The Experience of Musicians Who Perform Background Music. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 8 (3), 219-239.

Branigan, E. (1989), Sound and Epistemology in Film. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. 47, 4, 311-324.

Bristor, J. M., Fischer, E. (1993), Feminist Thought: Implications for Consumer Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 14 (4), 518-536.

Brown, S. (1993), Postmodern marketing. *European Journal of Marketing*, 27 (4), 19-34.

Brown, S. (1998a), The Wind in the Wallows: Literary Theory, Autobiographical Criticism And Subjective Personal Introspection. In

Advances in Consumer Research (25), (Eds.) Alba, J. W., Hutchinson, J. W., 25-30, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, UT, USA.

Brown, S. (1998b), Unlucky for Some: Slacker Scholarship and the Well-Wrought Turn. In *Representing Consumers: Voices, views and visions*. (Ed.) Stern, B. B., 365-383, Routledge: London, U.K.

Brown, S. (2005), *Writing marketing: literary lessons from academic authorities*. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, USA.

Brownlie, D. (2006), Emancipation, Epiphany and Resistance: On the Underimagined and Overdetermined in Critical Marketing. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 22 (5-6), 505-528.

Caldwell, M., Kleppe, I. A., Henry, P. (2007), Prosuming Multiple Gender Role Identities: A Multi-country Written and Audio-visual Exploration of Contemporary Young Mainstream Female Achievers. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 10 (2), 95-115.

Canning, P. (2001), Foucault, Michel. In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Postmodernism*, (Eds.) Taylor, V. E., Winuist, C. E., 133-135, Routledge: London, U.K.

Catterall M., Maclaran, P., Stevens, L. (2002), Critical Reflection in the Marketing Curriculum. *Journal of Marketing Education*, 24 (3), 184-192.

Celsi, R. L., Rose, R. L., Leigh, T. W. (1993), The Exploration of High-Risk Leisure Consumption through Skydiving. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 20 (1), 1-23.

Cho, J., Trent, A. (2009), Validity Criteria for Performance-Related Qualitative Work: Toward a Reflexive, Evaluative, and Coconstructive Framework of Performance in/as Qualitative Inquiry. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 15 (6), 1013-1041.

Colebrook, C. (2006), *Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed*. Continuum: London, U.K.

Coleman, F. (2011), *Deleuze & Cinema: The Film Concepts*. Berg: Oxford, U.K.

Collins, J., Mayblin, B. (2005), *Introducing: Derrida*. Icon Books: Cambridge, U.K.

Conley, T. (1993), Tranlator's Foreword: A Plea for Leibniz. In *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, Deleuze. G., ix-3, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, USA.

Costa, J. A. (2005), Empowerment and Exploitation: Gendered Production and Consumption in Rural Greece. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 8 (3), 313-323.

Cova, B., Cova, V. (2001), Tribal aspects of postmodern consumption research: the case of French in-line roller skaters. *Journal of Consumer Behavior*, 1 (1), 67-76.

Cova, B., Cova, V. (2002), Tribal marketing: The tribalisation of society and its impact on the conduct of marketing. *European Journal of Marketing*, 36 (5/6), 595-620.

Cova, B., Salle, R. (2008), The industrial/consumer marketing dichotomy revisited: a case of outdated justification? *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*. 23 (1), 3-11.

Cova, B., Dalli, D. (2009), Working consumers: the next step in marketing theory? *Marketing Theory*, 9 (3), 315-339.

Clifford, J., Marcus, G. (1986), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. University of California Press: Berkeley, USA.

Critchley, S. (2001), *Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press: New York, USA.

Critchley, S. (2008), *The Book of Dead Philosophers*. Vintage Books: New York, USA.

Cubitt, S. (1991), *Timeshift: On Video Culture*. Routledge: London, U.K.

Cubitt, S. (1993), *Videography: Video Media as Art and Culture*. Macmillan Distribution: London, U.K.

Cubitt, S. (2001), *Simulation and Social Theory*. Sage Publications: London, U.K.

Deleuze, G. (1994a/1968), *Difference & Repetition*. Trans. Patton, P., Columbia University Press: New York, USA.

Deleuze, G. (1986/1983), *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*. Trans. Tomlinson, H., Habberjam, B., University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, USA.

Deleuze, G. (1989/1985), *Cinema 2: The Time Image*. Trans. Tomlinson, H., Galeta, R., University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, USA.

Deleuze, G. (1990/1969), *Logic of Sense*. Trans. Lester, M., Stivale, C., Columbia University Press: New York, USA.

Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. (1994b/1991), *What is Philosophy?* Trans. Tomlinson, H., Burchell, G., Columbia University Press: New York, USA.

Denzin, N. K. (1995), *The Cinematic Society: The Voyer's Gaze*. Sage: London, U.K.

Denzin, N. K. (2001a), The Seventh Movement: Qualitative Inquiry and Practices of a More Radical Consumer Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 28 (2), 324-330.

Denzin, N. K. (2001b), The reflexive interview and a performative social science. *Qualitative Research*, 1 (1), 23-46.

Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S. (2005), Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research. In *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, (Eds.) Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S., 1-32, Sage: Thousand Oaks, USA.

Derry, S. J., Pea, R. D., Barron, B., Engle, R. A., Erickson, F., Goldman, R., Hall, R., Koschmann, T., Lemke, J. L., Gamoran-Sherin, M., Sherin, B. L. (2010), Conducting Video Research in the Learning Sciences: Guidance on

Selection, Analysis, Technology, and Ethics. *Journal of the Learning Sciences*, 19 (1), 3-53.

Deshpande, R., Webster, F. E. (1989), Organizational Culture and Marketing: Defining the Research Agenda. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 53 (1), 3-15.

De Valck, K., Rokka, J., Hietanen, J. (2009), Videography in consumer research: visions for a method on the rise. *Finanza marketing e produzione*, 27 (4), 81-100.

Doane, M. A. (1980), The Voice in the Cinema: The Articulation of Body and Space. *Yale French Studies*. 60 (Cinema/Sound), 33-50.

Doel, M. A. (2010), Representation and Difference. In *Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography*, (Eds.) Anderson, B., Harrison, P., 117-130, Ashgate Publishing Limited: Farnham, U.K.

Durant, W. (1961), *The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Great Philosophers of the Western World*. Pocket Books: New York, USA.

Ellingson (1998), 'Then You Know How I Feel': Empathy, Identification and Reflexivity in Fieldwork. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 4 (4), 492-514.

Ellis, C., Bochner, A. P. (2000), Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, Reflexivity. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, (Eds.) Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S., 733-768, Sage: Thousand Oaks, USA.

Evens, A. (2002), Sound Ideas, In *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari*, (Ed.) Massumi, B., 171-187, Routledge: New York, USA.

Fenwick, T. J. (2004), Toward a Critical HRD in Theory and Practice. *Adult Education Quarterly*, 54 (3), 193-209.

Feyerabend, P. (1999), Thesis on Anarchism. In *For and Against Method: Including Lakatos's lectures on scientific method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend correspondence*, (Ed.) Motterlini, M., 113-118, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, USA.

Firat, F. A., Venkatesh, A. (1995), Liberatory Postmodernism and the Reenchantment of Consumption. *Journal of Consumer Research*. 22 (3), 239-267.

Firat, F. A., Dholakia, N. (2006), Theoretical and philosophical implications of postmodern debates: some challenge to modern marketing. *Marketing Theory*, 6 (2), 123-162.

Firat, F. A., Dholakia, N., Venkatesh, A. (1995), Marketing in a postmodern world. *European Journal of Marketing*, 29 (1), 40-56.

Franklin, S. (1995), Science as Culture, Cultures of Science. *Annual Review of Antropology*, 24 (1995): 163-184.

Gadamer, H. G. (2004/1976), *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Trans. David E. Linge. University of California Press: Berkeley, USA.

Geertz, Clifford (1973), *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books: New York.

Gherardi, S. (2000), Practice-Based Theorizing on Learning and Knowing in Organizations. *Organization*, 7 (2), 211-223.

Giddens, A. (1984), *The Constitution of Society*. Polity Press: Cambridge, U.K.

Giesler, M. (2008), Conflict and Compromise: Drama in Marketplace Evolution. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 34 (6), 739-753.

Goodall, H. L., Jr. (2000), *Writing the New Ethnography*. AltaMira Press: Oxford, U.K.

Gould, S. J. (1991), The Self-Manipulation of My Pervasive, Perceived Vital Energy through Product Use: An Introspective-Praxis Perspective. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 18 (2) 194-207

Gould, S. J. (1995), Researcher Introspection as a Method in Consumer Research: Applications, Issues, and Implications. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (4), 719-722.

Goulding, C. (2003), Issues in representing the postmodern customer. *Qualitative Market Research*, 6 (3), 152-159.

Goulding, C. (2005), Grounded theory, ethnography and phenomenology: A comparative analysis of three qualitative strategies for marketing research. *European Journal of Marketing*, 39 (3/4), 294-308.

Goulding, C., Shankar, A., Elliott, R., Canniford, R. (2009), The Marketplace Management of Illicit Pleasure. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 35 (2), 759-771.

Grant, I. H. (2001), Postmodernism and Politics. In *Routledge Companion to Postmodernism*, (Ed.) Sim, S., 28-40, Routledge: New York, USA.

Greenbaum, J., Kyng, M. (1991), *Design at Work: Cooperative Design of Computer Systems*. Lawrence Erdbaum Associates: New Jersey, USA.

Grodal, T. (2009), *Embodied Visions: Evolution, Emotion, Culture and Film*. Oxford University Press: New York.

Gummesson, E. (2000), Qualitative research in marketing: Road-map for a wilderness of complexity and unpredictability. *European Journal of Marketing*, 39 (3/4), 309-327.

Gummesson, E. (2003), All research is interpretive! *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 18 (6/7), 482-492.

Gummesson, E. (2005), Qualitative research in marketing: Road-map for a wilderness of complexityand unpredictability. *European Journal of Marketing*, 39 (3/4), 309-327.

Guttenplan, D. D. (2011), Shunning the journals, a sociologist brings his research to life on film. *The Global Edition of the New York Times: International Herald Tribune*, Monday, July 11, 2011, 1.

Halkier, B., Jensen, I. (2011), Methodological challenges in using practice theory in consumption research. Examples from a study on nutritional contestations of food consumption. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 11 (1), 101-123.

Halkier, B., Katz-Gerro, T., Martens, L. (2011), Applying practice theory to the study of consumption: Theoretical and methodological considerations. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 11 (1), 3-13.

Hammond, G. B. (2001), Frankfurt School. In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Postmodernism*. (Eds.) Taylor, V. E., Winuist, C. E., 136-137, Routledge: London, U.K.

Harper, D. (1988), Visual Sociology: Expanding the Sociological Vision. *The American Sociologist*, 19 (1), 54-70.

Hastrup, K. (1992), Anthropological Visions: Some notes on visual and textual authority. In *Film as Ethnography*, (Eds.) Crawford, P. I., Turton, D., 8-25, Manchester University Press: Manchester, U.K.

Heath, T. B. (1992), The Reconciliation of Humanism and Positivism in the Practice of Consumer Research: A View from the Trenches. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 20 (2), 107-118.

Heaton, J., Groves, J. (2005), *Introducing: Wittgenstein*. Icon Books: Royston, U.K.

Heisley, D. D., Levy, S. J. (1991), Autodriving: A Photoelicitation Technique. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 18 (3), 257-272.

Henry, P., Caldwell, M. (2007), Headbanging as Resistance or Refuge: A Cathartic Account. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 10 (2), 159-174.

Hermans, H. J. M. (1996), Voicing the Self: From Information Processing to Dialogical Interchange. *Psychological Bulletin*, 119 (1), 31-50.

Hetrick, W. P., Lozada, H. R. (1994), Constructing the Critical Imagination: Comments and Necessary Diversions. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (3), 548-558.

Hietanen, J., Rokka, J., Roman, R. (2012), Pushing the Scene: Tensions and Emergence in an Accelerated Marketplace Culture, In *Advances in Consumer Research (39)*, Videography, Forthcoming.

Hietanen, J., Uotila, H., (2012), Post-Materialist Work: Dreams as Fetishes, In *Advances in Consumer Research (39)*, Videography, Forthcoming.

Hirschman, E. C. (1986), Humanistic Inquiry in Marketing Research: Philosophy, Method, and Criteria. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 23 (3), 237-249.

Holbrook, M. B. (1985), Why Business is Bad for Consumer Research: The Three Bears Revisited. In *Advances in Consumer Research (12)*, (Eds.) Hirschman, E. C., Holbrook, M. B., 145-156, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, USA.

Holbrook, M. B. (1987), From the Log of a Consumer Researcher: Reflections on the Odyssey. In *Advances in Consumer Research (14)*, (Eds.) Wallendorf, M., Anderson, P., 365-369, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, USA.

Holbrook, M. B. (2005), Customer value and autoethnography: subjective personal introspection and the meanings of photograph collection. *Journal of Business Research*, 58 (1), 45-61.

Holbrook, M. B., Grayson, M. W. (1986), The Semiology of Cinematic Consumption: Symbolic Consumer Behavior in Out of Africa. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 13 (3), 374-381.

Holbrook, M. B., O'Shaughnessy, J. (1988), On the Scientific Status of Consumer Research and the Need for an Interpretive Approach to Studying Consumption Behavior. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 15 (3), 398-402.

Holt, D. B. (1991), Rashomon Visits Consumer Behavior: An Interpretive Critique of Naturalistic Inquiry. In *Advances in Consumer Research (18)*, (Eds.) Holman, R. H., Solomon, M. R., 57-62, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, USA.

Holt, D. B. (1995), How Consumers Consume: A Typology of Consumption Practice. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 22 (1), 1-16.

Horkheimer, M., Adorno,T. W. (2002/1987), *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*. Trans. Jephcott, E., Stanford University Press: California, USA.

Hudson, L. A., Ozanne, J. L. (1988), Alternative Ways of Seeking Knowledge in Consumer Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 14 (4), 508-521.

Hughes, J. (2009), *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*. Athenaeum Press Ltd.: Gateshead, U.K.

Hunt, S. D. (1990), Truth in Marketing Theory and Research. *Journal of Marketing*, 54 (3), 1-15.

Hunt, S. D. (1991), Positivism and Paradigm Dominance in Consumer Research: Toward Critical Pluralism and Rapprochement. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 18 (1), 32-44.

Hunt, S. D. (1993), Objectivity in Marketing Theory and Research. *Journal of Marketing*, 57 (2), 76-91.

Hunt, S. D. (1994), On rethinking marketing: Our discipline, our practice, our methods. *European Journal of Marketing*, 28 (3), 13-25.

Hunt, S. D. (2004), For Truth and Realism in Management Research. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 14 (2), 127-138.

Jenkins, B. (2008), Fluxfilms in Three False Starts. In *Art and The Moving Image: A Critical Reader*, (Ed.) Leighton, T., 53-71, Tate Publishing: London, U.K.

Johnson, E. (2001), Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann. In *Routledge Encyclopedia of Postmodernism*. (Eds.) Taylor, V. E., Winuist, C. E., 427-428, Routledge: London, U.K.

Jones, K. (2006), A Biographic Researcher in Pursuit of an Aesthetic: The use of arts-based (re)presentations in "performative" dissemination of life stories. *Qualitative Sociology Review*, (2) 1, 66-84.

Jones, S. (1993), A Sense of Space: Virtual Reality, Authenticity and the Aural. *Critical Studies in Mass Communications*, 10 (3), 238-252.

Joseph, B. W., 'My Mind is Split Open': Andy Warhol's Exploding Plastic Inevitable. In *Art and The Moving Image: A Critical Reader*, (Ed.) Leighton, T., 92-111, Tate Publishing: London, U.K.

Joy, A., Sherry, J. F. (2003), Speaking of Art as Embodied Imagination: A Multisensory Approach to Understanding Aesthetic Experience. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 30 (2), 259-282.

Kavanagh, D. (1994), Hunt versus Anderson: Round 16. *European Journal of Marketing*, 28 (3), 26-41.

Kimura, J., Belk, R. W. (2005), Christmas in Japan: Globalization Versus Localization. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 8 (3), 325-338.

Kirsch, S., Mitchell, D. (2004), The Nature of Things: Dead Labor, Nonhuman Actors, and the Persistence of Marxism. *Antipode*, 36 (4), 687-705.

Kjeldgaard, D., Ostberg, J. (2007), Coffee Grounds and the Global Cup: Glocal Consumer Culture in Scandinavia. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 10 (2), 175-187.

Kozinets, R. V. (2001), Utopian Enterprise: Articulating the Meanings of Star Trek's Culture of Consumption. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 28 (1), 67-88.

Kozinets, R. V. (2002a), The Field Behind of the Screen: Using Netnography for Marketing Research in Online Communities. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 39 (1), 61-72.

Kozinets, R. V. (2002b), Can Consumers Escape the Market? Emancipatory Illuminations from Burning Man. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 29 (1), 20-38.

Kozinets, R. V. (2009), *Netnography: Doing Ethnographic Research Online*. Sage: Thousand Oaks, USA.

Kozinets, R. V., Belk, R. W. (2006), Camcorder Society: Quality Videography in Consumer and Marketing Research. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Marketing*. (Ed.) Belk, R.W., 335-344, Edward Elgar: U.K.

Kozinets, R. V., Sherry, J. F., Deberry-Spence, B., Duhachek, A., Nuttavuthisit, K., Storm, D. (2002), Themed flagship stores in the new millennium: theory, practice, prospects. *Journal of Retailing*, 78 (1), 17-29.

Kuhn, T. S. (1996/1962), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, USA.

Law, J., Urry, J. (2004), Enacting the social. *Economy and Society*, 33 (3), 390-410.

Leighton, T. (2008), Introduction. In *Art and The Moving Image: A Critical Reader*, (Ed.) Leighton, T., 7-40, Tate Publishing: London, U.K.

Lemke, J. L. (2007), Video Epistemology In-and-Outside the Box: Traversing Attentional Spaces. In *Video Research in the Learning Sciences*. (Eds.) Goldman-Segall, R., Pea, R., Erdbaum: Mahwah, USA.

Levin, M. (1991), The Reification-Realism-Positivism Controversy in Macromarketing: A Philosopher's View. *Journal of Macromarketing*, 11 (1), 57-65.

Levy, S. J. (1981), Interpreting Consumer Mythology: A Structural Approach to Consumer Behavior. *Journal of Marketing*, 45 (3), 49-61.

Levy, S. J. (2006), History of qualitative research methods in marketing. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Marketing*. (Ed.) Belk, R.W., 3-16, Edward Elgar: U.K.

Lincoln, Y. S., Guba, E. (1985), *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Sage Publications: Beverly Hills, USA.

MacDougall, D. (2001), Renewing ethnographic film: Is digital video changing the genre? *Anthropology Today*, 17 (3), 15-21.

Magaudda, P. (2011), When materiality 'bites back': Digital music consumption practices in the age of dematerialization. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 11 (1), 15-36.

Marcus, G. E., Fischer, M. M. J. (1986), *Anthropology as a Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, USA.

Marcoux, J-S., Legoux, R. (2005), Ground Zero: A Contested Market. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 8 (3), 241-259.

Marks, L. U. (2000), *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses*. Duke University Press: Durham, USA.

Martin, D. M. (2006), Reporting ethnographic research: bringing segments to life through movie making and metaphor. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Marketing*. (Ed.) Belk, R.W., 361-370, Edward Elgar: U.K.

Massumi, B. (2002), Introduction: Like a Thought, In *A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari*, (Ed.) Massumi, B., xii-xxxix, Routledge: New York, USA.

McLarney, C., Chung, E. (1999), Post-materialism's "silent revolution" in consumer research. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, 17 (6), 288-297.

Metz, C. (1980), Aural Objects. *Yale French Studies*. 60 (Cinema/Sound), 24-32.

Meyer, A. D. (1982), Adapting Environmental Jolts. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 27 (4), 515-537.

Mick, D. G. (1986), Consumer Research and Semiotics: Exploring the Morphology of Signs, Symbols, and Significance. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 13 (2), 196-213.

Monieson, D. D. (1989), Intellectualization in Macromarketing Revisited: A Reply to Hunt. *Journal of Macromarketing*, 9 (2), 11-16.

Murray, J. B., Ozanne, J. L. (1991), The Critical Imagination: Emancipatory Interests in Consumer Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 18 (2), 129-144.

Murray, J. B., Ozanne, J. L., Shapiro, J. M. (1994), Revitalizing the Critical Imagination: Unleashing the Crouched Tiger. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (3), 559-565.

Nichols, B. (1991), *Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary*. Indiana University Press: Bloomington, USA.

Pels, D., Hetherington, K., Vandenberghe, F. (2002), The Status of the Object: Performances, Meditations, and Techniques. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19 (5/6), 1-21.

Peñaloza, L. (1994), Atravesando Fronteras/Border Crossings: A Critical Ethnographic Exploration of the Consumer Acculturation of Mexican Immigrants. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (1), 32-54

Peñaloza, L. (1998), Just Doing It: A Visual Ethnographic Study of Spectacular Consumption Behavior as Nike Town. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 2 (4), 337-400.

Peñaloza, L., Cayla, J. (2006), Writing pictures/taking fieldnotes: towards a more visual and material consumer research. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Marketing*. (Ed.) Belk, R.W., 279-290, Edward Elgar: U.K.

Peñaloza, L., Venkatesh, A. (2006), Further evolving the new dominant logic of marketing: from services to the social construction of markets. *Marketing Theory*, 6 (3), 299-316.

Pink, S. (2001), More visualising, more methodologies: on video, reflexivity and qualitative research. *The Sociological Review*, 49 (4), 586-599.

Pink, S. (2006), *The Future of Visual Anthropology: Engaging the Senses*. Routledge: London, U.K.

Pisters, P. (2003), *The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory*. Stanford University Press: California, USA.

Raichle, M. E. (2010), The Brain's Dark Energy. *Scientific Americ*an, 302 (3), 28-33.

Ranciére, J. (2009), *The Emancipated Spectator*. Verso: London, U.K.

Reckwitz, A. (2002a), Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Cultural Theorizing. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5 (2), 243-263.

Reckwitz, A. (2002b), The Status of the "Material" in Theories of Culture: From "Social Structure" to "Artefacts". *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 32 (2), 195-217.

Richardson, L. (2000), Evaluating ethnography. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 6 (2), 253-255.

Rinallo, D., Borghini, S., Golfetto, F. (2010), Exploring visitor experiences at trade shows. *Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing*, 25 (4), 249-258

Rokka, J., Hietanen, J., De Valk, K. (2010), Brothers in Paint: A Practice Oriented Inquiry into a Tribal Marketplace Culture. In *Advances in*

Consumer Research (37), (Eds.) Campbell, M.C., Inman, J., Pieters, R., Association for Consumer Research: Duluth, USA.

Rorty, R. (2009/1979), *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, USA.

Ruby, J. (2000), *Picturing Culture: Explorations of Film and Anthropology*. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, USA.

Russell, C. (1999), *Experimental Ethnography: The Work of Film in the Age of the Video*. Duke University Press: Durham, USA.

Santiago-Irizarry, V., Gleach, F. W. (2007a), Ethnographic Video in Consumer Research: Fulfilling the Promise? In *Doing Anthropology in Consumer Research*, (Eds.) Sunderland, P. L., Denny, R. M., 249-278, Left Coast Press: Walnut Creek, USA.

Santiago-Irizarry, V., Gleach, F. W. (2007b), Reflexivity and Visual Media: Entanglements as a Productive Field. In *Doing Anthropology in Consumer Research*, (Eds.) Sunderland, P. L., Denny, R. M., 205-209, Left Coast Press: Walnut Creek, USA.

Sardar, Z., Van Loon, B. (2004), *Introducing: Cultural Studies*. Icon Books: Cambridge, U.K.

Schatzki, T. R. (1996), *Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K.

Schatzki, T. R. (2001), Introduction: Practice Theory. In *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, (Eds.) Schatzki, T. R., Knorr Cetina, K., Von Savigny, E., 1-14, Routledge: New York, USA.

Schatzki, T. R. (2002), *The site of the social: a philosophical account of the constitution of social life and change*. The Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania, USA.

Schatzki, T. R. (2010), *The Timespace of Human Activity: On Performance, Society, and History as Indeterminate Teleological Events*. Lexington Books: New York, USA.

Schatzki, T. R., Knorr-Cetina, K., Von Savigny, E. (2001), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*. Routledge: New York.

Schau, H. J., Muñiz, A. M., Arnould, E. J. (2009), How Brand Community Practices Create Value. *Journal Marketing*, 73 (5), 30-51.

Schouten, J. W. (1998), When a Rose is Eros: A Demianagramatical Study of Brand Names. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 2 (4), 337-465.

Schouten, J. W., McAlexander, J. H. (1995), Subcultures of Consumption: An Ethnography of the New Bikers. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 22 (1), 43-61.

Schwandt, T. A. (2000), Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry: Interpretivism, Hermeneutics and Social Constructionism. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, (Eds.) Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S., 189-213, Sage: Thousand Oaks, USA.

Schwarz, O. (2009), Good Young Nostalgia: Camera phones and technologies of self among Israeli youths. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 9 (3), 348-376.

Shankar, A., Patterson, M. (2001), Interpreting the Past, Writing the Future. *Journal of Marketing Management*, 17 (5/6), 481-501.

Sherry J. F. (1987), Keeping the Monkeys away from the Typewriters: An Anthropologist's View of the Consumer Behavior Odyssey. In *Advances in Consumer Research (14)*, (Eds.) Wallendorf, M., Anderson, P., 370-373, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, USA.

Sherry, J. F. (2006), Fielding ethnographic teams: strategy, implementation and evaluation. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Marketing*, (Ed.) Belk, R. W., 268-276, Edward Elgar: U.K.

Sherry, J. F. (2008), The Ethnographer's Apprentice: Trying Consumer Culture from Outside In. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 80 (1), 85-95.

Sherry, J. F., Camargo, E. G. (1987), "May Your Life Be Marvelous:" English Language Labelling and the Semiotics of Japanese Promotion. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 14 (2), 174-188.

Sherry, J. F., Schouten, J. W. (2002), A Role for Poetry in Consumer Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 29 (2), 218-234.

Shove, E., Pantzar, M. (2005), Consumers, Producers and Practices. Understanding the invention and reinvention of Nordic walking. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 5 (1), 43-64.

Siegel, H. (1988), Relativism for Consumer Research (Comments for Anderson). *Journal of Consumer Research*, 15 (1), 129-132.

Smith, D. W. (1997), Introduction: "A life of Pure Immanence": Deleuze's "Critique et Clinique" Project. In *Essays on the Critical and Clinical*. Trans. Smith, D. W., Greco, M. A., Deleuze, G. (1993/1997), xi-lii, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, USA.

Smith, S., Fisher, D., Cole, S. J. (2007), The Lived Meanings of Fanaticism: Understanding the Complex Role of Labels and Categories in Defining the Self in Consumer Culture. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 10 (2), 77-94.

Smithee, A. (1997), Kotler is dead! *European Journal of Marketing*, 31 (3/4), 317-325.

Spanjaard, D., Freeman, L. (2007), Tread Softly: Using Videography to Capture Shopping Behaviour. In *Asia-Pacific Advances in Consumer Research (7)*, (Eds.) Craig-Lees, M., Davis, T., Gregory, G., 26-29, Association for Consumer Research: Sydney, Australia.

Spencer, L. (2001), Postmodernism, Modernity, and the Tradition of Dissent. In *Routledge Companion to Postmodernism*. (Ed.) Sim, S., 158-169, Routledge: New York, USA.

Sperschneider, W., Bagger, K. (2003), Ethnographic Fieldwork under Industrial Constraints: Toward Design-in Context. *International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction*, 15 (1), 41-50.

Spiggle, S. (1994), Analysis and Interpretation of Qualitative Data in Consumer Research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 21 (3), 491-503.

Stern, B. B. (1993), Feminist Literary Criticism and the Deconstruction of Ads: A Postmodern View of Advertising and Consumer Responses. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 19 (4), 556-566

Stern, B. B. (1996a), Deconstructive Strategy and Consumer Research: Concepts and Illustrative Exemplar. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 23 (2), 136-147.

Stern, B. B. (1996b), Textual Analysis in Advertising Research: Construction and Deconstruction of Meanings. *Journal of Advertising*, 25 (3), 61-73.

Stern, B. B. (1998), Deconstructing consumption text: A strategy for reading the (re)constructed consumer. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 1 (4), 361-392.

Sunderland, P. L. Entering entertainment: creating consumer documentaries for corporate clients. In *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods in Marketing*. (Ed.) Belk, R.W., 371-383, Edward Elgar: U.K.

Sutton, D. (2010), Immanent Images: Photography after Mobility. In *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*. (Ed.) Rodowick, D. N., 307-325, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, USA.

Tadajewski, M. (2010), Critical marketing studies: logical empiricism, 'critical performativity' and marketing practice. *Marketing Theory*, 10 (2), 210-222.

Tapp, A. (2007), Physics envy. *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, 25 (3), 229-231.

Thompson, C. J. (1990), Eureka! And Other Tests of Significance: A New Look at Evaluating Interpretative Research. In *Advances in Consumer Research (17)*, (Eds.) Goldberg, M. E., Gorn, G., Pollay, R. W., 25-30, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, USA.

Thompson, C. J. (1997), Interpreting Consumers: A Hermeneutical Framework for Deriving Insights from the Texts of Consumers' Consumption Stories. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 34 (4), 438-455.

Thompson, C. J., Haytko, D. L. (1997), Speaking of Fashion: Consumers' Uses of Fashion Discourses and the Appropriation of Countervailing Cultural Meanings. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 24 (1), 15-42.

Thompson, C. J., Locander, W. B., Pollio, H. R. (1989), Putting Consumer Experience Back into Consumer Research: The Philosophy and Method of Existential-Phenomenology. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 16 (2), 133-146.

Thrift, N. (2008), *Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect*. Routledge: London, U.K.

Üstüner, T., Holt, D. B. (2007), Dominated consumer acculturation: The social construction of poor migrant women's consumer identity projects in a Turkish squatter. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 34 (1), 41-56.

Van Maanen, J. (1995), Style as Theory. *Organization Science*, 6 (1), 133-143.

Vargo, S. L., Lusch, R. F. (2004), Evolving to a New Dominant Logic for Marketing. *Journal of Marketing*, 68 (1), 1-17.

Vargo, S. L., Lusch, R. F. (2006), Service-dominant logic: reactions, reflections and refinements. *Marketing Theory*, 6 (3), 281-288.

Varman, R., Vikas, R. M. (2007), Freedom and Consumption: Toward Conceptualizing Systematic Constraints for Subaltern Consumers in a Capitalist Society. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 10 (2), 117-131.

Vikas, R. M., Varman, R. (2007), Erasing Futures: Ethics of Marketing an Intoxicant to Homeless Children. *Consumption, Markets & Culture*, 10 (2), 189-202.

Visconti, L. M. (2010), Ethnographic Case Study (ECS): Abductive modeling of ethnography and improving the relevance in business marketing research. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 39 (1), 25-39.

Wallendorf, M., Belk, R. W. (1989), Assessing trustworthiness in naturalistic consumer research. In *Special Volumes – Interpretive Consumer Research*, (Ed.) Hirschman, E. C., 69-84, Association for Consumer Research: Provo, USA.

Wallendorf, M., Brucks, M. (1993), Introspection in Consumer Research: Implementation and Implications. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 20 (3), 339-359.

Warde, A. (2005), Consumption and Theories of Practice. *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 5 (2), 131-153.

Williams, J. (2008), *Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense*. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, U.K.

Wittgenstein, L. (2009/1953), *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans: Asncombe, G. E. M., Hacker, P. M. S., Schulte, J., Blackwell Publishing Ltd.: Singapore, Hong Kong.

Ylirisku, S., Buur, J. (2007), *Designing with Video: Focusing the User-centered Design Process*. Springer-Verlag: London, U.K.

Zettl, H. (2008*), Sight, Sound, Motion: Applied Media Aesthetics*. Thomson Wadsworth: Belmont, USA.

Žižek, S. (1999), *The Ticlish Subject: The Abscent Center of Political Ontology*. Verso: New York, USA.

Žižek, S. (2006), *The Pervert's Guide to Cinema: Parts 1, 2, 3*. A Lone Star, Mischief Films, Amoeba Film Production.

Appendix 1

Examples of discussion threads on Internet discussion forums about our videographic projects:

Pushing the Scene (PTS)

Step Ahead forum (*http://stepahead.fi/*)
http://www.stepahead.fi/YaBB.pl?num=1321437057

Dubstep forum (*http://dubstepforum.com/*)
http://www.dubstepforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=224888&hilit=pushing

Brothers in Paint (BIP)

Paintball Nation forum (*http://pbnation.com/*)
http://www.pbnation.com/showthread.php?t=3332994

Appendix 2

To gain a more established footing on extant videographic work in CCT, I examined the videographic publications of the two *Consumption, Markets and Culture* Special DVD issues (Vol. 8, 2005; Vol. 10, 2007). Thus, I can provide a table summarizing the research as follows:

Context	Author(s)	Points of theoretical contribution	Use of video	CCT Domain	Marketing domain
Macintosh as a quasi-religious brand cult among avid users	Belk and Tumbat (2005)	Brand cults with an all-encompassing role in life - Consumerism in the form of sacred devotion with a secular focus	Video used exclusively for collecting interview data which was then transcribed	Marketplace Cultures + Mass-Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers' Interpretive Strategies	Brand communities
Background music as a bohemian romantic experience negotiated by musicians	Bradshaw, McDonaugh, Marshall and Bradshaw (2005)	Contemporary muzak as performance versus composition - Marginal-mainstream tension negotiated by artists who perform music for non-romantic commercial ends	No video, textual account accompanied by an audiotape to "enrich the listener's perception"	Consumer Identity Projects	Identity and consumption
Subcultural market resistance in tattooing practices from the perspective of tattoo artists	Bengtsson, Ostberg and Kjeldgaard (2005)	Marginal-mainstream tension between perceptions of sacred and profane - commercialization as the Other through which the marginal defines itself	Textual account as supplementary to the videography, video utilized in participant observation and the visualization of cultural symbols	Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects	Consumption cultures, Identity and consumption
Cross-cultural analysis of consumers' perceptions of ethical consumption and its influence on purchasing behavior	Belk, Devinney and Eckhardt (2005)	Disconnect of consumer rationale and behavior - Consumer perceptions of ethical importance influenced purchasing behavior to a limited extent	Video utilized to record in-depth interviews, video used to illustrate the results, text to provide a conceptual foundation	Marketplace Cultures + Mass-Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers' Interpretive Strategies	Consumption cultures, Consumer ethics, Business ethics
Tension in the changing socioeconomic status of women in a traditional Greek context through globalizing forces of tourism	Costa (2005)	The dynamic effect of tourism and the subsequent global materialist culture on traditional values and gender relations in a traditional culture - women assuming novel cultural roles	The nature of the video not explicitly addressed	Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects	Tourism, Identity and consumption, Gender studies
World holidays as global versus local culture	Kimura and Belk (2005)	Local adaptation and hybridization of global holiday discourses	Video utilized for contextual participant observation, videography contains extensive narration	Marketplace Cultures + Mass-Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers' Interpretive Strategies	Globalization of consumption

Context	Author(s)	Points of theoretical contribution	Use of video	CCT Domain	Marketing domain
Commercialization of perceived sacredness in the context of the 9/11 ground zero through selling of merchandize	Marcoux and Legoux (2005)	Commoditization of a place, social phenomenon transformed and reduced into commercial artifact	Videography as stand-alone academic publication, textual account problemitizes videography in academia - video used for interviews and participant observation, camera as "part of the action"	Marketplace cultures	Consumption cultures, Identity and consumption
Freedom and unfreedom of consumption in subaltern consumers	Vikas and Varman (2007)	Critique of capitalism regarding the mirage of freedom in consumption - requirement of resources in order to achieve freedom in global markets	Videography conducted to aid understanding by adding richness and depth. Video footage from interviews and participant observation in situ	The Sociohistoric Patterning of Consumption + Mass-Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers' Interpretive Strategies	Critical marketing
Global brands in local contexts, influence of global coffee culture in the Scandinavian marketplace	Kjeldgaard and Ostberg (2007)	Furthering the discourse of the glocalizing nature of MNC brands, local and global brands found co-existing without considerable tension.	Video as a supplement to other forms of ethnographic data gathering, used to record spatial settings only	Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects	Consumption cultures
Ritualistic consumption practices in the context of heavy metal music	Henry and Caldwell (2007)	Catharsis through collective rituals - facilitating emancipation from the mundane and moral justification through positive reevaluation of self	Video used occasionally in interviews and also for participant observation in situ	Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects	Consumption cultures
Practices of deviant consumer behavior in the context of homeless children	Varman and Vikas (2007)	A humanistic Kantian criticism of the utilitarian ethics of neoliberal markets	Video used exclusively for collecting interview data, thus capturing "rich temporal and non-verbal details"	The Sociohistoric Patterning of Consumption + Mass-Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers' Interpretive Strategies	Critical marketing
Life stories of informants related to domestic disorganization and clutter in a materialistic culture	Belk, Seo, Li (2007)	The deep symbolic meanings of attachment to possessions, the relationship with clutter and the notion of dirty are explored	The role of videography is not explicated	Consumer Identity Projects	Identity and consumption
Cross-cultural consumption related identity projects of 'contemporary young mainstream female achievers' (CYMFA)	Caldwell, Kleppe and Henry (2007)	Culture spanning inclination of CYMFAs incorporating multiple gender role identities in order to operate in various gender role domains	Vidography as a 'supplement' to text, yet providing broad accounts including interviews and participant observation in situ over several days.	Consumer Identity Projects	Identity and consumption, Gender studies

Context	Author(s)	Points of theoretical contribution	Use of video	CCT Domain	Marketing domain
Meaning-makings and individual justifications of fandom and fan culture in consumption	Smith, Fisher and Cole (2007)	The consumers' usage, acceptance and refusal of stigmatization in practices of fanatic consumption (fandom)	Video seen as a way of producing thicker first-person emic accounts in situ, making video superior in subsequent interpretative analysis.	Consumer Identity Projects	Identity and consumption

"He was too tough to experience disappointments and resentment – negative affections. In this nihilist fin-de-siècle, he was affirmation. Right through to illness and death. Why did I speak of him in the past? He laughed.
He is laughing. He is here. It's your sadness, idiot, he'd say"

Jean-François Lyotard on Deleuze's suicide in *Le Monde*

The production of videographies, conducting and presenting research on video, has with other critiques of representation, been gaining increasing recognition in consumer research, especially in the subfield of Consumer Culture Theory (CCT). Yet, its murky underlying layers have not received much attention. What could be an ontology and epistemology for video in CCT? How does experiencing video differ from other forms of academic expression (such as text)? Can you feel it? Are you moved by it? This study, in a bricolage fashion, fuses a Deleuzian poststructural ontology and his work on the philosophy of cinema, to ideas from practice theory, non-representational theory as well as experiential theories of the audiovisual moving image. The outcome is an emergent epistemology of indefinite relations, the eschewing of 'representation' as an underpinning to video work and a message of evocative hope for videography in CCT.

ISBN 978-952-60-4661-7
ISBN 978-952-60-4662-4 (pdf)
ISSN-L 1799-4934
ISSN 1799-4934
ISSN 1799-4942 (pdf)

Aalto University
School of Economics
Department of Marketing
www.aalto.fi

BUSINESS + ECONOMY

ART + DESIGN + ARCHITECTURE

SCIENCE + TECHNOLOGY

CROSSOVER

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

Aalto-DD 78/2012