School of Business | Department of Economics | Economics | 2016
Thesis number: 14772
Use of Auctions in Spectrum Awards
| Author: | Jääskeläinen, Jan |
| Title: | Use of Auctions in Spectrum Awards |
| Year: | 2016 Language: eng |
| Department: | Department of Economics |
| Academic subject: | Economics |
| Index terms: | taloustieteet; mobiilitekniikka; teleoperaattorit; kilpailu; huutokaupat |
| Pages: | 68 |
| Full text: | |
| Key terms: | spectrum awards; spectrum auctions; mechanism design; VCG mechanism; multi-unit auction; simultaneous ascending auction; combinatorial clock auction |
| Abstract: |
In my thesis I explore how to best award spectrum licenses to mobile network operators. During the last twenty years governments have shifted their preferred method of awarding spectrum from comparative awards to auctions. The praised VCG mechanism does not apply well to auctioning spectrum and instead simultaneous multiple round auction, clock auction, and combinatorial clock auction models are used. These models have flaws causing bidders to lack an unambiguous dominant strategy and practice demand reduction. Each spectrum auction is different and there exists no one-size-fits-all solution. Thus, the auction design process carries tremendous weight when attempting to organize a successful spectrum award.
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