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School of Business | Department of Economics | Economics | 2014
Thesis number: 13745
Corruption as a field of economics: Experimental approach and design
|Title:||Corruption as a field of economics: Experimental approach and design|
|Year:||2014 Language: eng|
|Department:||Department of Economics|
|Index terms:||taloustieteet; economic science; korruptio; corruption; lahjonta; bribery; etiikka; ethics; moraali; morals|
» hse_ethesis_13745.pdf size:1000 KB (1023371)
|Key terms:||Corruption, experimental economics, bribery, moral costs, field, laboratory, dictator game,; reciprocity, framing|
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:
This thesis has three main objectives. To provide a thorough review of the theoretical foundation of corruption in economics, introduce the methodologies and their main results and lastly design an economic corruption experiment addressing mechanics and importance of reciprocity for individuals in comparison to other moral costs of corruption.
Theoretical foundation reviewed in the thesis comprises of both theoretical and practical aspects of corruption. Theoretical part includes definitions and main categories of corruption while the practical part introduces the real world mechanics of corruption and the challenge they pose for development of a unified theory of corruption and anticorruption policies.
While this thesis introduces all five main approaches to corruption research in economics; perception indices, surveys, observation and lab and field experiments, special emphasis is placed on the latter two that comprise the experimental approaches of corruption research. The experimental approach is shown to have revolutionized an otherwise stagnant field of economics and holds great promise as a research tool for the notoriously difficult research subject of corruption.
This thesis provides a complete design, motivation and theoretical foundation for an experiment of the corrupting effects of reciprocity in bribery. As reciprocity is identified to be the key mechanic of bribery, this experiment intends to examine and value the effects of reciprocity on individual's decision making as a source of implicit bribery.
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