Aaltoyliopiston kauppakorkeakoulun gradujen tiedot nyt Aaltodocissa:
Aaltodocjulkaisuarkisto
Kauppakorkeakoulu  Taloustieteen laitos  Kansantaloustiede  2015
Tutkielman numero: 14013
A nested Stackelberg game between the government, a mining firm, and a travel resort: an application of bilevel programming
Tekijä:  Frantsev, Anton 
Otsikko:  A nested Stackelberg game between the government, a mining firm, and a travel resort: an application of bilevel programming 
Vuosi:  2015 Kieli: eng 
Laitos:  Taloustieteen laitos 
Aine:  Kansantaloustiede 
Asiasanat:  taloustieteet; economic science; peliteoria; game theory; päätöksenteko; decision making 
Sivumäärä:  70 
Avainsanat:  game theory; Stackelberg games; leaderfollower problem; bilevel optimization; multicriteria decision making 
Tiivistelmä: 
The classic example of a negative externality is that of an upstream paper mill polluting the water used by a downstream fishery. Though this example is simplistic, similar situations abound in real life. One realworld example of such a negative externality is the case where a mining facility negatively affects the operations of a nearby vacation resort. This particular situation is the object of analysis of this thesis. I consider the situation from the government's perspective, which faces a multicriteria decision making problem because it would like to keep both the mine and the resort operating simultaneously in order to maximize social welfare while at the same time trying to keep environmental damages to a minimum. This approach effectively makes the considered problem into a Stackelberg competition model, whereby the government acts as the leader by subjecting the firms to a certain level of pollution taxation, and the two firms  the mine and the resort  assume the roles of followers and adjust their operations accordingly. Furthermore, since the resort is directly and adversely affected by the mine's operations, the relationship between them can also be viewed as a Stackelberg model, and the problem becomes a trilevel optimization problem compared to the classic bilevel Stackelberg problems encountered in the literature. The closedform analytical solution to the problem is presented, which includes the formulations of the optimal taxation structures for the leader, the optimal operating levels of the followers, and the optimal profits of all parties involved. The relationships between the players are clearly illustrated by various graphs, and some shortcoming and worthwhile extensions of the model are also discussed.

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