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Aalto University School of Business Master's Theses are now in the Aaltodoc publication archive (Aalto University institutional repository)
School of Business | Department of Economics | Economics | 2016
Thesis number: 14772
Use of Auctions in Spectrum Awards
Author: Jääskeläinen, Jan
Title: Use of Auctions in Spectrum Awards
Year: 2016  Language: eng
Department: Department of Economics
Academic subject: Economics
Index terms: taloustieteet; mobiilitekniikka; teleoperaattorit; kilpailu; huutokaupat
Pages: 68
Full text:
» hse_ethesis_14772.pdf pdf  size:681 KB (696552)
Key terms: spectrum awards; spectrum auctions; mechanism design; VCG mechanism; multi-unit auction; simultaneous ascending auction; combinatorial clock auction
Abstract:
In my thesis I explore how to best award spectrum licenses to mobile network operators. During the last twenty years governments have shifted their preferred method of awarding spectrum from comparative awards to auctions. The praised VCG mechanism does not apply well to auctioning spectrum and instead simultaneous multiple round auction, clock auction, and combinatorial clock auction models are used. These models have flaws causing bidders to lack an unambiguous dominant strategy and practice demand reduction. Each spectrum auction is different and there exists no one-size-fits-all solution. Thus, the auction design process carries tremendous weight when attempting to organize a successful spectrum award.
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